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ABSTRACT 
 
Using the E. coli vaccine as a case study, this thesis examines the factors affecting the adoption 
of technologies with positive spillover (externality) effects related to food safety.  Positive 
spillovers occur when the benefits from a technological innovation extend beyond the firm 
(farm) adopting the technology or they do not flow to the adopter.  If there are insufficient 
incentives for the firm to adopt the new technology, adoption levels are sub-optimal, resulting in 
forgone benefits to society.  These benefits include the avoidance of potential health costs, 
productivity loss and premature death costs as a result to exposure to E. coli O157:H7.  
Therefore, if the market incentives to adopt the technology are strengthened, adoption levels of 
the technology could reach socially optimal levels resulting in an improvement in food safety.  
This has been the case in the Canadian cattle industry, where the uptake of the E. coli vaccine by 
cow-calf producers has been very low.  As such, a number of potential incentives to increase 
adoption of the vaccine were identified and assessed through a survey of cow-calf producers on 
the Prairies.  Data from the survey were analyzed using a stated preference methodology, Best-
Worst Scaling, and Latent Class cluster analysis.  A Binary Probit Model was also used to 
examine the factors affecting willingness to adopt the vaccine. 
The results suggest that a significant number of producers were not aware of the existence of the 
E. coli vaccine.  In addition, producers were most likely to be influenced in their adoption 
decisions by market/supply chain oriented incentives and government intervention incentives in 
the form of subsidies. On the other hand, incentives that were least likely to influence cow-calf 
producers’ decisions to adopt included government intervention through recommending use of 
vaccine and neighbours (other cow-calf producers) adopting the vaccine.  The Latent Class 
cluster analysis revealed the existence of three unique producer clusters with different attitudes 
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towards these incentives.  Several socio-demographic variables and individual characteristics 
utilized in the Probit analysis were found to be determinants of a producer’s willingness to adopt 
an E. coli vaccine.  The implications of this research are such that producer education and 
awareness campaigns may be utilized as tools for disseminating information on food safety 
technologies such as the E. coli vaccine.  Furthermore, the market/supply chain incentives may 
be used to form potential market-based solutions to address the current low adoption rates.  The 
existence of three unique producer clusters suggest that a one-size fits all strategy to encourage 
the adoption of the E. coli vaccine might be difficult to implement and thus a more targeted 
approach may be a feasible alternative.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
 
1.1. Problem Statement 
 
The beef industry, particularly in North America, has been experiencing major structural 
changes.  Food consumption that is more centered on the premise of healthy lifestyles, product 
safety, convenience and an assortment of other attributes related to food quality is becoming the 
norm.  In addition, the growing sophistication of consumers has also contributed to increased 
scrutiny of production practices which encourages changes in the organization and coordination 
of business transactions and relationships within the beef sector (Brocklebank et al. 2008).  
These changes have taken the form of more complex supply chains that must coordinate a 
variety of resources such as genetics, extensive grazing, precision feeding strategies, high tech 
processing, cold chain logistics and, a key aspect of this thesis, food safety protocols 
(Brocklebank et al. 2008).  
A widely publicized threat to food safety within the beef industry that has also shaped the 
transition to more complex supply chains has been the emergence of a bacteria based pathogen: 
E. coli O157:H7.  As recently as Fall 2012, the vulnerability of the beef sector in Canada was 
highlighted with problems of E. coli contamination at an Alberta-based processing plant (XL 
Foods) that resulted in the largest beef recall in Canadian history. Various food safety 
technologies and innovations are currently available in the market, including an E. coli vaccine 
(Econiche) for cattle, however, Canadian cattle producers have been slow to adopt this 
technology in large part due to the benefits of adoption flowing elsewhere within the supply 
chain, mainly to processors/packers, retailers and consumers.  The E. coli vaccine was designed 
with the intention of reducing the likelihood of cattle carrying the E. coli pathogen in their 
rumens, and also subsequently reducing the spread of this pathogen during the shedding process 
(excrement of fecal matter).  This pathogen is a naturally occurring bacterium within the rumen 
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and as such does not pose any harm or reduce the productivity of the cattle.  The sole benefit of 
the E. coli vaccine therefore is to reduce the potential for E. coli contamination of meat products.   
Using the E. coli vaccine as a case study, this project examines the factors affecting the adoption 
of technologies with positive spillover (externality) effects related to food safety.  Positive 
spillovers occur when the benefits from a technological innovation extend beyond the firm 
(farm) adopting the technology.  If there are insufficient incentives for the firm to adopt the new 
technology, adoption levels are sub-optimal, resulting in forgone benefits for society.  If the 
market incentives to adopt the technology were strengthened, adoption levels of the technology 
could reach socially optimal levels resulting in an improvement in food safety. 
1.2. Study Objectives 
 
There are four main objectives to this research: 
I. Examine the underlying economics of incentives to adopt socially beneficial technologies 
II. Explore the barriers that currently exist towards the adoption of the E. coli vaccine by 
cattle producers 
III. Examine whether incentives for adoption could be strengthened through closer supply 
chain coordination 
IV. Discuss the implications for policies to enhance adoption of socially beneficial 
technologies. 
This chapter is structured as follows.  First, background on the development of pre-harvest 
interventions and E. coli incidences in Canada are discussed.  Second, known foodborne illnesses 
resulting from various pathogens including E. coli are assessed with specific emphasis on their 
social and economic costs.  Then, a detailed background on a brand of an E. coli vaccine - 
Econiche is discussed.  Finally, an outline of the structure of the remainder of the thesis is 
provided.  
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1.3. Background 
1.3.1. Emergence of Pre-harvest Interventions and E. coli Outbreaks in Canada 
 
The E. coli O157:H7 bacterium occurs naturally within the intestines of cattle and other similar 
mammals, while the animals themselves are not affected (asymptomatic carriers).  E. coli 
contamination of food can occur in two major ways: first, through contamination of water 
irrigation supplies or ground water systems with manure run-off (which has been known to cause 
E. coli outbreaks in fresh salad and vegetable products as well as drinking water, as occurred in 
Walkerton, Ontario in 2000).  These can be categorized as environmental sources of the E. coli 
pathogen.  Second, E. coli contamination can also occur through cross-contamination from cattle 
hides to meat products or even raw milk as a result of shedding within a slaughter/dairy plant.   
In a recent consulting report to the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA), Regulatory 
Impacts, Alternatives and Strategies Incorporated noted that policy makers’ attempts to address 
the issue of E. coli incidences within the beef sector have thus far been concentrated at the 
processing level (RIAS, 2012).  The authors went on to state that this has been achieved through 
the introduction of a variety of measures that have been designed to prevent E. coli from coming 
into contact with meat and by sterilizing carcasses during the processing stages.  The CFIA’s 
mandate in food safety regulations includes verifying that federally inspected beef slaughter and 
processing plants are effectively managing E. coli O157:H7 risks at all the stages of production 
via an established required food safety control plan. Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points 
(HACCP)
1
 (CFIA, 2013).  CFIA inspectors are utilized in the field to make sure that the 
federally registered meat facilities are executing their identified critical control points in their 
everyday operations. 
                                                          
1
 Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP) is an approach to food safety that is 
systematic and preventive. It goes beyond inspecting finished food products. It helps to find, 
correct, and prevent hazards throughout the production process. HACCP involves the 
identification of physical, chemical, and biological hazards, the identification of critical control 
points for mitigating these hazards, and the documentation of the management of critical control 
points (CFIA, 2012). 
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Policies such as requiring HACCP have assisted in the reduction of the prevalence of E. coli 
pathogen contamination within the Canadian beef industry.  In Canada, mandatory adoption of 
HACCP occurred in 2005.  Moreover, federally-registered fish establishments are required to 
follow a HACCP plan under the Quality Management Program (QMP) (CFIA, 2012).  Although 
effective by most standards, and quite costly to processors/packers to implement, the incidence 
of E. coli outbreaks is still very much a reality, a costly one at that from both social and 
economic standpoints.  The XL Foods E. coli case (August 2012) is considered to be the largest 
beef recall in Canadian history, where despite the preventative measures stipulated, an E. coli 
outbreak occurred with 18 persons reported to have fallen ill from exposure to contaminated 
meat products.  D’Aliesio (2013) quotes the statistics on the final size of the recall at a market 
value of CAD $40 million.  An independent report on XL Foods Inc by Lewis et al. (2013) 
reached the conclusion that a “weak food safety culture” and “relaxed attitude” to safety protocol 
was behind the breach.  
Other E. coli outbreaks that have occurred in Canada include one as recently as October 2013, 
when an E. coli cheese related outbreak originating in British Columbia spread to Alberta, 
Quebec, Saskatchewan and Manitoba, prompting a recall. One person was reported dead and 20 
seriously ill due to the ingestion of cheese made from raw unpasteurized milk (Canadian 
Broadcasting Corporation News (CBC News), 2013).  In September 2004 an outbreak of E. coli 
associated with the consumption of beef donair occurred in Calgary, Alberta.  Currie et al. (2007) 
noted that the beef donair concept originates from the Middle East and is a mix of ground beef 
and spices (sourced locally) molded into a cone that has become popular in parts of Canada.  The 
authors went on to report that the Calgary Health Region received 12 reports of lab-confirmed E. 
coli infections with all these cases indicating that the victims ate at one of two locations of a 
local chain restaurant.  
In addition to the cases mentioned above, Canada’s worst ever E. coli contamination was 
environmental in nature occurring in Walkerton, Ontario in May 2000 as a result of run-off from 
a livestock farm into a nearby well, thus breaching the ground water supply.  According to the 
CBC News (2010) 2,300 people fell ill while 7 were reported dead after drinking contaminated 
water from their taps at home.  The E. coli vaccine is relevant in this case from the perspective 
that a reduction in the shedding of cattle has the potential to reduce the risk of environmental 
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contamination, thus reducing contamination of ground water systems, and by extension 
municipal water supplies and horticultural farming operations dependent on underground 
irrigation systems.  
While these remain isolated incidences, and the Canadian beef supply is generally considered 
very safe, the highlighted diverse incidences of E. coli contamination above serve as an indicator 
to industry stakeholders and also policy makers that more can be done beyond the slaughter and 
processing stages to prevent E. coli outbreaks.  Furthermore, these incidents impose costs on the 
beef sector as well as on society.  RIAS Inc. (2012) argue that, to date, policy makers have not 
specifically prioritized preventative pre-harvest interventions mainly because technologies such 
as the E. coli vaccine (Econiche) did not exist or were not commercially proven to be effective in 
arresting the E. coli pathogen.  Pre-harvest interventions thus may have a greater role to play in 
reducing these incidences of E. coli contamination in tandem with the currently ongoing efforts 
in place at the various stages of the beef production process.  As will be seen in the reviewed 
literature in section 2.2 of Chapter 2, pre-harvest interventions such as the E. coli vaccine have 
been proven to be efficacious in significantly reducing pathogens at the source, suggesting that 
they offer the potential to enhance the safety of the food supply system over and above existing 
post-harvest intervention methods. 
A number of potential interventions have been introduced in both the post-harvest and pre-
harvest stages of beef production as a means of addressing the E. coli pathogen.  These 
interventions range from the use of vaccines, microbial probiotics designed to exclude or reduce 
microbial pathogens within the digestive tract of livestock, to bio-security measures which 
involve systems that monitor, certify and quarantine herds or flocks to ensure the occurrence of 
potential diseases is substantially minimized. Other intervention technologies available to assist 
in reducing the risks of E. coli contamination at processing plants include: electron-beam 
processing; irradiation; ethylene gas processing and steam pasteurization.  Electron-beam 
processing utilizes high-energy electrons to kill germs; irradiation involves exposing food to a 
radioactive material, known as cobalt 60 to kill E. coli in the food, while ethylene gas processing 
involves food being placed in a room filled with the gas to kill any E. coli pathogens before 
being placed in another room to remove any leftover gas attached to the food (Teisl et al. 2001). 
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1.3.2. Foodborne Illness from Pathogens and its Social and Economic Costs 
 
Crutchfield et al. (2000) maintain that North Americans enjoy access to an abundant, diverse and 
a relatively inexpensive food supply made possible by the domestic agricultural sector and 
imports of various food items from abroad.  Nevertheless, the authors go on to suggest that 
despite the high level of safety of North America’s food supply in relation to many countries 
around the world, foodborne diseases caused by bacteria, parasites, viruses, and man-made 
chemicals remains a public health issue.   
The foodborne diseases caused by microbial pathogens are of interest in this thesis, particularly 
that of E. coli O157:H7.  Table 1.1 shows E. coli O157:H7 cases in the United States in 
comparison to other common sources of foodborne illnesses.  From the table it can be 
ascertained that the E. coli pathogen lies right in the middle of the pathogen spectrum with 
reported cases totaling 62,500 in 1998, with fewer hospitalizations and deaths in comparison to 
Campylobacter, Salmonella and Listeria.  It should be noted that comparable data for Canada 
proved to be difficult to find, however, information specifically on human E. coli incidences 
categorized by province was available, as can be seen in Table 1.2.  Furthermore, more recent 
complete data were unavailable. 
 
Table 1.1: Estimated Annual Extent of U.S. Foodborne Illness for Five Major Pathogens, 1998 
Source: Mead et al. 1999 
 
 
 
Pathogen Cases Hospitalizations Deaths Costs 
US($Billion) 
Campylobacter spp. 1,963,141 10,539 99 2.4 
Salmonella, non-
typhoidal 
1,341,873 15,609 553 2.2 
E. coli O157:H7 62,458 1,843 42 0.7 
E. coli, non-O157:H7 
STEC 
31,229 921 26 0.4 
Listeria 
monocytogenes 
2,493 2,299 499 2.6 
Total 3,513,694 3,513,694 1,604 8.3 
7 
 
Table 1.2: Incidence of Human VTEC
2
 cases in Canada per 100,000 population, 1995-2000 
Source: Grier and Schmidt (2009) 
Following from the cases presented in Table 1.1, specifically E. coli O157:H7, hospitalizations 
and in extreme cases death lead to social costs such as productivity loss.  These costs estimated 
in 1998 $Billions suggest that Listeria accounted for the majority of the costs to society, 
followed by Campylobacter, Salmonella and then E. coli O157:H7.  According to Sockett et al. 
(2014) in Table 1.3 citing Canadian data, the medical cost of a case of illness caused by E. coli 
can range from $9 per case to over $500,000 in the most severe cases that result in End-stage 
Renal Disease (ESRD). Premature death as a result of pathogen exposure carries a value of 
statistical life worth $ 7.1 million (2012 dollars).  Additionally, it was noted that the average 
number of work days lost can range from 0.25 for mild cases to 30 for severe cases with 
complications. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2
 Verocytotoxigenic 
Province/Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
British 
Columbia 
4.98 3.51 3.34 4.62 7.15 4.06 3.33 3.4 2.96 4.6 
Alberta 3.99 4.29 4.88 7.97 6.5 10.85 9.42 8.41 5.92 8.96 
Saskatchewan 5.03 3.04 3.54 3.73 2.96 4.27 6.2 4.42 n.a. n.a. 
Manitoba 14.08 9.17 6.78 7.56 6.74 7.58 5.21 6.4 7.06 4.87 
Ontario 5.42 4.24 3.79 3.55 3.24 14.65 3 3.23 3.69 2.49 
Quebec 4.72 4.15 5.09 5.18 6.17 7.35 4.54 3.51 1.78 2.04 
New 
Brunswick 
0.53 2.53 3.06 6.8 5.46 4.53 4.93 1.07 2.4 1.86 
PEI 5.95 7.37 5.88 8.1 10.27 6.59 12.44 20.45 6.56 4.35 
Nova Scotia 1.94 3.97 0.64 7.94 3.86 5.03 3.11 2.46 1.82 1.28 
Newfoundland 2.11 0.36 0.18 1.3 1.31 0.57 0.96 1.73 0.77 0.39 
Canada 5.05 4.14 4.08 4.84 4.96 9.81 4.3 3.96 3.35 3.36 
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Table 1.3: Medical, Productivity, and Premature Death Costs per Primary Illness caused by 
VTEC Infection 
Source: Sockett et al. (2014) adjusted for 2012 wages and inflation. Estimated average hourly wage: 
$23.84 (Statistics Canada, September 2012a); estimated daily rate: $ 178.80 (calculated as $23.84/hour * 
7.5 hours per day). 
 
The most common symptoms of E. coli O157:H7 according to Karch et al. (2005) are severe, 
acute hemorrhagic diarrhea and abdominal cramps on the milder side, where in most cases the 
illness subsides within five to ten days.  In addition, the authors note that the more serious 
consequences of the bacterium can also cause hemolytic uremic syndrome (HUS) that can result 
in kidney failure (ESRD); lifelong dialysis; organ transplants, and neurologic sequela.  E. coli 
O157:H7 therefore has a potentially costly impact on human health.   
The costs of an E. coli contamination also extend beyond the impacts on human health and 
include costs of product recall, damage to industry reputation and market access restrictions.  For 
example, the Fall 2012 E. coli contamination at XL foods led to exporters of Canadian beef not 
only losing market access but also to suffer, in the short run, a damaged reputation.  These 
effects were noted as far as Japan and Hong Kong, countries that imported beef products from 
XL Foods Inc. (Lewis et al. 2013).  According to Trust for America’s Health (2008) most food 
producers and food companies take safety issues very seriously and historically much of the 
innovation for improving food safety has come from within the food industry particularly at the 
post-slaughter level.  However, the organization goes on to note that food producers, processors 
and retailers operate in markets and allocate their resources in response to market pressures and 
Outcome Medical Cost Productivity Loss 
Mild Cases $9.56 $44.50 
Avg. missing days: 0.25 
Moderate Cases $128.25 $536.40 
Avg. missing days: 3 
Severe Cases $5,337.92 $1,251.60 
Avg. missing days: 7 
Hemolytic Uremic 
Syndrome  
$24,661.04 $2,324.40 
Avg. missing days: 13 
End Stage Renal Disease $534,652.42 $5,364.00 
Avg. missing days: 30 
Premature Death Value of Statistical Life: 
$7.1 million (2012 dollars) 
N/A 
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incentives, and thus far the pressure and incentives from the downstream players in the supply 
chain, mainly processors and consumers, do not appear to have been sufficient to push cattle 
producers to adopt the more effective pre-harvest innovations currently available in the market. 
In relation to the use of vaccines as a potential intervention method to reduce the E. coli 
bacterium, a focus area of this research, there exists an E. coli vaccine (Econiche) marketed and 
distributed by Bioniche Life Sciences Inc. that has been approved by the Canadian Food 
Inspection Agency (CFIA) while holding provisional licenses in the United States and special 
certificate system in some countries in the European Union, particularly the United Kingdom.  
Econiche has been available in Canada since 2008 and has been the focus of quite a number of 
studies in relation to its efficacy and effectiveness.  Smith et al. (2012), referencing a number of 
studies, suggests that the successful implementation of pre-harvest interventions, such as the E. 
coli vaccine in the cattle industry, require both efficacy and effectiveness to be demonstrated.  
Vogstad (2012) refers to efficacy as the ability of the intervention to decrease the likelihood of 
recovering Shigatoxigenic group of E. coli (STEC) O157 from live cattle, while effectiveness 
refers to the actual usefulness of the intervention in the beef production system.  The efficacy 
and effectiveness of a bovine E. coli vaccine product that utilizes three doses of type III secreted 
proteins was shown to reduce fecal populations of E. coli O157:H7 in live cattle anywhere from 
43% to 73% and 99% in relation to gut colonization according to Vogstad (2012).  Section 1.3.3 
provides more information on specific studies undertaken to ascertain the efficacy and 
effectiveness of the Econiche E. coli vaccine.     
Despite the presence of a fairly robust E. coli vaccine marketed as a pre-harvest control, its 
availability to the beef sector and the demonstration of the vaccine’s efficacy, the adoption rate 
of Econiche, currently estimated to be at 5%, has been minimal by any standard.  Canadian cattle 
producers have been hesitant to adopt this technology in large part because the benefits from the 
adoption of the vaccine flow elsewhere within the supply chain, particularly to the 
processors/packers and the consumers of beef products.  In addition to benefits flowing 
elsewhere, a potential adopter incurs costs of purchasing and administering the vaccine such as 
labour and veterinary costs. 
Given the credence nature of this food safety intervention, other costs that can be incurred 
include third party verification costs and identity preservation costs arising from distinguishing 
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one’s product from the generic products in the market.  The credence nature of food safety 
intervention creates information asymmetry within the supply chain as the vaccine adopter would 
have more information regarding his/her own intervention processes than the other stakeholders.  
The free-rider problem is also of concern if non-technology adopters benefit from the food safety 
enhancement created by adopters of the technology.  These issues are discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 3, theoretical considerations.  The development of the Econiche vaccine is discussed in 
more detail below. 
1.3.3. The development of the Econiche vaccine 
 
RIAS Inc. (2012) notes that the potential for an E. coli vaccine emerged several years ago when 
a laboratory at the University of British Columbia under the leadership of Dr. Brett Finlay made 
the discovery of how E. coli O157:H7 secrete proteins and how these proteins have the potential 
to adhere to intestinal cells as a receptor.  This discovery suggested the possibility that 
vaccination of cattle could reduce occurrences of human disease.  Dr. Finlay subsequently 
approached the University of Saskatchewan, specifically the Vaccine and Infectious Disease 
Organization (VIDO), to assist in making secreted proteins to immunize cows.  In-house 
experimental trials at the University of British Columbia showed evidence that vaccinating cattle 
proved to be an effective means in reducing E. coli shedding (RIAS, 2012).   
The innovative new vaccine (Econiche) was subsequently licensed by Bioniche Life Sciences 
Inc., an Ontario based company which commissioned studies involving thousands of cattle to 
demonstrate the efficacy of the proposed vaccine.  Guilbault (2011) reports that Econiche 
efficacy studies conducted under varying field conditions have been published in several peer-
reviewed scientific publications (Potter at al. 2004; Van Donkersgoed et al. 2005, and Smith et 
al. 2009) where collectively the data supported the widespread vaccination of cattle using 
Econiche to reduce the shedding of E. coli O157.  The author notes that it is important to take 
into account that the formulation of the product changed after the various trials prior to licensure.   
Guilbault (2011) goes on to state that these changes proved successful in subsequent trials where, 
under conditions of natural exposure, vaccinated cattle were 98.3% less likely to be colonized by 
E. coli.  This confirmed the efficacy of the vaccine to combat colonization as captured by 
11 
 
Peterson et al. (2007) and also the reduction of shedding and hide contamination as elucidated by 
Smith et al. (2009).  In addition to these natural exposure conditions, subsequent efficacy 
demonstrations dealt with cattle artificially exposed to E. coli which only further proved vaccine 
efficacy and thus assisted with the commercial licensure of Econiche by the CFIA (Allen et al., 
2011).   
The E. coli O157:H7 vaccine Econiche, the world’s first cattle vaccine to reduce the E. coli 
O157 pathogen threat, received full licensing approval in Canada in 2008.  It should be noted 
that in addition to the commercial approval in Canada, Econiche also received provisional 
approval in the U.S. in the same year (which is still the case currently) and is on a special 
certificate system across various countries in the European Union; it received an import permit 
from the Australian Quarantine Inspection Service in 2011.   
The vaccine cost has been reported to be approximately $3 per dose and has been authorized for 
use by the CFIA as a 3 dose regimen to be utilized at the pre-harvest (pre-slaughter level) by 
cattle producers at the cow-calf or feedlot stage (Grier and Schmidt, 2009).  The authors note 
that, consistent with existing vaccination practices, beef/dairy calves would receive 2 doses of 
Econiche within the first 12 months of life, and animals over 1 year are recommended to receive 
1 dose per year on an ongoing basis.  The vaccine was intended to be available to cattle and dairy 
producers through their veterinarians, who would either administer it themselves or supervise the 
vaccination process.  It should be noted that this thesis will only focus on the use of the E. coli 
vaccine in the beef sector while recognizing the fact that the vaccine is also applicable in the 
dairy industry, particularly on cull cows, an important source of beef. 
Various sources of funding were used to finance the development and commercialization of the 
vaccine.  Bioniche Life Sciences was granted a repayable loan in 2001 by Technology 
Partnerships Canada worth CAD $7.6 million for vaccine development and a CAD $5 million 
repayable contribution in 2007 from the federal government as support to scale-up vaccine 
production (RIAS Inc. 2012).  Unfortunately, for a variety of reasons outlined in this thesis, the 
vaccine has not been broadly adopted by farmers, as the E. coli pathogen does not cause disease 
in cattle.  The lack of financial incentives to incur this additional cost from the vaccine without 
any recoupment mechanisms in place has led to the market penetration of the vaccine to be 
estimated at 5% or less, according to Bioniche Life Sciences (Grier and Schmidt, 2009).    
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1.4. Outline 
 
This thesis is organized as follows.  First, Chapter 2 reviews, examines and assesses the literature 
surrounding the adoption of socially beneficial technologies with particular emphasis on the E. 
coli vaccine.  The literature takes into account the efficacy and effectiveness of the vaccine; risk 
factors associated with E. coli; the barriers, incentives and cost and benefits of pre-harvest 
intervention and finally, consumer willingness to pay for foodborne pathogen intervention 
technologies.  Following the literature review section, key theoretical considerations 
underpinning this thesis are discussed in Chapter 3 which shed light on the current trend of low 
adoption and serve as potential solutions: Market Failure; the Tragedy of the Anti-commons and 
Transaction Cost Economics.  Chapter 4 outlines the methodology used for a Canadian cow-calf 
producer survey evaluating incentives to adopt the E. coli vaccine.  Chapter 5 presents and 
analyzes the results of the cow-calf producer survey and discusses policy implications.  The final 
chapter presents the conclusions, limitations of the research, and suggestions for further research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
This thesis deals with the under-adoption of a socially beneficial technology using the example 
of an E. coli cattle vaccine.  Central to this thesis, therefore, is to assess the barriers that have 
hampered the adoption of the vaccine, as well as the incentives that could be instituted to 
increase adoption rates, and inform government and industry policy.   
In order for adoption rates to reach socially optimal levels, an assessment of the barriers to 
adoption and the possible incentives is critical as these key components define the policy 
implications for the beef sector.  This section presents economic literature relating to the barriers 
to adoption, the possible motivating factors that can change the current trend of non-adoption 
and the methodological techniques that have been used previously to model the adoption of 
socially beneficial technologies particularly the E. coli vaccine.  The chapter is organized as 
follows: first the literature on simulation models and effectiveness of pre-harvest interventions is 
assessed, followed by the risk factors associated with E. coli.  This is followed by the barriers, 
incentives and costs and benefits of pre-harvest interventions.  Literature examining willingness 
to pay for foodborne pathogen technologies is explored, and finally an overall assessment of the 
reviewed literature is provided. 
2.2. Simulation Models and Effectiveness of Pre-harvest Interventions 
 
This section reviews literature on the efficacy of pre-harvest interventions, particularly the E. 
coli vaccine, in terms of its impact on the reduction of occurrences of pathogens through tackling 
the source.  Jordan et al. (1999), using a stochastic simulation model, assessed the benefit of 
measures implemented in the pre-slaughter period to reduce the contamination of beef carcasses 
with shiga-like-toxin producing Escherichia coli O157:H7.  The base scenario adopted was that 
of an abattoir processing approximately 1,000 head of lot-fed cattle per day.  The control 
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measures that were utilized by the researchers in the simulation included some that were 
hypothetical in nature so as to assist with the planning of research priorities.  The measures 
included were based on either: the reduction in herd level prevalence of infection, reduction in 
opportunity for cross-contamination in the processing plant by re-ordering of the slaughter 
queue, reduction of concentration of E. coli O157 in fresh faeces, or a reduction in the amount of 
faeces, mud and bedding transferred from the hide to the carcass.  The authors noted that 
uncertainty over input assumptions was dealt with by allowing input parameters to be expressed 
as probability distributions.    
The results of the simulations suggest that out of all the pre-slaughter measures, vaccinations 
paired with an agent that reduces the shedding of E. coli O157 in faeces proved to have the 
greatest potential impact.  Furthermore, it was noted that the rapid testing of all animals in the lot 
may be of some benefit in tackling E. coli, however knowledge of herd-test results obtained via 
testing a sample of animals can only provide a slight advantage in pre-harvest control programs.  
Another key finding from the simulation, according to Jordan et al. (1999), was that under most 
scenarios, there existed ample opportunities for cross-contamination to occur within the slaughter 
plant as a consequence of the early entry of cattle contaminated with E. coli O157.   
Using the same stochastic simulation model, Signorini and Tarabla (2010) assessed the effects of 
measures implemented in the agri-food-chain in Argentina to reduce the contamination of ground 
beef with verocytotoxigenic (VTEC)
3
.  The authors made use of an already existing published 
risk assessment model developed in Argentina as the baseline scenario for their study.  Similar to 
Jordan et al. (1999), the authors employed control measures including a reduction in herd 
prevalence of infection as a result of vaccination, reduction in the opportunity for cross-
contamination in slaughterhouses by the introduction of an on-line-hide wash cabinet, and finally 
the control of storage temperatures in slaughterhouses, in retail stores and in consumer 
households.  
                                                          
3
 VTEC is a particular group of the bacterium Escherichia coli.  Although most strains of E. 
coli are harmless and live in the intestines of healthy humans and animals, VTEC strains produce 
a powerful toxin and can cause severe illness.  The most common member of this group of 
bacteria is E. coli O157:H7 (Crowley, 2011). 
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The simulations suggested that the greatest potential impact aimed at reducing VTEC prevalence 
and contamination in cattle hides in the initial stages of the agri-food-chain was associated with 
the hide wash cabinet and cattle vaccinations.  The authors noted that the control of storage 
temperatures was deemed not to be effective, particularly if cross-contamination of carcasses 
with the pathogen was not prevented or curtailed.  In addition to running the simulation with the 
above mentioned control measures, the authors also modelled the increase in feedlot production.  
The results showed that an increase in production (fattening) of cattle in feedlots has the 
potential to raise the risk exposure of VTEC infection and its sequelae.  In a special point of 
departure, the authors postulated that although the pre-slaughter measures can prove to be 
effective in the control of VTEC, its greatest benefits can be realized when the post-slaughter 
controls are highly effective at reducing microbial growth.  For example when the storage 
temperatures of ground beef in slaughterhouses, cutting and deboning, and retail and consumer 
households are under proper control.  
Vogstad (2012), using the same simulation approach as the studies above, modelled the efficacy 
and effectiveness of Shigatoxigenic Escherichia coli (STEC) O157 pre-harvest interventions on 
the premise that this pathogen is one of the leading causes of hemolytic uremic syndrome (HUS) 
in humans.  The results of the research indicated that days from administration of the last vaccine 
dose did not significantly modify the measure of vaccine efficacy for a 3-dose regimen of a Type 
III secreted protein vaccine (TTSP) product.  In relation to the usefulness of the vaccine, after 
5000 simulations, vaccination with a TTSP vaccine was found to reduce summertime pen 
prevalence distributions of STEC O157 to levels comparable to wintertime pen prevalence, with 
the major effect being the variability in fecal shedding prevalence.  
Hurd and Malladi (2012), in developing a stochastic model, took a slightly different approach 
from the other simulation studies in that the authors evaluated the impact of E. coli O157 
vaccination as the only control measure on key epidemiological outcomes in the United States.  
The focus of the model was on the reduction in the prevalence of O157 in feedlot cattle, as well 
as concentration in cattle faeces as a result of vaccination. The results of the simulation showed 
that vaccination can have a significant benefit with respect to certain relevant outcomes.  These 
outcomes included: (i) the number of human O157 illnesses due to consumption of ground beef, 
(ii) the number of production lots with high E. coli infection levels, (iii) the likelihood of 
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detection by U.S. Department of Agriculture Food Safety and Inspection Service, and (iv) the 
probability of multiple illnesses due to ground beef servings from the same lot.  Having 
established the literature on the efficacy and effectiveness of the E. coli cattle vaccine, the next 
section explores the risk factors associated with the pathogen. 
 
2.3. Risk Factors Associated with E. coli 
 
Synge et al. (2003) investigate the management factors that might play a role in influencing the 
shedding of verocytotoxigenic-producing Escherichia coli by beef cows in Scotland, where they 
noted unusually high rates of human E. coli infections.  The authors sampled at least thirty-two 
herds on a monthly basis over approximately a one year time period for the collection of fresh 
pat samples and information on management factors.  In similar style to the previous studies 
mentioned above, the faecal pat samples were tested for VTEC by established culture and 
immunomagnetic separation methods.  Questionnaires were utilized during the monthly visits to 
farms to collect and record relevant management factors; this data was analyzed from both the 
univariate and multi-factor generalized least squares mixed model perspective.  
The results of the study indicated that changes in the number of cows in a group, the presence of 
dogs and wild geese within the farm environment, housing arrangements and the feeding of draff 
(distillers’ grains) proved to be statistically significant as risk factors in influencing the shedding 
of E. coli.  The authors suggest that the event of calving appeared to reduce the likelihood of 
shedding, while any effects of weaning were not considered to be statistically significant.  
Rugbjerg et al. (2003) performed a risk factor study on eight dairy herds found to excrete VTEC 
in Denmark previously used in a prevalence study.  Similar to Synge et al. (2003) the authors 
attempted to tease out the associations between excretion of VTEC O157 and management 
factors.  Factors such as housing and feeding were analyzed using a general least squares mixed 
model as in Synge et al. (2003); the authors stratified the animals in three age groups which were 
sampled four times during a one year time period.   
The results of the study revealed that the risk of excreting VTEC O157 was higher amongst 
weaned cows than non-weaned cows, which proved contrary to the results of Synge et al. (2003) 
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who found this particular variable not to be statistically significant.  The researchers reported that 
calves aged 1-4 months showed a significant risk reduction if the calf had suckled colostrum 
from its mother or stayed for 2 days or greater with its mother after calving, similar to the 
significant result recorded by Synge et al. (2003).  In addition, the authors noted that calves 5-24 
months that had been moved within the last 2 weeks had a higher risk of exposure; however, this 
risk was averted if they were fed barley silage, unlike cows fed grain or molasses which recorded 
a higher risk of shedding VTEC O157. 
A study by Nielsen et al. (2002) was designed with a two-fold objective in mind: to determine 
the prevalence of VTEC O157 in Danish dairy herds and to investigate the relationship dynamics 
between the shedding of E. coli and a number of animal and herd characteristics.  Sixty dairy 
farms were visited by the researchers once between the months of August – October, where 
faecal samples collected from each herd upward of 50 animals were analyzed for VTEC using 
similar methods to the studies above: enrichment, immunomagnetic separation, and plating on 
selective agar.  
The results indicated that a strong effect of age was apparent with 2-6 month old calves as the 
high risk age group in contrast to calves < 2 months and cows.  Moreover, a tendency of bull 
calves to have a higher prevalence than heifers within the age group of 2-6 months was found 
although not significant.  It was also discovered and deemed significant that more of the herds 
characterised by having relatively many bull calves or many animals brought into the herd were 
positive for VTEC.  The authors noted that no influence of herd size or housing conditions was 
found, which is contrary to some of the studies reported earlier.   
Schouten et al. (2004) assessed the prevalence estimation and risk factors for E. coli on Dutch 
dairy farms.  In order to estimate the prevalence of E. coli O157 on Dutch dairy herds, the 
authors collected faecal samples from 658 randomly selected dairy farms from October 1996 – 
December 2000.  Similar to Synge et al. (2003) and Rugbjerg et al. (2003), a questionnaire was 
administered on the farm characteristics enabling the researchers to generate variables that could 
be analyzed to identify and quantify factors associated with the presence of E. coli O157.  The 
authors utilized a logistic regression with a sine function accounting for seasonality to analyze 
the variables obtained from the questionnaire to compare positive and negative herds. The results 
of the study suggested that the presence of at least one pig within the farm environment, the 
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purchase of animals within the last 2 years before sampling, the supply of corn to the cows and a 
herd in the year 1999 or 2000 compared to sampling done in 1998 were linked to the incidence 
of E. coli O157. 
In examining risk factors, Cernicchiaro et al. (2009) focused on identifying farm management 
factors associated with the prevalence of E. coli O157:H7 among cattle in Ontario beef cow-calf 
operations.  A total of 119 cow-calf operations in southern Ontario with at least 50 cows were 
visited between the months of June and December 2002.  The researchers also employed the use 
of a questionnaire to collect information on characteristics such as farm size, cattle 
demographics, farm management practices, the presence of other livestock and wildlife and other 
aspects of the farm environment.  A multivariable logistic model inclusive of random effects for 
farm and county was applied to determine the association between the prevalence of E. coli in 
cattle faeces and specified management factors.  
The results of the study indicated that the presence of pigs within the farm environment was 
strongly associated with the incidence of E. coli in fecal pat samples, similar to Schouten et al. 
(2004).  Furthermore, it was reported that the use of corn silage in winter was positively 
associated with the presence of E. coli in cattle faeces.  Fairbrother and Nadeao (2006) in putting 
this into context, suggested that the contamination of silage can occur pre-harvest following a 
run-off of contaminated water or even the spreading of manure as fertilizer; in post-harvest via 
contamination from birds, rodents and other mammalian faeces during storage.  Another risk 
factor encouraging the presence of E. coli that was identified to be significant by the researchers 
was that of taking cattle to shows.  It was noted that this factor may reflect the opportunity for 
cattle to be exposed either directly or indirectly to the excrement of other animals. 
Erdem and Rigby (2013) explore perceptions of a set of risks within a framework characterized 
by the level of control that rural (farmers) and urban respondents believe they have over the 
risks, and the level of worry the risks prompt.  The risks considered by the authors include a set 
of food risks, both recently emergent (e.g., cloned animals) and longer established (e.g., 
hormones).  In order to provide a broader context to their study, the authors follow the approach 
in Slovic (2010) and Sparks and Shepherd (1994) by including a number of non-food risks.  The 
survey method features Best-Worst Scaling (BWS) which is explained in more detail in chapter 
four.   
19 
 
In relation to survey design and data collection, Erdem and Rigby (2013) note that twenty risks 
were included in the BWS survey, with half concerning food hazards and the rest non-food 
hazards.  The experimental design comprised eight blocks (versions) of eight sets, with each set 
including five risks, where the number of risks included in each set was left to the determination 
of the researcher.  Paper-pen surveys were conducted in the United Kingdom in the summer of 
2009, where members of the general public in both urban (city of Manchester) and rural areas 
(agricultural shows) inclusive of farmers were sampled.  Total observations amounted to 280 
respondents, comprising 166 rural and 114 urban.  The authors use best worst scaling (BWS) to 
elicit the levels of control respondents believe they have over risks and the level of concern those 
risks prompt.   
The results of the study show that individuals have different perceptions of control and worry 
over the risks; gender has a significant effect on perceptions of control, but not on worry.  Males 
are found, on average, to believe that they have more control over risks than their female 
counterparts.  The authors state that among the food risks considered in the study, food 
pathogens are regarded to be the most worrying.  They believe this is attributed to recent 
outbreaks and subsequent media coverage that play an important role in forming such 
perceptions. Salmonella and E. coli in particular, are regarded as more worrying than all other 
food risks such as bovine spongiform encephalopathy, food allergies, genetically modified 
ingredients, and pesticide residues, or hormones or additives in food.  However, the authors note 
that people perceive E. coli slightly (6.8%) more worrying that salmonella.  
The literature reviewed in the above sections examined the efficacy and effectiveness of the E. 
coli cattle vaccine, and the risk factors that may be responsible for the incidences of 
contamination.  This information is useful in informing the design of the producer survey in 
terms of gauging cattle producers’ knowledge of the E. coli vaccine and use of management 
factors that could contribute to E. coli contamination, such as housing arrangements and the 
presence of other animals within the farm environment.  The following section examines the 
barriers, incentives, costs and benefits of pre-harvest interventions such as the E. coli vaccine. 
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2.4. Barriers, Incentives and Costs and Benefits of Pre-harvest Interventions 
 
Based on the literature above, the E. coli vaccine was determined to be a fairly efficacious pre-
harvest intervention capable of making a difference within the beef sector; the risk factors that 
can exacerbate the spread of the E. coli pathogen have also been well documented.  However, 
despite this progress, the adoption of the E. coli vaccine as a pre-harvest intervention has not 
received much attention from the Canadian beef sector.  This section presents literature 
examining the possible barriers that have made this the case, incentives/motivating factors that 
could be used to strengthen adoption incentives and previous cost and benefit analyses of the E. 
coli vaccine.  
Ellis-Iversen et al. (2010) examined the perceptions, circumstances (intrinsic and extrinsic 
barriers) and motivators that influence the implementation of zoonotic control programs on cattle 
farms.  The authors postulated that the implementation of disease control programs on farms 
requires an act of behavioural change.  Such a postulate led to the use of a social-ecological 
model adapted from public health to investigate, communicate and explain a cattle farmer’s 
decision-making process as it relates to zoonotic control.  This model proposed four main stages 
of behaviour change: no intent, intent, implemented control and sustained control.  Furthermore, 
it was noted that the model illustrates how intrinsic circumstances affect the intent to change 
behaviour as outlined by the Theory of planned behaviour (Azjen, 1985), and once this intent is 
obtained, how extrinsic factors influence the step from intent to action.  This leads to this action 
having to be maintained to provide the desired outcome of a reduction in disease (Ellis-Iversen et 
al., 2010).  
Field data from interviews conducted with 43 English and Welsh farmers were used in the study.  
An ordinal multivariable logistic regression was used to identify the motivators (private 
veterinarian, financial rewards or penalties, and consumer demand) associated with the different 
levels of implementation.  The results of the study indicated that none of the interviewed cattle 
farmers had implemented programs to control zoonosis, with less than 50% having an intention 
of doing so.  Moreover, the authors contended that the remaining farmers showed intent, but had 
not implemented any structured control program due to external barriers such as lack of 
knowledge. 
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The authors concluded that cattle farmers in general had positive attitudes towards controlling 
zoonosis on their farms and thus felt a responsibility to deliver safe products.  It was noted 
however, that intent was often stalled by lack of belief in self-efficacy
4
 and non-supportive social 
norms
5
 while farmers without intent felt that advice through their private veterinarian would be 
the most effective motivator for program implementation.  In addition, the results suggested that 
younger farmers and those with larger herds were more likely to place financial responsibility 
upon the industry rather than government.   
Herath and Henson (2006) investigated the barriers that prevent the adoption of the HACCP food 
safety management system by food processing firms in Ontario, Canada.  The objectives of this 
study were: to identify a set of barriers that prevent food processing firms from implementing 
HACCP; to quantify the seeming severity of these barriers; and to explore whether there are 
systematic categories of barriers that are comparatively more important than others.  The study 
used a survey focused mainly on quality assurance managers/owners operators in food 
processing plants.  Data was collected at the firm level with 134 food processing firms in Ontario 
receiving mailed questionnaires. The authors noted that the sample was stratified across three 
industries: (meat, dairy, and fruits and vegetables) and across 3 jurisdictional categories 
(federally registered, provincially licensed, and municipally inspected).  
Through the review of the literature and an analysis of the survey data, the authors identified a 
number of potential barriers to the implementation of HACCP.  The authors noted that 
respondents were asked to indicate the importance of each on a five-point scale from ‘very 
important’ (5) to ‘very unimportant’ (1).  The results of the study across the entire sample 
revealed the most important barriers were associated with finance, namely internal budgetary 
constraints, and problems obtaining external funding. Questionable appropriateness of the 
management techniques; scale of changes required to existing production practices and the 
                                                          
4
 Defined by the author as the perception of the ability to carry out behaviour change in order to 
obtain a desired outcome 
5
 Social norms derived from the perceived expectations of close contacts such as family, local 
community, faming/veterinary collaborators and industry partners. 
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overall scale of the changes being considered overwhelming were also found to be barriers to 
adoption of HACCP.   
The food economics literature identifies three elements that increase incentives for firms/farms to 
adopt enhanced food safety controls: (a) product liability laws, (b) food safety law and 
regulation, and (c) market forces (see e.g. Buzby, Frezen & Rasco, 2001; Loader and Hobbs, 
1999).  Below these incentives and cost and benefit analyses are examined from a broader 
perspective.  
Henson and Holt (2000) explored the incentives that motivate the adoption of food safety 
controls by businesses using a study of HACCP adoption in the UK dairy processing sector.  
Given that HACCP adoption in the UK dairy processing sector was made mandatory in May 
1995, the authors wanted to investigate what other motivating factors outside of legal 
requirements fueled the adoption of this food safety control.  In so doing, a mail survey was 
designed based on the existing literature on the implementation of HACCP and other quality 
management systems.  A total of 1,196 firms were surveyed, with 240 questionnaires were 
returned and 192 of those being usable.  
Using a factor analysis, Henson and Holt (2000) suggest that the decision by food manufacturers 
to adopt food safety controls is complex and is motivated by a number of public and private 
incentives either internal or external to the firm.  The study put forward that market-based 
incentives relating to wider effects of food safety controls and which can influence business 
performance are also important motives for the adoption of HACCP. These included: 
improvements in efficacy/profitability, reduced product wastage, reduced customer complaints, 
retaining existing customers and/or attracting new customers, and enhanced product quality.  
 From these results Henson and Holt (2000) were able to distinguish the relative importance of 
individual incentives in the adoption of HACCP.  The authors noted that these incentives clearly 
differed between firms, and subdivided firms into four categories according to their motivation 
for adopting HACCP: commercially driven; good practice driven; efficiency driven, and 
externally driven.  External requirements were found to be a key factor in motivating the 
adoption of HACCP among larger firms that produced private-label products for food retail 
chains and for businesses manufacturing branded specialty products.  Furthermore, the authors 
23 
 
find that such businesses tended to adopt HACCP earlier than others and prior to the introduction 
of the legal requirement.  On the other hand, efficiency was found to be an important motivating 
factor among businesses that produced generic products.  
Henson (2008) explores the role of public and private regulation in motivating the adoption of 
enhanced food safety controls by firms in agri-food supply chains.  The aim of his research is to 
provide an overview of the issues associated with public and private regulation and the related 
incentives to adopt enhanced food safety controls.  The author notes that while the stringency of 
public regulation has been enhanced, and increased emphasis put on management-based food 
safety standards, private regulation is playing a greater role in driving the adoption decisions of 
firms.  Furthermore, the author contends that firms face what he refers to as an inter-related 
series of incentives to implement enhanced food safety controls that reflect the blend of public 
and private regulations they face.  
Henson (2008) suggests that it is increasingly becoming difficult to distinguish between public 
and private institutional forms of food safety governance.  The author notes that these public and 
private standards are often inter-related, with the declaration of one dependent on how the other 
is evolving, while the traditional dichotomy between the “regulator” and “regulated” is breaking 
down.  The author notes that the challenge for policy-makers is to understand the incentives 
associated with public and private regulation and to harness these in a manner that steers firms to 
make desirable food safety investments from a social welfare perspective.  
In examining whether export orientation is a major incentive for the adoption of food safety 
systems among Turkish dried fig firms, Cobanoglu (2012) explores the hypothesis of whether 
this is a legitimate force behind export orientation. The author operates under the assumption that 
temporary and permanent employee numbers and the actual capacity of each firm could vary 
over a prolonged interval.  Data was gathered from 91 dried fig businesses located in Aydin, 
Turkey via face to face interviews during May – August 2010.  
The study uses a binomial logit model due to its simplicity and computational ease and estimates 
the model parameters using maximum-likelihood (Cobanoglu, 2012).  The results of the study 
support the hypothesis considering that most dried figs produced in Turkey are exported to EU 
countries.  Furthermore, these groups of countries (the EU) are also known to adhere to strict 
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food safety regulations coupled with low aflatoxin limits.  The majority of the firms thus 
appeared willing to implement these food safety practices fully.  The author concludes that this 
dynamism compels the fig firms to adopt the appropriate and desired food safety compliances 
and practices.  The parameters that were identified as influencing the decision to adopt included: 
contractual agreements with other firms; implementation of good practices by the dried fig 
farmers; export orientation and cost-benefit ratio (Cobanoglu, 2012).  The estimated marginal 
effect suggested that when dried fig farmers are export oriented the probability that these firms 
will adopt food safety systems increases by 39.5%.  
Cobanoglu (2012) introduced the idea of export orientation as an incentive for adoption of food 
safety controls.  The Canadian beef sector exports their beef products as far afield as Japan, 
Hong Kong and 18 other countries according to Lewis et al. (2013).    According to Statistics 
Canada (2006), more than one million head of live cattle were exported to the U.S. prior to the 
BSE outbreak. When this market closed the industry did not have the capacity to process these 
numbers and by the end of 2004 financial losses to cattle producers were estimated at $5.3 
billion.  South Korea, in similar stance to the U.S., placed a ban on Canadian beef following the 
BSE outbreak that lasted 8 years ending in January 2012, with industry estimates indicating 
Canadian beef exports to South Korea could total $30 million by 2015 (CBC News, 2012).  
These major export markets and other potential new ones make the author’s assertions about 
export orientation very relevant to this thesis.  This can translate to more secure export markets 
for Canadian producers who are willing to meet food safety driven market trends. 
A quantitative assessment of economic incentives for firms in the red meat and poultry sectors in 
Canada to adopt food safety controls and the potential impact of a number of firm and market-
specific characteristics on such behaviour is provided by Jayasinghe-Mudalige and Henson 
(2006).  Data for this study was elicited through a postal survey with a national sample of red 
meat and processing plants in August to December 2003.  The questionnaire included seventy-
two statements derived from in-depth interviews, including five indicators for each of the ten 
incentive constructs and twelve statements. A total of 279 questionnaires were returned, 
representing a response rate of 34.2%.  
The data were analyzed using the N-Vivo qualitative data analysis software which identified ten 
hypothetical distinct incentives based on the interview scripts.  These included: (1) financial 
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implications/cost; (2) impact on human resource efficiency; (3) impact on procedural efficiency; 
(4) “good practice”; (5) impact on sales, (6) impact on firm reputation; (7) commercial pressure; 
(8) existing government regulation; (9) anticipated government regulation, and (10) product 
liability laws.  The overall results suggest that the anticipated impact on sales and the reputation 
of firms are the predominant drivers behind the food safety responsiveness of plants in the 
Canadian red meat and poultry processing sector.  These results may indicate that firms are likely 
to be most responsive to the need to upgrade their food safety controls in the presence of 
potential gains in relation to increased market revenue.  Moreover, “good practice” was also 
found to be a strong motivating factor, suggesting that numerous firms implement food safety 
controls simply because they perceive it to be the right thing to do.  
In a theoretical study of traceability and liability incentives, Pouliot and Sumner (2008) explore 
in detail the relationship between traceability and the provision of food safety, where traceability 
facilitates the assignment of liability to individual firms for possible lapses in food safety.  In 
other words, traceability was proposed as a motivating factor in the adoption of food safety 
controls given the potential it may create for identifying the source of the lapse.  The authors set 
out to show how traceability can increase the supply of safe food via allocating liability using a 
two-stage marketing channel formal model with homogeneous farms that sell raw material to 
homogeneous marketers who sell food to consumers.  They argued that it is easy for firms to 
remain anonymous in the absence of traceability exposing the supply of safe food to the free-
rider problem.  With the lack of proper traceability mechanisms, the authors noted that liability 
incentives are severely dampened for upstream firms/farms due to the imperfect nature of 
information being transmitted through the marketing chain.  
Moreover, Pouliot and Sumner (2008) argue that the lack of traceability per se should be viewed 
as a problem not only for consumers but also for food firms within the supply chain as, without 
traceability, upstream firms are unable to transfer liability to their suppliers once a problem 
occurs at earlier stages.  The inverse also holds in that the increased traceability in the early 
stages of production can shift liability to upstream firms.  Liability costs and potential loss of 
reputation associated with publicized lawsuits can also create significant incentives for firms and 
farms in the supply of safer food leading to the reduction in societal costs of foodborne illnesses 
(Pouliot and Sumner, 2008).  The results suggest that downstream firms show greater potential 
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using traceability back to the farms in order to shift liability upstream and reduce the chance of 
food safety occurrences.    
Cost and benefit analyses have been carried out concerning the E. coli vaccine Econiche.  These 
types of assessments quantify the private and public costs and benefits arising from non-adoption 
or adoption of the vaccine.  Grier and Schmidt (2009), providing an updated version of the 2007 
George Morris Report submitted to Bioniche Life Sciences, endeavoured to determine the 
economic benefits of an E. coli O157 control program involving the immunization of Canadian 
cattle.  The authors argued that the E. coli pathogen has several negative impacts: sickness, 
death, industry costs and lost demand for specific food products.  The authors argue that 
Econiche can reduce E. coli O157 in cattle herds, the reduction or elimination of these problems 
can be viewed as the potential benefits of Econiche.  A cost/benefit analysis was used by the 
researchers to ascertain whether the benefits flowing from Econiche outweigh the costs accruing 
to the industry due to an Econiche vaccination program.   
In their analysis, the authors assumed a 100% utilization rate for the vaccination program for two 
major reasons: given the ultimate goal was to have the entire herd vaccinated, full costs of such 
an activity needed to be thoroughly taken into account.  Secondly, it was noted that the tabulated 
benefits were done under the assumption that E. coli has been mostly reduced from the available 
herd in Canada which is only possible if the majority of the animals are vaccinated.  According 
to Grier and Schmidt (2009) the cost/benefit analysis yielded an approximate cost/benefit ratio of 
3:1.  A summary of the benefits of the Econiche vaccination program totalled $103 million per 
year from the reduction or elimination of medical costs - $21 million; recalls and industry costs - 
$4 million, and loss in demand - $78 million. On the other hand, the cost of the Econiche 
vaccination program to the industry was estimated to be $35 million annually, which primarily 
depends on the number of doses to be administered and on herd numbers.   From this it was 
determined that the benefits of the product would exceed the annual estimated costs by $68 
million per year leading to the estimated cost/benefit ratio of 3:1.   
The literature reviewed in this section makes it clear that barriers to adoption exist with most 
food safety technologies, and to mitigate against such barriers, various regulatory or market 
incentives that can reverse the low adoption may be necessary.  Cost benefit analyses are useful 
in this context in painting the pros and cons of the technology and the intended method of 
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application. Such analyses have the potential to influence interested parties’ willingness to pay 
for foodborne pathogen intervention technologies, which is discussed in the next section. 
2.5. Willingness to Pay for Foodborne Pathogen Intervention Technologies 
 
Willingness to pay (WTP) studies, although in most cases hypothetical, allow for one to examine 
the socio-economic factors that drive the decisions of respondents toward a particular action. The 
review of such literature has the potential to inform the direction of this thesis.  A survey of 
Canadian cattle producers authorized by Bioniche Life Sciences and executed by Strategic 
Research Associates (2010) was created with the objective of understanding producer 
willingness to implement animal treatment on the farm to reduce public health risks.  
Furthermore, the study aimed to understand how strongly producers felt about participating in a 
national vaccination program under different scenarios.  The researchers conducted 771 
telephone interviews among a random sample of Canadian beef and dairy farmers.  The survey 
was divided into four major categories: awareness, information, willingness and attitudes 
towards paying.  The results of the survey, statistically significant within +/- 3.5 % revealed that 
75% of the producers were familiar with E. coli.  In addition, the majority of producers 
expressed price sensitivity regarding the cost of the vaccine.  The research firm also reported that 
87% of producers felt it was important to take action to prevent on-farm contamination of food 
products with E. coli.  
A large literature has emerged on consumers’ willingness to pay for food safety or food safety 
assurances. Most of these studies have evaluated WTP for food with stronger levels of food 
safety, but in an interesting departure, Mukhopadhaya et al. (2004) estimate consumers’ 
willingness to pay for a hypothetical vaccine that would protect a consumer against major 
foodborne pathogens.  Using contingent valuation (CV), the authors estimate WTP for protection 
over a variety of durations ranging from (1 year, 5 years, 10 years and lifetime protection) 
against Salmonella, E. coli or Listeria.  A further objective of the study was to assess the factors 
that impact the WTP responses elicited.  The data for the study was obtained from the U.S. 
Foodborne Diseases Active Surveillance Network (FoodNet) through randomly selected 
telephone interviews spanning 9 states over a 12 month period in 2002 yielding 5,293 
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observations. A combination of logit and Tobit models were used in the estimation of the 
economic benefits of food safety against the aforementioned foodborne pathogens.  
The results of the study indicated that consumers were not only willing to pay for protection 
against foodborne pathogens but pay more for a protracted protection.  Moreover, the 
respondents stated that they would pay more for safeguard against E. coli exposure in relation to 
Salmonella or Listeria; conversely, consumers were less willing to pay if the protection proved to 
be costly.  The factors affecting WTP included a respondent’s education, household income and 
whether they live in a rural or urban setting.  
Focusing on a food processing technology, Nayga et al. (2006) explored consumers’ willingness 
to pay for irradiated ground beef with survey respondents having been provided with information 
about the nature of food irradiation and what it entails.  Taking a different approach from 
previous studies, the authors estimated consumer WTP using a non-hypothetical experiment with 
actual products (irradiated ground beef), cash, and an actual exchange.  Data were collected at 
selected stores of a regional supermarket chain in Austin, Houston, San Antonio and Waco, 
Texas from March to June 2002.  The researchers further noted that instead of using an auction 
elicitation mechanism, a face-to-face WTP dichotomous choice field experiment provides a more 
familiar setting for consumers and thus yields more accurate estimates.  
Using the data gathered from the dichotomous choice experiments, the authors estimate 
consumer WTP for irradiated foods utilizing the traditional single bounded approach and the one 
& one-half bounded approach based on similar works of Cooper et al. (2002).  The results 
suggested that many individuals are willing to pay for foods that have undergone irradiation once 
they have been adequately informed about the nature of the technology and its capabilities in 
reducing the risk of foodborne illness.  In addition, WTP estimates indicated that respondents 
were willing to pay a premium of $0.77 for a pound of irradiated ground beef, which proved 
higher than the actual cost to irradiate the beef product (Nayga et al. 2006).  
According to Teisl and Roe (2010), governments often use cost-of-illness approaches to value 
reductions in morbidity.  However, the authors note that this approach has been criticized by 
economists as it has the tendency to undervalue the benefits accrued from a food safety 
improvement initiative.  With this context in mind, Teisl and Roe (2010) administered a national 
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survey to 3,511 adults in the U.S. including a hypothetical food-choice experiment in order to 
provide more accurate and wide-ranging measures of consumer WTP for food safety 
improvements.  The authors argued that their proposed approach was an improvement from 
previous evaluations of food safety improvements due to: (i) they provided the respondent with 
information regarding the promised change in the probability of pathogen exposure in retail food 
packages rather than changes in the probability of falling sick.  (ii) They elicited changes in 
respondents’ subjective probability of falling sick, and (iii) they elicited forecasted changes in 
the quantity demanded for products that have undergone food safety improvements.   
In the choice experiments the described product was either exposed to Listeria or E. coli; the 
food type used in the surveys was either hotdogs or hamburgers, while the process used to 
eliminate the pathogens was either electron beam (irradiation) or ethylene gas processing.  Given 
that the cost-of-illness approach fails to place value on key aspects of individual morbidity, such 
as pain, suffering, lost leisure time and worry, the inclusion of these aspects in the WTP estimate 
is a strength of this approach.  The results yielded large estimates commensurate with the 
expectations compared to existing estimates for improvements in food safety.  Furthermore, this 
result held true even when the authors adopted conservative assumptions at key stages of the 
estimation process.   
In addressing a void in the literature, Marette et al. (2012a) investigated consumer willingness to 
pay for food safety human vaccines and simulated the impact on social welfare resulting from 
the subsidization of consumer vaccines from two possible industry reactions.  These two industry 
reactions took the form of the status quo: maintenance of current food safety vigilance or 
reduced food safety vigilance as a result of a moral hazard
6
, which in this case is the use of 
vaccines by consumers.  The authors’ use of stated preference data, obtained from the FoodNet 
survey from U.S. residents over a 12 month period allowed for the estimation of consumer 
response to vaccines that would protect the individual from Salmonella, E. coli or Listeria across 
various time periods of protection (1 year, 5 years, 10 years, or lifetime protection) in similar 
style to Mukhopadhaya et al. (2004).  Unlike previous vaccine analyses, models of three distinct 
                                                          
6
 Moral hazard is defined in this context as the lapse of pathogen intervention standards by 
industry players due to the fact that consumers are protected from possible pathogens by the use 
of human pathogen vaccines. 
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aspects of a respondent’s decision-making process were captured using binary and Ordered 
Probit models: the choice of being vaccinated, the subjective estimate of the probability of 
contracting the illness, and finally the subjective assessment of the severity of illness.  
The results as reported by Marette et al. (2012a) showed a large consumer WTP if vaccines are 
reasonably inexpensive, while the existence of anticipated moral hazard has an upward effect on 
consumer WTP and their voluntary uptake of a vaccine.  In addition, the estimated vaccine price 
and probability of illness parameters confirmed a priori expectations of not only being 
significant but showing that respondents are much more likely to become vaccinated if they 
recognize that eating food will result in no illness after vaccination.  Similar to Mukhopadhaya et 
al. (2004) the researchers reported that individuals were more likely to purchase the vaccine if it 
controlled for E. coli as compared to Listeria or Salmonella. 
Building from the previous study, Marette et al. (2012b) explored the notion of the development 
of human vaccines as a means to combat the threat of foodborne pathogens by investigating how 
this introduction could alter consumer and producer behaviour in the food markets that are 
subject to these pathogens.  The authors built a partial-equilibrium model of the US beef sector 
that addresses this behaviour from the perspective of foodborne illness damages formed by E. 
coli contamination.  The model was calibrated using parameters from the previous econometric 
studies of the US beef sector and stated preference studies on the uptake for such innovations.  
From the calibrated model, three scenarios were simulated: the introduction of a vaccine; the 
tightening of pathogen standards for beef production; and lastly the concurrent introduction of 
both vaccinations and tighter standards.  The results of the simulation showed that all the 
proposed policies have the potential of increasing the aggregate surplus given most calibrated 
scenarios with the authors attributing the largest effects to the introduction of vaccines.  
Furthermore, such an intervention leaves a firm’s marginal beef production costs unchanged (or 
lower by taking moral hazard into consideration), which can stimulate beef demand amongst 
those protected.  However, those consumers who decide not to get vaccinated whether they are 
aware of the vaccine or not, experienced no change in expected damages (or a higher expectation 
of damages taking moral hazard into effect) but nonetheless faced a higher price of food due to 
the more robust beef demand from vaccinated consumers (Marette et al.  2012b). 
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2.6. Assessment of Reviewed Literature 
 
The literature reviewed above highlights the diversity of the works concerning socially beneficial 
technologies, with special emphasis placed on the E. coli vaccine cases.  From the literature, it is 
evident that these types of innovations have been proven to be efficacious and fairly effective as 
pre-emptive measures and strategies in combating the growth and spread of pathogens.  
Moreover, the WTP studies reveal that consumers are willing to pay in order to benefit from the 
use of these technologies which perhaps highlights future market possibilities.  The studies by 
Jordan et al. (1999) and Signorini and Tarabla (2009) confirm that vaccination as a mechanism 
of addressing pathogens such as E. coli is efficacious and effective, thus suggesting that there is a 
place for such innovations within the beef supply chain if the barriers and incentives can be 
adequately addressed.  
In relation to some of these barriers, Ellis-Iversen (2010) asserts that a significant portion of 
farmers had showed intent towards the adoption of a possible zoonotic vaccination program.  
However, the implementation of any such structured control program was curtailed due to the 
existence of external barriers such as lack of knowledge.  Other types of barriers may present 
themselves in the form of various costs that the industry might have to grapple with while 
attempting to determine the benefits of adoption of various socially beneficial technologies as 
expounded by Grier and Schmidt (2009) in their cost and benefit analysis.  In addition to the 
barriers mentioned above, Herath and Henson (2005) in assessing the adoption of HACCP 
systems identified the most important barriers as associated with financial constraints, 
questionable appropriateness of management techniques and the scale of changes required to 
existing production practices.   
To counter some of these barriers, the industry (private) or government (public) can provide 
relevant incentives to stimulate the adoption rates of innovations such as the E. coli vaccine so as 
to allow the public to benefit from increased food safety standards.  Henson (2008) raised the 
notion that private standards are playing a greater role in driving the adoption decisions of 
firms/farms.  Government intervention may not be necessary if the private sector is assertive 
enough to recognize the industry’s needs and align itself accordingly in a manner that steers 
firms/farms to make desirable food safety investments from a social welfare perspective.  This 
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alignment can involve the adoption of relevant socially beneficial technologies under the right 
stimulus.  Perhaps a way for the private sector to achieve this can be through the use of supply 
chain strategies such as branded beef programs where certain sought after attributes can be 
realized through supply agreements.  A good example of a branded beef program would be that 
of A&W and its recent better beef (hormone free) campaign, which is sourced from carefully 
selected supply chain participants (McKenna, 2013). Pouliot and Sumner (2008) suggest the use 
of enhanced traceability coupled with liability as having the potential of creating stronger 
incentives for adoption.   
The presence of incentives is however not a guarantee for adoption of these types of 
technologies.  As highlighted by Ellis-Iversen et al. (2010), barriers such as lack of economic 
pressure from either the government or industry, particularly from processors/packers and 
consumers can inhibit adoption.  The X-inefficiency concept can be used in this instance to 
capture the current under-investment by the beef supply chain participants.  The X-inefficiency 
concept suggests that there exists a positive relationship between external pressures on a firm and 
effort exerted by employees (Leibenstein, 1966) cited in Church and Ware (2000).  The absences 
of pressure from consumers to retailers, and in turn retailers to processors/packers, 
processors/packers to cattle producers may have contributed to the non-adoption of socially 
beneficial technologies such as the E. coli vaccine, in addition to the fundamental issues of 
spillover effects.  
Marette et al. (2012a) and (2012b), in assessing human vaccines as a means of combating 
foodborne pathogens, highlight the issue of the moral hazard problem that may present itself in 
the event that consumers are inoculated to protect them from various pathogens.  In other words 
moral hazard arises if other supply chain participants relax their efforts in terms of the 
preventative steps they take to reduce or eliminate E. coli because of the belief that since 
consumers are vaccinated the risk of foodborne illness is lowered. 
Roe (2004) refers to the above phenomenon as a lulling effect and continues to note that this 
effect is pertinent to foodborne illness whereby there is potential for bilateral damage: one 
agent’s effort affects the marginal effectiveness of the other agent’s efforts.  The author goes on 
to postulate that for most foodborne illnesses caused in the home setting, consumers have the 
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ability to alter damages by simultaneously changing their preventative efforts according to the 
industry’s preventative efforts.  
Taking the above in this study’s context, if cattle producers decide to adopt the E. coli vaccine as 
a pre-harvest intervention in the early stage, there is potential for a similar lulling effect 
occurring within the supply chain where the processor/packer eases their preventative efforts 
with the belief that the measures taken by the cattle producer are enough to compensate for the 
relaxation of standards and procedures in reducing the prevalence of E. coli in beef products.  In 
other words, if cattle producers perceive that others in the supply chain might do this then this 
may be yet another disincentive for them to vaccinate.  This perhaps highlights the fact that the 
reduction or elimination of such pathogens is going to take continuous effort at each stage of the 
supply chain by the various stakeholders.  Roe (2004) states that under such technologies, 
socially optimal prevention often requires one party to exert considerable effort while the other 
party exerts little effort, which explains the current dynamics within the Canadian beef supply 
chain regarding such preventative technologies.  This statement makes it even more relevant to 
examine the barriers, and particularly the incentives that can be put in place to bring equity for 
this considerable effort required by the one party.  
In similar style to some of the studies that have been highlighted in the reviewed literature, this 
study endeavours to investigate and explore the barriers that are currently proving to be a 
deterrent for Canadian beef producers in widely adopting socially beneficial technologies with 
particular emphasis on the E. coli vaccine.  These barriers will be made more apparent through 
the conceptual framework which follows.  Furthermore, incentives to adopt food safety controls, 
the main focus of this study, will also feature heavily as part of the investigation.  Following the 
examples of the literature, this thesis utilizes a producer survey to determine the potential 
effectiveness of various incentives to adopt an E. coli vaccine. It should be noted that in 
attempting to fill a gap in the literature, this research also intends to look at the possibility of 
closer forms of supply chain co-ordination as a potential of strengthening adoption. 
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CHAPTER 3 
3. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
Several theoretical frameworks can shed light on the low adoption rates of the E. coli vaccine 
and other technologies whose benefits spillover into different sectors or different stages of the 
supply chain, as well as potential solutions. These theoretical frameworks include: Market 
Failure; the Tragedy of the Anti-Commons, and Transaction Cost Economics (TCE). 
3.2. Market Failure 
 
The prospect of market failure, in this instance where private markets have failed to bring about 
the socially optimal allocation of resources, takes all of its three forms: public goods/externalities 
(positive) and information asymmetry.  
3.2.1. Public Goods/ Externalities 
 
As indicated in Chapter 1, the availability of the first ever E. coli vaccine to be sanctioned and 
approved in Canada and worldwide has proven not to have many takers within the Canadian beef 
industry.  A key reason is due to the vaccine possessing attributes (food safety benefit) that might 
deem it a public good.  Public goods are known to exhibit two major characteristics: that of non-
rivalry and non-exclusivity.  If a cattle producer decided to adopt the E. coli vaccine within the 
current supply chain structure, the producer will not be able to prevent other parties (free-riders) 
from benefiting from his/her positive spillover/externality of investment whilst still incurring the 
additional costs.  
The food safety benefit as a result of an E. coli vaccine exhibits the characteristics of a public 
good in the sense that the adopter cannot prevent everyone within the beef sector from obtaining 
this benefit (non-exclusivity); every industry player can use this benefit at the same time without 
inhibiting the utility of another (non-rival).  The benefit in this case is the reduced prevalence of 
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E. coli outbreaks in the beef industry that impact many beef producers (i.e. preventing the types 
of disruption to beef supply chains and market access that occurred in the XL Foods outbreak).   
The combination of the two characteristics results in a free-rider problem.  The free-rider 
problem makes the market very inefficient in supplying public goods.  A classic example is 
streetlights, where if one decides to invest in streetlights to improve one’s own safety and the 
neighbour receives the same benefit at no cost, this becomes a free-rider problem because they 
cannot exclude others from consuming the street lights.  
In the presence of public goods the Marginal Social Benefit (MSB) is greater than the Marginal 
Private Benefit (MPB). This reflects the current market situation in the Canadian beef sector 
where the MSB from vaccinating cattle from E. coli is greater than the MPB as there are 
unaccounted external benefits that accrue to other supply chain participants and to society at 
large as a result of vaccine adoption.  Therefore, in order for cattle producers to adopt such a 
technology to socially optimal levels, MPB will have to be equal to or greater than the MSB.  
The resulting deadweight loss (DWL) forgone to society can be addressed through various 
incentives which will be one of the primary focus areas of this research.  
Related to a public good is the concept of an externality.  McConnell et al. (2010) describes an 
externality as a cost (negative externality) or benefit (positive externality) accruing to an 
individual or a group, a third party that is external to a market transaction.  In this sense, a 
positive externality is a form of public good.  Externalities are benefits or costs from production 
or consumption accruing without compensation to non-buyers and non-sellers of a product.   
Figure 3.1 below shows the mechanics of a positive externality/spillover which leads to under-
production or under-allocation of a resource because the market demand, D (MPB) does not take 
into account the full benefit of the resource being produced.   McConnell et al. (2010) suggest 
that the market demand curve only reflects the direct private benefits to the producer but does not 
reflect the external benefits, the positive externalities that accumulate to every other party in Dt 
(MSB).  The outcome of this is that the equilibrium output Qe is less than the optimal output Qo 
thus in this instance the market fails to produce enough E. coli vaccinated cattle leading to a 
lower demand for the E. coli vaccine which translates to under-allocation for this resource and 
therefore loss in market efficiency as captured by the DWL.   
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Figure 3.1: Graph depicting the effect of a Positive Externality in the Market for Vaccine 
Source: McConnell et al. (2010) 
3.2.2. Information Asymmetry 
 
Another source of market failure results when market players have insufficient or inaccurate 
information and their cost of obtaining better information is prohibitive.  McConnell et al. (2010) 
state that asymmetric information is where unequal information is available to buyers or sellers 
about price, quality, or some other aspect/attribute of a good or service.  Complete information is 
necessary in the market in order for goods and services to be exchanged in an efficient manner.  
In the absence of such, insufficient or inaccurate information makes it difficult for the market to 
differentiate between trustworthy and untrustworthy sellers or buyers or high or low quality 
creating the classic market for lemons problem.   
In the case of the E. coli vaccine, it is quite difficult for market players to distinguish between 
cattle that have been vaccinated and ones that have not undergone this treatment.  To illustrate, 
suppose we have E. coli vaccinated cattle and non-vaccinated cattle misrepresented as vaccinated 
cattle available in the beef market.  When an E. coli outbreak creates a shock in the beef market, 
the market demand curve for the entire industry is affected; this is also inclusive of those cattle 
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producers who invested in the vaccine technology.  Consumers, and presumably also processors 
and retailers in such a scenario are unable to distinguish between the two products in the absence 
of quality verification and thus penalize both the trustworthy and the untrustworthy products by 
decreasing their consumption.  This is akin to a pooling equilibrium where both high quality and 
low quality goods are pooled, resulting in a reduction in demand due to quality uncertainty. 
 
 
                         
  
 
 
 
Figure 3. 2: Graph depicting the effect of Information Asymmetry in the Vaccinated Cattle 
Market 
 
Figure 3.2 shows the demand for vaccinated cattle by potential buyers in the presence of 
information asymmetry.  Given the difficulty in distinguishing between a lemon and a non-lemon 
as a result of the pooling effect mentioned above, the perceived quality uncertainty leads to the 
decrease in the demand of vaccinated cattle causing leftward shifts.  As a result of the decrease in 
demand for vaccinated cattle, cattle producers operating in vaccinated cattle operations may be 
skeptical of this market leading also to the drop in demand of the vaccine technology.  Overall, 
as long as there are potential E. coli shocks in the beef market and information asymmetry 
between buyers and sellers, the demand curve for vaccinated cattle will continue to shift leftward 
to the point where even a lower price of vaccinated cattle might not seem attractive to potential 
buyers (P = 0).  
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Figure 3.3 illustrates an alternative way of looking at the market failure problem as a result of 
information asymmetry. As a result of asymmetric information, the market under-provides 
vaccinated cattle due to quality uncertainty as consumers cannot tell the difference between a 
lemon and a quality product as captured by D
u
.  However, with the availability of full 
information, consumer demand could be higher as mechanisms would be in place to ascertain the 
authenticity of the vaccinated cattle as showed by the demand curve D
F. 
 In the absence of full 
information however, there is an inefficient allocation of resources leading to a deadweight loss.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 3. 3: Information Asymmetry and deadweight loss in the Vaccinated Cattle Market 
 
The ultimate result from these different forms of market failure is one and the same.  The logical 
response from producers regarding pre-harvest technology to aid in the reduction of E. coli in 
their cattle will be either under-investment or no investment at all.  This holds true for the free-
rider problem in the case of this technology that displays public good attributes, the positive 
externalities/spillovers that accrue to other parties, and lastly the classical conundrum of the 
market for lemons due to information asymmetry.  This under-investment results in market 
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failure which may warrant government intervention so as to correct the loss of efficiency within 
the market, provided that the benefits of intervention outweigh the costs.  
3.3. Tragedy of the Anti-Commons 
 
The theory of the Anti-Commons is premised on the notion that the right to exclude is greater 
than the right to use, thus leading to the under-utilization of a resource (Heller, 1997) and 
provides further insights into the underuse of the E. coli vaccine.  In order for the E. coli vaccine 
to be significantly integrated into the beef industry, a threshold level of adoption is needed.  In 
other words, in order for cattle producers who adopt the vaccine to benefit, other producers must 
also adopt the vaccine, otherwise incidences of E. coli contamination in the beef sector will not 
be lessened.  Currently the non-adopters of this technology far exceed those that are willing to 
adopt.  This follows from the three forms of market failure that were highlighted and discussed 
above.   
Buchanan & Yoon (2000) suggest that the Tragedy of Anti-commons be measured in terms of 
the non-realized economic value due to the under-use of a resource considering that the size of 
such forgone opportunity is proportional to the number of exclusion right holders
7
 involved.  The 
authors note that the key factor to take into account in this case is the inefficiency that is imposed 
by each exclusion right holder on the willing participants and thus on society in general.  Putting 
the above into the E. coli vaccine context, cow-calf operators that have currently chosen to 
enforce their exclusion rights by opting not to adopt the E. coli vaccine can be said to have 
capped the potential of those that are willing to adopt.  This has led to low levels of adoption of 
this food safety initiative and losses to society at large.  
Taking the explanation of Anti-Commons further, Parisi et al. (2003) suggest that this tragedy 
induces static (current) and dynamic externalities.  They note that static externalities result from 
the current exercise of the right of exclusion by one or more owners, which nullifies the value of 
similar rights to use held by others.  Furthermore, the authors suggest that dynamic externalities 
occur throughout time and are as a result of under-use of production assets in the present, bearing 
                                                          
7
 In the E. coli vaccine case, the exclusion right holders are those producers that are currently not 
willing to adopt. 
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consequences into the future in the form of penalties such as the XL Foods Inc. beef recall.  The 
implications of this are such that the continued under-use of production assets such as the E. coli 
vaccine have the potential of causing recurring E. coli incidences in the beef industry. 
Parisi et al. (2003), in their Anti-Commons argument, advocate that once a common resource (E. 
coli vaccine) is subject to multiple exclusion rights held by two or more individuals, the resource 
would not be utilized to its highest potential by these participants.  The authors go on to note that 
the existence of a cluster of single owners seeking to exert their individual exclusion rights will 
cause the overall initiative to fall short of the net social benefits of the asset in this case in terms 
of its impact on the food safety improvement.  This loss occurs simply because the multiple 
holders of exclusion rights do not fully internalize the cost created by the enforcement of their 
rights to exclude willing participants.  
To put the tragedy of the Anti-Commons into the threshold perspective, suppose a portion of 
Canadian cattle producers decided to adopt the vaccine technology.  After incorporating the 
technology as part of their pre-conditioning routine, the cattle are raised to slaughter weights in 
feedlots and eventually sold to packers.  However, if the feedlot/packer also accepts cattle from 
producers who have not vaccinated their cattle, the reduction in the risk of contamination 
through cattle that are super shedders
8
 is put in jeopardy.  Thus, a certain threshold of adopters is 
needed to generate the potential industry wide benefits that can be created by such a technology.  
Figure 3.4 below captures the Anti-Commons phenomenon from a cost perspective.  Due to the 
presence of market failures, the right to exclude for cattle producers who do not wish to adopt the 
vaccine technology is greater than that of those who wish to adopt.  Pictured in the graph, the 
marginal cost (MC) of a potential adopter increases relative to that of a non-adopter. This is due 
to identity preservation costs, third party certification costs, and search and information costs in 
arising from finding buyers interested in their vaccinated cattle.  Furthermore, negotiation costs 
arise from attempting to secure contractual agreements for supply of their cattle, and finally 
general production and administration costs related to the vaccine are incurred.  In the process of 
locating processors that can cater to their differentiated product, the aforementioned costs would 
be incurred as a means of distinguishing their products from unvaccinated cattle (the lemons 
                                                          
8
 Super shedders are cattle that exhibit higher levels of the E. coli bacterium in their rumens.   
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problem).  These higher differentiation and production costs therefore have the potential of 
pricing the cattle producer off the market (point a in Figure 3.4).   
Due to the various costs mentioned above, the price of the vaccinated cattle becomes very high 
relative to that of generic cattle to the point where potential buyers become uninterested.  It 
should be noted that the MC would continue to rise as long as the pooling problem is in effect.  
In other words, E. coli vaccinated cattle shares the same supply chain with conventional beef 
products causing the continuous leftward shift in the supply curve.  Linking the threshold 
perspective to that of the cost, once an optimal threshold is achieved, the aforementioned costs 
can be reversed back to equilibrium MC as shown in Figure 3.4.  In other words, the right to use 
will be greater than the right to exclude if a favourable threshold could be achieved thus 
impacting on costs positively and ultimately increasing the demand for vaccines. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 3. 4: Graph depicting the anti-commons phenomenon as it relates to cost 
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3.4. Transaction Cost Economics 
 
Further insights are provided by Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) which, unlike the 
Neoclassical Economics framework, recognizes that there are costs that arise from exchanges 
across a market.  Transaction costs arise between firms and affect the supply chain structures that 
emerge.  Transaction costs include the costs of information search, negotiation, monitoring and 
enforcement.  In the context of the E. coli vaccine, an adopter of the technology faces increased 
costs in relation to purchase and administration of vaccine; differentiation costs incurred as a 
result of preserving the identity of vaccinated cattle.  If vaccinated cattle are pooled with non-
vaccinated cattle in feedlots or by packers, the benefit of the cattle vaccine is reduced. The 
question thus arises whether packers will pay a premium for vaccinated cattle and the extent to 
which these cattle can be identified and segregated in beef supply chains.  Supply chain 
governance structures that allow a value to be placed on the reduced risk from vaccinated cattle 
are necessary before a premium for these cattle will emerge.  Closer forms of coordination such 
as through branded beef alliances or contracting may reduce the transaction costs of verifying 
vaccination programs. 
Brocklebank et al. (2008) postulate that a rise in information costs is inevitable when supply 
chain participants fail to determine the presence of a particular attribute and thus spend resources 
finding other reputable supply chain partners.  According to TCE, the governance structures that 
emerge are determined by the transaction costs facing buyers and sellers, thus as information 
costs increase due to the presence of credence attributes (vaccinated cattle), the cost of 
transacting through the spot market increases and supply chains are likely to become more 
closely coordinated.  For example, this may entail introduction of vaccination requirements as a 
production protocol within a contract as part of a branded beef program.  
The theoretical frameworks detailed above provide insights into the factors causing the low 
adoption rates of the E. coli vaccine and the potential changes to supply chain relationships that 
may be necessary to strengthen the market incentives for producers to adopt the vaccine.  The 
market failure concept identified the E. coli vaccine as having public good attributes and positive 
externalities related to its usage by producers.  Low rates of adoption are compounded by 
information asymmetry in distinguishing between vaccinated and non-vaccinated cattle in the 
absence of verification mechanisms.  These insights help identify current barriers and incentives 
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to adoption.  Overall, the market failure concepts will assist in addressing the first and second 
objectives of this thesis: 1) Examine the underlying economics of incentives to adopt socially 
beneficial technologies and 2) explore the barriers that currently exist towards the adoption of the 
E. coli vaccine.  The TCE framework allows for the third objective of this study to be realized by 
gleaning some insights into whether the incentives for adoption could be strengthened through 
closer forms of supply chain coordination, such as branded beef programs, as a means of 
rewarding the adopter of the technology by sharing the benefits from the technology adoption.  
The proposed methodology for addressing the study objectives is outlined in chapter 4.   
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CHAPTER 4 
 
4. METHODOLOGY 
4.1. Introduction 
 
Emerging from the previous chapters is the need to examine the incentives that might encourage 
the adoption of socially beneficial technologies such as an E. coli vaccine amongst Canadian 
cow-calf producers. The factors that can influence a cow-calf producer’s willingness to adopt are 
also of interest.  The literature review in Chapter 2 implies that, like any other technology, there 
exist barriers and risk factors even if the technology has been shown to be fairly efficacious.  
Adoption therefore is dependent on the right conditions being met as was explained in Chapter 3 
where various theories were used to shed some light on the challenges of adopting the E. coli 
vaccine.  A survey of Canadian cow-calf producers is undertaken to explore these issues.  This 
chapter explains the survey methodology, Best-Worst scaling (BWS) and other related 
approaches: Latent Class (LC) cluster analysis and the Binary and Ordered Probit model that are 
used to analyze the survey data. 
The survey was designed to explore key areas such as the awareness and attitudes of cow-calf 
producers regarding their adoption of an E. coli vaccine; the management practices/interventions 
currently being exercised within their operations; the barriers that can lead to non-adoption and, 
the heart of the survey, the relative strength of different incentives to encourage adoption.  The 
incentives and motivations are positioned as attributes in a stated preference experimental setting 
using BWS, rather than being examined using the typical method of asking respondents to rank 
the incentives in order of their importance (Likert-scale).  
This chapter is structured as follows.  First, an introduction to BWS and its application in a brief 
set of literature are discussed, followed by a description of scaling methods and BWS in sections 
4.3 and 4.4 respectively.  Section 4.5 introduces a conceptual framework and offers an empirical 
justification for BWS, followed by section 4.6 which describes the implementation of the BWS 
method and the design of the choice sets/tasks for the cow-calf producer survey used in this 
analysis.  Data and analysis of BWS choice tasks together with the method for identifying BWS 
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choice heterogeneity, are outlined in sections 4.7 and 4.8.  Finally, analytical methods used to 
assess producer willingness to adopt and the empirical model specification used to analyze the 
data are explained, along with details of the modeling approach.  
4.2. BWS Introduction 
 
The major purpose of this chapter is to introduce the method of BWS, its application and its 
potential advantages in relation to alternative methods of examining the adoption of an E. coli 
vaccine.  From the perspective of this study, the BWS approach is useful in examining the 
relative strength of various incentives for cow-calf producers to adopt an E. coli vaccine. It does 
so by probing the best (most influential) or the worst (least influential) among a set of incentives 
(attributes) presented in a series of repeated choice sets. 
 A relatively novel but sophisticated attribute-based method of stated preference, the BWS 
approach is used to examine the influence of a set of incentives in a way that would allow the 
greatest of discrimination through multiple sets of attribute trade-offs.  BWS is also effective at 
reducing any biases that have previously distorted the analysis of survey data, as will be 
discussed in the scaling methods section.   The best-worst scaling method has been used in a 
range of disciplines, particularly in health and consumer marketing, with relative success.  In 
addition, BWS in conjunction with Latent Class cluster analysis has also been used in various 
agri-food applications, as captured by the brief literature review below.  
Best-Worst Scaling is a stated preference based method that allows surveyed respondents to 
choose the “best” and “worst” attributes in a repeated number of choice sets, in this case, 
incentives to adopt a specified management technology.  These best and worst choices are 
subsequently counted according to a realizable scale that is dependent on the number of times 
each of the presented attributes appears in the total choice sets.  The count information is then 
transformed into BWS scores which signal the relative importance of each attribute presented in 
the available choice sets.  For more details on the calculation of the BWS score, see the 
analytical method sub-section 4.7.2.  Erdem and Rigby (2013) note that BWS is specifically used 
for ranking a large number of items with respect to their importance or preferability to 
individuals.  Sackett et al. (2013) on the other hand note that it requires survey respondents to 
choose the most important and least important attributes from a set of competing options 
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simultaneously; the major benefit to the researcher being the simplicity of analysis (Goodman et 
al., 2005).  
4.3. Scaling Methods 
 
According to Cohen (2009), one form of a rating scale is the Likert-type scales where subjects 
are typically asked to rate each attribute on a preference rating scale. The author notes that 
sometimes each response category is labeled and at times only the endpoints are indicated; 
descriptors such as (e.g. “important”, “not important”, “good” or “fair”) are often used to label 
scale categories.  Crask and Fox (1987) suggest that one issue regarding scaling methods is that 
survey respondents are not inclined to use the ratings provided in the same way across 
respondents, and thus, the meaning respondents tend to associate to categories influences the 
perceived distance between categories.  They note that the distance between four and five for one 
individual may be different to that of another individual.   
Goodman et al. (2005) posit that unless one alternative or attribute clearly dominates, it is rather 
difficult to identify the most important attribute or the most preferred product.  Thus, treatment 
of category ratings as equal interval scales has the potential to generate different conclusions 
than if they are treated as ordinal scales.  The authors note that oftentimes these differences are 
statistically significant and emphasize the difficulty of assessing whether the rating of 5.7 out 7 is 
meaningfully different from 5.1 out of 7.  A subsequent issue with respect to rating scales is that 
each attribute is frequently measured with a single item rating scale specifically developed just 
for that particular survey, thus the reliability and validity of the scale is unknown outside of that 
study sample.   
Finn and Louviere (1992) state that assessing attribute importance by rating scales is usually not 
measured relative to other attributes thus making such responses unable to provide adequate 
discrimination to help managers identify real priorities.  Following this, the relative importance 
of each attribute is then derived based on the averages determined across all respondents, thus, it 
is not possible to draw reliable conclusions concerning the importance of issues or attributes as 
there is no possibility for respondents to make trade-offs between the attributes (Cohen, 2009).   
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Another method used to evaluate the relative importance of attributes that warrants discussion is 
ranking.  This method requires respondents to rank attributes in terms of a specific characteristic, 
in this case, for example, ranking incentives for adoption of the E. coli vaccine by importance.  
Cohen (2009) notes that this task is considered relatively easy for respondents to complete if the 
number of attributes is small, however, as the number of attributes increases the task becomes 
exhausting for respondents.  The author goes on to state that the ranking task could be simplified 
further by using paired comparisons (developed by Thurstone, 1927) due to its ease of use and 
reliability.  In this method, respondents are asked to choose which is “more” important (the other 
being the “less” important) of the two items that are presented.  Assuming n items, Cohen (2009) 
suggests that the number of possible pairs would be n (n-1)/2, thus highlighting the disadvantage 
of the paired comparison: the number of pairs required to be judged rises as the number of items 
increases.  For example, for 10 items one would need 45 pairs to be compared, with 13 items we 
need 78 pairs and for 16 items the number of pairs would be 120 (Cohen, 2009).  
An effective way to overcome the exponential increase in the number of subsets is to divide the 
items in manageable subsets of three or four items each and ask the subject to order the items in 
each subset in terms of importance.  This has the opposite effect, as the number of items in each 
subset increases, the number of subsets decreases, for example, if one wants to compare 13 
attributes and use subsets of four items in each subset, only 13 subsets will be required if a 
balanced incomplete block design (BIBD) is incorporated (Cohen, 2009).  Rather than ranking 
four items in each choice set, one can choose the most preferred item (“best”) and the least 
preferred item (“worst”) making the BWS method an extension of the paired comparison.  Best-
worst scaling according to Goodman et al. 2005 (p.4) “models the cognitive process by which 
respondents identify the two items with the most and the least of a characteristic from designed 
subsets of three or more items.” Furthermore, the authors note that this method has several 
advantages that overcome the limitations of other methods of measurements such as rating-based 
methods as discussed above.  
Discrete choice experiments are also fairly common in the literature, where attributes are 
presented in various combinations and respondents are asked to make trade-offs between the 
choice sets.  Cohen (2009) notes that although this method allows preferences for new attributes 
and combinations to be assessed, a strength of the method, it has a number of disadvantages.  
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One of the disadvantages of discrete choice experiments is that the design and analysis is 
complex and requires the use of highly sophisticated computer software.  Moreover, another 
more serious limitation noted by Louviere and Street (2000) is the difficulty of interpreting the 
data including the inability to compare utilities across different experiments.  Best-worst scaling 
is therefore well placed to address some of the concerns experienced with other survey 
methodologies. 
The choice of BWS was informed by a review of alternative stated preference methodologies and 
an assessment of their relative strengths and limitations with respect to the research questions 
posed in this thesis.  According to Louviere et al. (2010) grey literature suggests that hundreds, if 
not thousands of research projects in varying forms of surveys have been carried out by 
academics and practitioners alike throughout the world with the intention of capturing people’s 
subjective views and opinions, attitudes and perceptions, and value systems.  The authors 
indicate that the majority of these surveys and research projects utilize rating scales, with a 
substantial majority having preference for methods such as paired comparisons or ranking 
(sorting, etc.), or “pick-any” methods to elicit data from individuals and groups about subjective 
quantities.  
 
The Best-Worst Scaling approach was developed by Louviere and Woodworth (1990) and first 
published in 1992 by Finn and Louviere.  Recent pertinent studies that have utilized the best-
worst scaling method include Erdem and Rigby (2013) who used BWS to elicit the levels of 
control respondents believe they have over risks and the level of concern those risks prompt.  
The surveyed sample comprised members of the general public, 166 from rural areas including 
farmers and 114 urban respondents.  Twenty risks were included as attributes in the BWS 
survey, with half concerning food hazards such as E. coli, Salmonella, additives and BSE while 
the rest covered non-food hazards such as being burgled, struck by lightning and climate change. 
The BWS approach was useful in this particular study as the authors sought to capture 
perceptions of control and concern over a variety of risks.  This elicitation method as noted by 
the authors is structured to allow a reduction in the cognitive burden typically associated with 
ranking large sets; the approach permits derivation of individual-level values or scores.  
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Cross et al. (2011) adapted the best-worst scaling method to elicit experts’ assessment of the 
relative practicality and effectiveness of measures to reduce human exposure to E. coli O157:H7.  
The authors examined a total of 30 interventions grouped into 12 sets, with each set containing 
five measures and the various combinations of the sets having been determined by an 
experimental design.  These attributes in the form of measures included: cattle vaccination, hand-
washing, usage of probiotics and the removal of high shedding animals prior to slaughter to 
mention but a few.  The use of BWS proved to be a powerful tool according to the authors as it 
broke down an otherwise cognitive demanding process into simple, repeated and manageable 
tasks.  Moreover, statistical analysis of the resulting data provided a scaled set of scores for the 
measures, as opposed to just a ranking.   
 
An example of a BWS study run concurrently with a LC cluster analysis is that of Umberger et 
al. (2014) who examined the relative importance of various buyer characteristics (attributes) to 
small potato farmers in Indonesia.  Examples of these attributes included: pays cash 
immediately, provides price premiums, established relationship, and always follows through on 
commitments to buy my product, to mention a few.  A Latent Class cluster analysis is used to 
explore whether producers’ utilities (preferences) for marketing channels are heterogeneous; the 
results of the study found existence of four unique classes/segments of producers.  Latent Class 
cluster analysis involves using cluster software to find differences in decision making patterns 
among respondent data and grouping respondents with similar patterns into unique 
classes/segments. 
 
Another method that is used to analyze other aspects of the cow-calf producer survey is the 
Binary and Ordered Probit models which are used to determine the factors that can affect a 
producer's willingness to adopt (WTA) an E. coli vaccine.  In the survey developed for this 
thesis, the question that was used to capture the WTA was presented in the form of an anchor: 
would you consider adopting an E. coli vaccine if presented with the right incentives? (See 
appendix: question 27 of survey for full details).  Presenting this question in anchor form created 
a variation of what the literature refers to as an anchored BWS.  This question would normally be 
asked after each of the presented choice sets as a means of capturing extra information from the 
respondent regarding the attributes presented within the choice sets. 
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4.4. Best -Worst Scaling 
 
Best-Worst Scaling takes three forms, divided into three main categories: BWS case 1, case 2 
and case 3.  Louviere et al. (2012) note that the frequent lack of clarification in a myriad of 
published articles as to which case is being used reflects the fact that different disciplines have 
tended to embrace different cases.  For this particular research, case 1 of the BWS was deemed 
to be appropriate to capturing the importance of various incentives for E. coli vaccine adoption.  
Case 1 BWS is considered to be suitable when the researcher is interested in the relative values 
associated with each item in a list objects (Louviere et al, 2012); see Table 4.1 below as an 
example.  Case 2, as noted by Adamsen et al. (2013) cited in (Potoglou et al. 2011, p.4), has 
primarily been used in valuation studies concerned with general population preferences, such as 
quality of life attributes.  The authors state that it is generally acknowledged that this approach is 
most appropriate when respondents have no experience with choice making in the particular area 
of investigation, therefore warranting profiles to be presented one at a time, contrary to case 3, as 
seen in Table 4.2.  Table 4.3 below shows multiple profiles that are utilized in case 3.  It should 
be noted that the emphasis here is not so much on the contents in the tables but on the structure 
and the presentation of information contained within the tables.   
Louviere et al. (2012), in explaining case 1, further suggest that the objects might take the form 
of brands, public policy goals, or any set of objects that can be meaningfully compared without 
the consideration of a level structure (e.g. colour as an attribute (object) with levels presented as: 
blue, green and orange).  Moreover, since there is no level structure to consider, case 1 designs 
are typically less complex (and less problematic) as compared to other stated preference survey 
methodologies, such as Discrete Choice Experiments (DCEs).  Adamsen et al. (2013) posit that 
the main differences between case 1 and the other BWS cases is that case 1 study objects (which 
might be an attribute or profile) are simply presented as stand-alone measures and evaluated as 
such, whereas in cases 2 and 3 studies attributes are bundled into a product or service as captured 
in Tables 4.2 and 4.3.  Furthermore, cases 2 and 3 focus on the different levels that an attribute 
may contain which are then presented in a bundled format so as to elicit responses from survey 
participants. 
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Table 4.1: An example of case 1 BWS (adapted from Flynn, 2010) 
 BWS Case 1 
Please consider you are out 
shopping and want to buy 
apples.  Tick which attribute is 
most and least important to 
you. 
 
Best/Most  Worst/Least 
 Production Method  
 Price  
 Packaging  
 Appearance  
 
Table 4.2: An example of case 2 BWS (adapted from Flynn, 2010) 
BWS Case 2 
Please consider you are out shopping and want 
to buy apples.  Tick which apple is most and 
least important to you. 
 
Apple 1 
Organic 
AU$8.99/kg 
Packaged 
B-grade 
Best     
Worst   
 
 
Please consider you are out shopping and want 
to buy apples.  Tick which apple is most and 
least important to you. 
 
Apple 2 
Conventional 
AU$6.99/kg 
Packaged 
A-grade 
Best     
Worst   
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Table 4.3: An example of case 3 BWS (adapted from Flynn, 2010) 
 BWS Case 3 
Please consider you are out 
shopping and want to buy 
apples.  Tick which apple is 
most and least important to 
you. 
 
Apple 1 Apple 2 Apple 3 
Organic 
AU$8.99/kg 
Packaged 
B-grade 
 
Conventional 
AU$6.99/kg 
Packaged 
A-grade 
Organic 
AU$7.99/kg 
Loose-weight 
A-grade 
Best Best Best 
Worst Worst Worst 
 
The BWS method assumes that there is some underlying subjective dimension, such as “degree 
of importance” or “degree of interest” and the researcher wishes to measure the location of some 
sets of objects along this dimension (Auger et al., 2004).  In this thesis, the underlying continuum 
is “degree of influence” and the objects are the various incentives that can potentially influence 
adoption of a socially beneficial technology (an E. coli vaccine). This method is commonly 
referred to as “maximum difference scaling” since the attributes chosen are designed to 
maximize the difference in utility realized by a respondent on an underlying scale of preference.  
In addition to the “best” information, the collection of the “worst” information ensures that BWS 
respondent’s choices of the top and bottom objects in a set, ceteris paribus, are more reliable and 
valid than choices of middle objects (adequate discrimination) (Louviere et al., 2013).   
Sackett et al. (2013) state that the measured level of importance from the best-worst data analysis 
is applied to a standardized ratio scale that determines the percentage difference in importance 
across attributes with more certainty.  Additionally, selection of best and worst items also 
provides sufficient information to calculate the preference scores of each survey respondent, 
allowing heterogeneity of responses for individual items to be assessed (Jones et al., 2013). 
Sackett et al. (2013) note that BWS is capable of addressing relative impacts on utility across 
attributes that customary discrete choice questions cannot, given the level of discrimination BWS 
allows through multiple trade-off opportunities.  The authors argue that for one to observe the 
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trade-off behaviour in a BWS model, the repetition of the specific attributes from a choice set of 
competing alternatives is necessary over a number of variable choice sets.  Following from this, 
the best-worst tasks would provide more information than single choice designs whilst 
simultaneously forcing respondents to consider the extremes of their utility space (Sackett et al., 
2013).  Erdem and Rigby (2013) state that the models estimated on best-worst data sets are 
probabilistic in nature and thus inconsistencies (such as violations of transitivity) within the 
ranking process are not inconsistent with the analytical approach.  They note further that 
increasing the frequency with which items are seen helps reduce the impacts of such occasional 
violations.  
Another motivation for the use of BWS is that the choice task is thought to be more manageable 
and easier to complete for respondents compared to tasks where respondents are asked to rank 
full sets with Likert scales (e.g., strongly agree to strongly disagree or 1 to 5, with 1 being not 
important and 5 very important) (Auger et al., 2004; Cohen and Markowitz, 2002; Finn and 
Louviere, 1992).   Furthermore, Cohen and Orme (2004) suggest that there is evidence that 
people use better judgment when they only need to evaluate extreme preferences rather than 
preferences in levels.  Thus identifying preferences with levels can be problematic due to the 
different uses and open interpretation of the rating/ranking scale which may potentially cause 
biases (Cohen and Markowitz, 2002). Cross et al. (2012), Finn and Louviere (1992) and Marti 
(2012) indicate that BWS avoids biases such as scale bias and provides improved discrimination 
between items. The BWS approach therefore may reduce or even avoid these problems because 
the terms “most” and “least” are less open to variation in interpretation (Erdem and Rigby, 
2013).   
In addition to the above mentioned potential advantages, the BWS process generates data 
conducive to estimation using well-established econometric models that improve 
accommodation of heterogeneity, in both preferences and error variance, through estimation of, 
inter alia, Latent Class, Random Parameter, and error component Logit models (Erdem and 
Rigby, 2013).   
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4.5. Conceptual Framework for Best-Worst Scaling 
 
Louviere et al. (2013) note that the basic tenets of the best-worst scaling method are underpinned 
by Random Utility Theory (RUT), as with other methodologies such as DCEs.  This theory 
assumes that an individual’s relative preference for an object A over object B is a function of the 
relative frequency with which object A is selected as a preferred choice to object B.  Louviere et 
al. (2013) summarize the above as a theory that requires individuals to make choices 
stochastically (with some error).  
Thurstone (1927) proposed the use of RUT, which served as motivation in developing the 
method of paired comparisons where individuals are faced with the task of choosing the “best” 
object from sets of two objects given the objective of uncovering an individual’s relative 
preference of one preference over another  Louviere et al. (2013), alluding to Thurstone, 
recognized that the RUT theory is dependent on individuals making errors in their choices, so 
that it is possible to derive the model parameter estimates that are known as “scale values.” The 
authors define scale values as measures of the locations of each object on an underlying 
subjective scale of interest.  Following Thurstone (1927), McFadden (1974) was successful in 
generalizing Thurstone’s RUT model yielding more tractable closed-form models, which have 
the capability of accommodating choices from sets of three or more objects.  Formally 
illustrated, the “best” only case by McFadden is shown in the choice set below with attributes A, 
B, C and D; S referring to the true but unobservable subjective quantities of each of the 
attributes. 
SA = VA + EA 
SB = VB + EB 
SC = VC + EC 
SD = VD + ED                                                                                  (4.1) 
The true subjective value (SK) of the Kth object consists of two components as seen above, the 
observed value Vk which is considered to be systematic (explainable) in nature and the error term 
Ek which is random (unexplainable).  McFadden (1974) notes that the random component 
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implies that one cannot predict the exact choice that a person will make, but rather, only the 
probability that a person will choose each object offered.  The choice probability can be 
expressed as follows: 
P (A = best │A, B, C, D) = P [(VA +EA) > (VK +EK)]                 (4.2) 
Considering all other options that are available to be chosen in the comparison set, the 
probability of attribute A being selected as preferred from the entire choice set is equivalent to 
the probability of the unobservable subjective value of attribute A being greater than the 
subjective value of all the other options.  McFadden (1974) was able to derive what is commonly 
known today as the Conditional Logit model by making the assumption that the error terms 
displayed above operate as independent and identically distributed (I.I.D) Type 1 extreme values.  
Turning to the present project, in similar style to Erdem and Rigby (2013), we use the RUT to 
model decisions, views or opinions (i.e. perceptions of importance of incentives for the adoption 
of an E. coli vaccine), rather than the usual maximization of utility from a good or service.  The 
major idea here is that a producer is going to select incentives that maximize his/her level of 
satisfaction in terms of the perceived desirability of different incentives to adopt this technology.  
A simplified Random Utility Model can take the following form: 
Uij, t = Bi Xij, t + Eij, t                                                                    (4.3)        
Where, Uij, t is individual i’s utility from his/her selection of alternative j in a choice set t = {1, 
2,…K}, Bi is individual i’s utility parameter vector, Xij, t is a vector for attributes (incentives) 
associated with alternative j, and Eij, t is the stochastic (random) component, which allows 
researchers to make probabilistic statements about respondents’ behaviours, in our case 
producers’ choice behaviours, as suggested by Adamowicz et al. (1998) and Lusk (2003).   
The major idea here is that a respondent will choose a pair of attributes (i.e. incentives) that 
maximize the utility differences in his/her best and worst choices.  Let’s assume that the 
respondent chooses incentive j over incentive k, as the best and worst, respectively, out of a 
choice set with J items.  The probability then that respondent i chooses incentive j over incentive 
k is the probability that the difference in utility Uij, t and Uik+, t is greater than all other J (J-1)-1 
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possible differences in the choice set (Louviere et al. 2013).  Assuming Eij, t is distributed I.I.D 
Type 1 extreme value; this probability can be expressed in a simple Logit form as follows: 
        (4.4) 
To recall, one of the reasons best worst scaling is considered as a useful method of evaluating 
survey responses is its ability to transform the best and worst scales into ratios that are equivalent 
to the multinomial Logit estimates.  The next section delves into the implementation of a Best-
Worst experiment. 
4.6. Implementing Best-Worst Choice Tasks 
 
4.6.1. Design 
 
Louviere and Woodworth (1990) suggest that one of the key issues of implementation is to 
design a series of choice sets that include all of the items/objects identified by the researcher and 
all the possible comparisons an equal number of times for each respondent. A 
statistical/experimental design to construct the choice sets in the form of a balanced incomplete 
block design was utilized in the cow-calf producer survey to meet that standard.  The BIBD was 
used to design the comparison sets since BIBDs can arrange attributes as efficiently as possible, 
reducing the number of sets that are required to obtain information about the importance of the 
attributes (incentives) selected with minimum loss of statistical information (Burke et al. 2013).  
The outcome of such a design is that each of the incentives occurs equally often and in a 
controlled number of times with each other.  According to Louviere et al. (2012) a BIBD, in 
ensuring that occurrences and co-occurrences of attributes is constant, also helps in minimizing 
the chance that respondents can make unintended assumptions about the attributes based on 
aspects of the design.  An example is if an attribute occurs within the choice sets more than the 
others, the respondent might select it on the conclusion that the attribute is more favoured by the 
researcher, thus causing social desirable responses on the part of the survey respondent. 
A BIBD was applied to the incentives identified in Table 4.4 below.  In a similar approach to 
Cohen (2009), a BIBD design for v attributes denoted as (b, r, k, λ) was adopted, where b is 
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defined as the number of choice sets (blocks), r is the repetition per level, k is defined as the 
number of attributes appearing in each choice set (block size) and λ the pair frequency.   
In the context of this study the BIBD takes the form (13,4,4,1), where Ѵ = 13 incentives yielding 
13 choice sets, each incentive appearing 4 times across all the available blocks, each choice set 
containing 4 incentives and each incentive compared once with each of the other incentives.  The 
result of the BIBD of the 13 attributes (incentives) is shown in Table 4.5 below.  Each of the 13 
choice sets were presented as separate tables/choice sets in the producer survey (see survey 
question 26 in Appendix 1), with the number of the attribute substituted with its description as 
per Table 4.4. 
Based on the review of literature, key issues drawn from the discussion of theoretical 
considerations, and interviews with cow-calf producers and industry participants, 13 attributes 
deemed to be suitable incentives in influencing producer decisions to adopt the E. coli vaccine 
were chosen.  These attributes (incentives) are presented in Table 4.4.    These incentives can be 
subdivided into several categories: government intervention related incentives, market/supply 
chain incentives, production protocol related incentives; producer reputation incentives; and 
other.  
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Table 4.4: Attributes (Incentives) 
Identified Attributes: Incentives for E. coli Vaccine Adoption9 
Government Intervention Incentives 
Government recommending use of E. coli vaccine for cattle (Government recommendation) (3) 
Subsidy to compensate the costs of my adoption of the vaccine is available through a government 
vaccination program (Subsidy to compensate costs) (10) 
Market/Supply Chain Incentives 
Premiums for E. coli vaccinated cattle are available through various programs (branded beef program) 
within the supply chain ( Premiums for E. coli vaccinated cattle available) (2) 
Attraction of a new set of buyers for my vaccinated cattle (8) 
My buyer requiring use of vaccine as part of the production protocol as a condition for accepting my 
calves/cattle (My buyer requiring use of vaccine) (11) 
Feedlots providing an assurance that they will give my cattle a booster of the E. coli vaccine to maintain 
the immunity of my cattle (Feedlots providing booster assurance) (6) 
Through vaccination, my farm is less exposed to the effects of E. coli outbreaks, such as beef recalls and 
supply disruptions at packing plants (Less E. coli exposure due to vaccination) (13) 
Production Protocol Incentives 
Recommendation from my veterinarian to use the E. coli vaccine in my operations (Recommendation 
from Veterinarian)  (4) 
I can include an E. coli vaccination in my existing vaccination routine (Inclusion of vaccine in existing 
vaccination routine) (7) 
Duration of immunity for my calves/cattle is greater than six months (12) 
Producer Reputation Incentives 
Beef products from my calves/cattle can be traced back to my farm/operations (Traceability to farm) 
(1) 
My reputation for a cattle producer is at risk because of higher consumer expectations concerning food 
safety (Reputation as producer is at risk) (5) 
Other 
My neighbours (other cattle producers) are adopting the E. coli vaccine (Neighbours adopting E. coli 
vaccine) (9) 
                                                          
9
 The numbers included in brackets after each incentive refer to the attribute numbers presented 
in Table 4.5. 
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Table 4.5: Balanced Incomplete Block Design (Adapted from Cohen, 2009) 
 
Ѵ = 13 
Choice set no. 
     (13,4,4,1) 
 Attribute no. 
  
1 1 2 4 10 
2 2 3 5 11 
3 3 4 6 12 
4 4 5 7 13 
5 5 6 8 1 
6 6 7 9 2 
7 7 8 10 3 
8 8 9 11 4 
9 9 10 12 5 
10 10 11 13 6 
11 11 12 1 7 
12 12 13 2 8 
13 13 1 3 9 
 
4.6.2. Justification of Attributes (Incentives) 
 
Government Intervention related Incentives 
The first category involves government recommendation (attribute 3) and subsidy to compensate 
costs (attribute 10) in Table 4.4.  These incentives are included on the premise that a situation of 
market failure makes government intervention a potential action in correcting the deadweight 
loss (DWL).  This intervention is however dependent on the benefit of intervention outweighing 
the cost.  In this case, the potential market failure comes in the form of information asymmetry 
and public good/positive externalities from possible adoption of the E. coli vaccine as discussed 
in Chapter 3.  The expectation that cow-calf producers should be compensated for costs of 
adoption is derived from the market fundamentals of welfare economics particularly through the 
compensation principle in the event that the Pareto principle cannot be achieved i.e. a second-
best option.  Government intervention could also take the form of strong recommendation, 
particularly in the case where public safety is a concern in relation to E. coli incidences, as 
captured by attribute no.3 where government recommends use of the vaccine.    
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Market/Supply Chain Incentives 
 
The market/supply chain attributes (incentives) shown in Table 4.4 include: premiums for E. coli 
vaccinated cattle available, my buyer requiring use of vaccine, feedlots providing booster 
assurance, and less E. coli exposure due to vaccination.  These incentives are relevant for cow-
calf producers if the adoption of an E. coli vaccine has the potential to create product 
differentiation in the form of a value chain for vaccinated cattle, where private labels and brands 
generate higher margins for an assured supply of vaccinated cattle and beef with lower risks of 
E. coli.  Thus, these attributes allow an assessment of the extent to which the availability of 
premiums or access to differentiated supply chains incentivizes producers to adopt the vaccine.  
Furthermore, such incentives may also have the potential of reducing the chances of beef recalls 
and any disruptions to cow-calf producer access to markets for their calves. 
 
Production Protocol Incentives 
 
The extent to which including the E. coli vaccine in already existing production protocols affects 
incentives to adopt is captured by recommendation from veterinarian (attribute 4) and less E. coli 
exposure due to vaccination (attribute 7) in Table 4.4.  The idea here is that if producers 
incorporate this technology/innovation into their already existing preconditioning process, this 
would lower their cost of adoption.  These incentives tie back to the notion of scale of change 
introduced in the literature, where the perception of a larger scale of change may serve as a 
barrier to adoption.  In addition, these incentives also capture vaccine efficacy concerns.  A key 
issue for most cow-calf producers that was uncovered in the pre-survey interviews was the 
duration of immunity captured by attribute 12.  Based on industry interviews, it is expected that a 
duration of 6 months or greater is preferred in order to preserve producer efforts through to the 
next stage of the production process.  
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Producer Reputation Incentives 
 
Reputation is a key element in any business operation.  Therefore, if traceability mechanisms are 
created within the supply chain, such that in the event of an E. coli outbreak the contaminated 
beef can be traced to its point of origin, producers may be inclined to take extra measures to 
ensure their output is safe and secure for the consuming public.  For this reason, two reputation 
based attributes were included: traceability to farm (attribute 1) and reputation as producer is at 
risk (attribute 5) as seen in Table 4.4.  In the literature, Pouliot and Sumner (2008) introduced 
traceability and liability as motivating factors in the adoption of food safety controls.  
 
Other 
 
Neighbours adopting E. coli vaccine (attribute 9) captures the social network within which 
producers operate.  This social network influences the practices within their operations, as 
discovered by Ellis-Iversen (2010) who assessed the role of veterinarians serving as motivators 
in the adoption of zoonotic measures. Thus, if a producer's neighbours are adopting the 
technology and they share their experience with the producer, his/her learning curve may be 
reduced.  This attribute ties back to the Anti-Commons argument developed in Chapter 3, where 
a particular adoption threshold would need to be met to encourage greater producer participation.  
 
Following is an example of a choice set: choice set no. 7 in Table 4.5 (attributes 7, 8, 10, and 3) 
presented in Table 4.6 below.  Respondents of the survey were provided with 13 randomized 
choice sets with different combinations of incentives to assess.    
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Table 4.6: An example of a BWS Choice set as presented in the survey 
 Following from the scenario above, for each of the 
following tables, tick (click) the ONE incentive 
that will MOST influence your choice of adoption 
and the ONE that will LEAST influence this 
decision. 
 
Most Influential 
(select only one) 
Of these incentives, which would be Most likely to 
influence and Least likely to influence your 
adoption of an E. coli vaccine... 
Least Influential 
(select only one) 
o  I can include an E. coli vaccination in my existing 
vaccination routine. 
o  
o  Attraction of a new set of buyers for my vaccinated 
cattle 
o  
o  Subsidy to compensate the costs of my adoption of 
the vaccine is available through a government funded 
vaccination program. 
o  
o  Government recommending use of E. coli vaccine for 
cattle 
o  
 
 
4.7. Data and analysis of BWS choice tasks 
 
4.7.1. Data collection 
 
An online survey of Canadian cow-calf producers was used to gather data for this study.  Prior to 
contacting participants, approval from the University of Saskatchewan Behavioural Research 
Ethics Board was obtained.
10
 A market research company (Ipsos Agriculture and Animal Health) 
was commissioned to administer the survey, given the geographical coverage of the sample and 
the target audience. This sample was drawn from Ipsos animal health/producer database.  The 
survey was conducted in July 2014, where pre-tests of the online version of the survey were done 
in mid-July on approximately 20 cow-calf producers to determine whether any changes to the 
                                                          
10
 Approval was granted on June 27, 2014 (University of Saskatchewan Behavioural Research 
Ethics Board BEH # 14-136). 
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survey were needed. Finally, a full launch of the survey was performed towards the end of July 
that targeted cow-calf producers in the provinces of Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba.  These 
provinces were selected as they represent the largest share of the beef cow population in Canada 
at 40.7%, 29.8% and 11.6% respectively (Figure 4.1). 
Initial paper drafts of the producer survey were pre-tested in person through interviews with 
cow-calf producers from various locations in Saskatchewan.  Furthermore, draft surveys were e-
mailed to willing pre-testers which included industry experts who were not available face to face.  
Based on the feedback received from the pre-tests, a refined paper version of the producer survey 
was further pre-tested on other cow-calf producers in Saskatchewan.  Minor modifications were 
then made before the survey was formatted into a final online version to be administered to cow-
calf producers.  The pre-test and re-test phase was necessary to ensure that the survey was 
understood by intended respondents, well-designed, and capable of answering the research 
questions presented in Chapter 1. 
 
Although internet surveys have been known to create some sampling biases in terms of the 
demographic structure (older, less wealthy and less educated individuals), the growth and 
proliferation of internet access across Canada lessens such concerns.  Statistics Canada (2012b) 
quotes internet use within the general population as 83 percent in Canadian households. Given 
that this study sought to survey a sample of cow-calf producers, an internet based survey was 
well placed to harness the geographical diversity of the sampled group.   
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Figure 4. 1: Beef cow population by Province 
Source: (Canfax) 
 
Furthermore, an online-based survey proved to be advantageous from the perspective of reducing 
potential missing values in critical aspects of the survey.  In the BWS section respondents were 
required to respond to all of the choice sets
11
.  Cohen (2009) notes that using online surveys 
compared to paper questionnaires helps avoid missing data points due to respondents not 
completing the choice sets as intended.  The author argues that online surveys also allow 
randomization of choice sets, which is a complex task using paper questionnaires.  The choice 
sets in the cow-calf producer survey were randomized across respondents to eliminate any 
familiarity or pattern bias. 
                                                          
11
 It should be noted that an exit option was available such that respondents could opt out of the 
entire survey at any time.  The final number of observations includes only fully completed 
surveys. 
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The survey consisted of four main sections (see Appendix 1 for the full survey).  First, 
information was gathered about the cow-calf operation, such as the respondent’s primary role on 
the farm and marketing channels used.  Second, an awareness and information section assessed 
cow-calf producers’ knowledge and perceptions towards the E. coli O157:H7 pathogen and the 
E. coli vaccine (survey questions 6-19). Furthermore, management interventions/practices in use 
to reduce or mitigate E. coli incidences on the farm/environment were examined (question 24).  
In the next section, a best-worst choice task experiment was presented whereby cow-calf 
producers were asked to choose the “best” and “worst” incentives to adopt an E. coli vaccine 
from a series of 13 choice sets, each containing four incentives. The implementation of the best-
worst choice task was explained in section 4.6 above.  This section was designed to assess the 
relative importance of each incentive to cow-calf producers.   
 
Third, questions on the barriers to the adoption of the E. coli vaccine, such as costs, uncertainty 
about benefits of adoption etc. (see question 28) were examined.  Locus of control
12
 questions 
followed (see question 29) which evaluate the locus of control of individual respondents with 
respect to both their cow-calf businesses in general and the management of E. coli risks in 
particular.  Examples of questions used to capture the internal and external locus of control 
included: “whether or not I’m successful in mitigating/controlling E. coli depends mostly on my 
own ability”; “to a great extent E. coli incidences on my cow-calf operation are determined by 
factors beyond my control” respectively.  These questions sought to measure the internal locus, 
the belief that one’s own ability, effort, or actions determine what happens on the farm and the 
external locus, the belief that fate, luck or outside forces are responsible for what happens within 
the farm environment.  The inclusion of a locus control section in surveys is explained by 
Spector (1982), who notes that locus of control may moderate the relation between incentives 
and motivation and between satisfaction and turnover in his assessment of behaviour in 
organizations as a function of employees’ locus of control. 
 
 
                                                          
12
 This variable was measured using a Likert scale, with 1 representing complete disagreement 
and 5 complete agreement. See chapter 5 for a more detailed explanation of the measurement of 
this variable. 
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Lastly, socio-demographic questions were included: respondents’ gender, age, highest level of 
education, years of experience in the cow/calf sector, how long they intend being in the cow-calf 
business, and the importance of the cow-calf operations to their livelihood.  These questions 
allow for sources of heterogeneity in the responses to best-worst questions to be assessed.  
 
4.7.2. Analytical Method 
 
The BWS component of the data/survey was designed to ensure that each incentive appeared 4 
times across all the choice sets (see Table 4.4 above).  As noted earlier, the simple difference in 
BWS scores, i.e. taking the number of times an item is considered “best” and subtracting the 
number of times it is considered “worst” is a close approximation of the true scale values: the 
scales values obtained through Multinomial Logit analysis (Marley and Louviere, 2005).  Such 
properties allow for a swift and simplified investigation of the relative value of a specific object 
by scaling the number of times the object is considered “best” against the number of times the 
object is considered “worst”.  
In the analysis of BWS data, in order to determine the level of importance for each of the 
incentives, the number of times an incentive was selected as least important (worst) was 
subtracted from the number of times it was chosen as the most important (best) for all 13 
attributes for each respondent.  The outcomes of these calculations are individual level scales for 
each of the 13 incentives.  The level of importance of each attribute depends on the number of 
respondents and the frequency that each attribute appears in the choice sets, as per equation (5) 
below.  As each of the 13 incentives appeared a total of four times in all the presented choice 
tasks, the individual level scales for each of the incentives can only range from + 4 to – 4.  As 
noted by Cohen (2009) frequencies beyond this range indicate error(s) in the data.   
For example, a value of + 2 could be obtained if a survey respondent chose an incentive as most 
desirable three times and selected the same incentive once as least desirable.  Positive values of 
best-worst indicate that the particular incentive was more frequently chosen as best; while 
negative values suggest that the incentive was more often selected as worst.  The level of 
importance/influence of a particular attribute/incentive was transformed into a standard score, 
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following Goodman et al. (2005) who note that the reason for such standardization is to allow 
comparison between different groups of respondents.  Below is a simple formula showing how 
the best-worst outcomes are transformed into standard scores for each attribute. 
 
                                                                                                        (4.5) 
Where: 
Count (best) = total number of times an incentive was most important 
Count (worst) = total number of times an incentive was least important 
N is the number of questionnaires/observations 
4 is the frequency of the appearance of each incentive in the design 
Further to this standardization, in order to determine the rank ordering of the incentives in terms 
of their relative importance and, following Marley and Louviere (2005), a “maximum 
difference” scale that is simply the difference between the “best” and “worst” columns is 
calculated.  Another approach to enable comparison of the importance of incentives was to 
derive ratio scores of the best-worst scores.  Adamsen et al. (2013) note that by taking the square 
root after dividing the total best scores by the total worst scores, one can derive ratio scores that 
assist in the comparison of attribute importance.  The square root for all best/worst incentives are 
then scaled by a factor, such that the most important incentive with the highest square root (B/W) 
takes the index or interval scale of 100. The authors state that this allows for easy interpretation 
and comparison across incentives.  The resulting coefficients, according to various authors, 
(Auger et al., 2007; Cohen, 2009; Flynn et al., 2007; Lee et al., 2008 and Marley and Louviere, 
2005) measure the choice probability compared to the most important item.  A vital component 
that results from the formulation of the best-worst scores is that of heterogeneity.  The following 
section explains in more detail the issue of heterogeneity from the perspective of a case 1 BWS 
design. 
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4.8. BWS Choice Heterogeneity  
 
Adamsen et al. (2013) explain that the first output for case 1 of the best-worst analysis does not 
reveal any heterogeneity that might be present in the data.  Thus, following Adamsen et al. 
(2013), additional steps such as the calculation of the variance and standard deviations are used 
as a means of ascertaining whether the choice of attributes (incentives) is consistent amongst all 
respondents (homogeneity).  The standard deviations are calculated based on the individual BWS 
scores and, as suggested by Mueller and Rungie (2009), incentives with a standard deviation 
above an absolute one signify the existence of producer heterogeneity.   
For a closer examination of heterogeneity among cow-calf producers, a Latent Class cluster 
analysis (Latent GOLD® 5.0) is used to determine whether producers are heterogeneous in their 
selection of adoption incentives and whether unique classes or segments of producers exist 
which can be explained by certain farm and farmer characteristics.  Vermunt and Magidson 
(2008) and Haughton et al. (2009) as cited in Umberger et al. (2014) contend that Latent Class 
cluster analysis is a relatively new clustering technique that assumes individuals belong to one of 
k Latent Classes, of which the size and number are unknown a priori.  Umberger et al. (2014) 
note that the LC is distinct from other approaches such as K-Means cluster analysis, as it 
involves estimating the probability of class membership using model parameters and observed 
individual measures.  In other words, the method identifies latent classes of respondents within 
the data. 
The authors further state that LC cluster analysis uses the co-variation among individuals’ 
observed preference scores (e.g. BWS scores) as a measure of utility that is used to predict 
individuals’ unique membership in a specific latent class.  These observed preferences, are 
similar among individuals within a class who are assumed to come from the same probability 
distribution, thus unobserved utility is heterogeneous across classes but homogeneous within a 
class.  LC therefore is dependent on observable attributes captured by the covariates (such as age 
and gender, for example) and latent heterogeneity that varies with factors that are observable to 
the researcher (Loureiro and Dominguez Arcos, 2012).  The authors note therefore, that it is 
assumed that individuals are sorted into a set of Q classes or clusters; however, the researcher 
does not have prior knowledge as to which individuals belong to which class. 
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Following Loureiro and Dominguez Arcos (2012), the selected choice model is a logit model for 
a discrete choice among j alternatives (4 for each incentive presented), by each respondent (i) 
with each of the choice incentives T (13 in this case). 
        (4.6) 
Yit below is used to denote a specific choice made, as the best incentive, so that the model 
provides: 
                                                                         (4.7) 
For the given class assignment, the contribution of individual i to the likelihood function would 
be the joint probability of the sequence yi = [yi1, yi2, yi3… yiT]: 
                                                                                   (4.8) 
A priori the class assignment is unknown.  Let Hiq denote the prior probability for class q for 
individual i.  Similar to Loureiro and Dominguez Arcos (2012), the multinomial logit form is 
adopted: 
                                                                                   (4.9) 
With q (number of classes) = 1. . . Q, where Z denotes a set of observable characteristics which 
enter the model for class membership.  The likelihood for individual i is the expectation (over 
classes) of the class-specific contributions: 
                                                                                           (4.10) 
The log likelihood of this classification and selection problem for the sample is therefore 
presented as: 
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                         (4.11) 
The individual B-W scores for all 13 incentives are used as dependent variables in the Latent 
Class cluster analysis to explore whether cow-calf producers are heterogeneous in their 
perceptions of which incentives are most influential in the adoption of the E. coli vaccine.  In a 
similar approach to Umberger et al. (2014), it is anticipated that reactions to incentives described 
as a series of best-worst choices are likely to be heterogeneous, notwithstanding the different 
reasons for selecting particular incentives.  The heterogeneity that emerges from the survey data 
can be further evaluated to extract different clusters (classes) of cow-calf producers in order to 
assess the features and characteristics of each of the identified segments.   
 
A Latent Class cluster analysis is thus used to identify whether cow-calf producers can be 
segmented based on their choices of the best-worst incentives across the available choice sets.  
The generated BW scores are used as the indicator variable and social demographic and selected 
questions from the survey appear as covariates (variables used to describe or predict the indicator 
variable).  Table 4.7 contains the definitions of the socio-demographic characteristics that are 
included as covariates, with the remainder of the variables applicable to the probit analysis 
discussed in section 4.9. The covariates include: gender, age, education, livelihood, experience, 
continuity, and locus of control, which were chosen in line with the literature as possible 
predictors of classes unknown to the researcher. The LC estimations are performed employing 
the software Latent Gold 5.0 (Statistical Innovations, 2014).  
To summarize, if the most and least important incentives for an E. coli vaccine adoption are 
found to vary among cow-calf producers, LC analysis makes it possible to characterize or 
classify these producers into segments based on their latent attitudes toward the incentives.  This 
information can prove useful for stakeholders within the industry and policymakers to better 
understand the motivations for adopting an E. coli vaccine and the extent to which a latent group 
of potential “first mover” adopters can be identified and incentivized. 
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Table 4.7: Farm and Producer Characteristics and Descriptions 
Characteristic  Variable Description 
Gender Coded as 1 if Male and 0 if otherwise. 
Age Used as a categorical variable in Latent Class 
analysis, with ‘1’ representing ages 25-34, ‘2’ 
35-44, ‘3’ 45-54, ‘4’ 55-64, and ‘5’ > 64. 
Actual age in years was used for the Probit 
analysis. 
Education Education level coded as ‘1’, for respondents 
with an education level at or above the college 
level and ‘0’ otherwise. 
Experience Years as principal decision maker, used as a 
categorical variable in LC analysis, with ‘1’ 
representing less than 4 years, ‘2’ 5-20, ‘3’ 21-
35, ‘4’ > 35.  Actual number of years (data 
collected as a range) mid-points for each 
respondent was used to get an approximation of 
experience for the Probit analysis. 
Continuity No. of years a producer plans to continue in 
operation.  Data collected as a range, thus the 
mid-point of the range is used to find an 
approximation for each respondent. 
Awareness Awareness of E. coli vaccine, coded ‘1’ if the 
respondent has heard of an E. coli vaccine and 
‘0’ otherwise. 
Responsibility  Primary responsibility of reducing E. coli 
incidences is a categorical variable. Dummy 
variables were created to represent each 
category coded ‘1’ if cow-calf producers, ‘0’ 
otherwise. Coded ‘1’ if feedlots, ‘0’ otherwise; 
coded ‘1’ if packers/processors, ‘0’ otherwise; 
coded ‘1’ if retailers, ‘0’ otherwise; coded ‘1’ if 
consumers, ‘0’ otherwise, and coded ‘1’ if 
regulators and ‘0’ otherwise. (Q.20) 
Benefits Perception of beneficiaries to adoption, coded 
as ‘1’ if cow-calf producer and ‘0’ otherwise. 
Sales/Revenues Percentage of revenues derived from cow-calf 
operations. Treated as a categorical variable 
with ‘1’ representing 0-24%, ‘2’ 25-49%, ‘3’ 
50-79%, and ‘4’ 80-100%. 
Livelihood Importance of cow-calf operations to livelihood, 
coded as ‘1’ if very important and essential and 
‘0’ if otherwise. 
Retain ownership Retaining of ownership of cattle/calves, coded 
‘1’ if “yes” and ‘0’ if “no”. 
Size of operation Actual Herd size of cattle in operation 
Location Province/territory operation is located. Dummy 
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variables were created for each province coded 
as ‘1’ if AB, ‘0’ otherwise. Coded ‘1’ if SK, ‘0’ 
otherwise. Coded ‘1’ if MB, ‘0’ otherwise. 
Willingness to Adopt  Willingness of cow-calf producer to adopt E. 
coli vaccine, coded ‘1’ if yes, ‘0’ otherwise 
(Binary Probit) 
Coded‘3’ if respondent replies “yes”; coded ‘2’ 
if respondent replies “don’t know/unsure” and 
coded ‘1’ if respondent replies “no” (Ordered 
Probit). (Survey Q. 27) 
Locus of control For LC analysis, an average of internal and 
external locus questions was utilized and the 
Likert scale maintained to assess effect of each 
category.  The Probit analysis was similarly 
done, however, just as a single variable (no 
categories assessed). 
Individual B-W scores Individual B-W scores calculated for 
respondent for each incentive.  
 
4.9. Producer Willingness to Adopt  
 
In addition to the Latent Class model, a Binary Probit model is useful to evaluate the 
determinants of a cow-calf producer’s willingness to adopt a socially beneficial technology such 
as an E. coli vaccine.  As can be seen in the producer survey (Appendix 1), after the best-worst 
choice tasks section, an anchor question (see question 27) to the best-worst choice tasks was 
asked to capture the willingness of producers to adopt the E. coli vaccine based on the incentives 
presented in the prior choice sets.  The question was as follows: “would you consider adopting 
an E. coli vaccine if presented with the right incentives such as some of those appearing above?”  
In the Binary Probit model
13
, producer willingness to adopt is evaluated using the three 
categories presented in the survey, with 1 representing the weakest willingness (No); 2 the 
intermediate willingness (Don’t know/Unsure) and 3 representing the strongest producer 
willingness to adopt choice (Yes).  In order to facilitate the binary approach, the yes responses 
                                                          
13
 It should be noted that in order to explore the effect of different model specifications, an 
Ordered Probit Model was also estimated , where the dependent variable took the form of 1, 2, 3 
to represent the ‘no’, ‘don’t know/unsure’ and ‘yes’ categories. See Appendix 2 for modeling 
details. 
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were transformed to 1 with all other responses becoming 0.  Following Verbeek (2004), the 
willingness to adopt function is presented as follows: 
                                        У* = β΄Х + ε                               (4.12) 
Where у* is a latent unobservable dependent variable, willingness to adopt, coded as 1 for yes 
and 0 otherwise;  β is the vector of estimated parameters, while x is the vector of explanatory 
variables; ε is the error term which is assumed to be normally distributed with (0, σ2) with 
cumulative distribution denoted by Ф (.).  The utility difference between adoption of an E. coli 
vaccine and non-adoption is expected to depend upon factors including a producer’s personal 
characteristics. Thus, for each producer i, the utility difference between their willingness to adopt 
and non-willingness to adopt is a function of observed characteristics xi and other unobserved 
characteristics captured by εi.  
4.9.1. Binary Probit Model 
 
Following Verbeek (2004), equation (4.13) below shows the probabilities of the 2 available 
choices being selected. 
Prob (y = 0 ׀ x) = P (у* ≤ α1 ׀ x) 
= P (xβ + ε ≤ α1 ׀ x) 
= P (ε ≤ α1 – xβ ׀ x) 
= Ф (α1 – xβ) 
 
                                                    Prob (y = 1 ׀ x) = 1- P (у* ≤ α1 ׀ x) 
   = 1- Ф (α1 – xβ)  
                                                                                                  (4.13) 
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The alphas (α) represent cut-off points or thresholds levels.  The assumption is that an individual 
is willing to adopt an E. coli vaccine if the utility difference exceeds a certain threshold level. 
Consequently we observe yi = 1 (willingness to adopt: yes) if and only if yi* > α1 and yi * ≤ α1 
(No) otherwise.  
Thus substituting the appropriate form for Ф (.) gives an expression that can be maximized with 
respect to β using the method of maximum likelihood. 
The likelihood function becomes: 
 
Ln L = Σ Iyi=0 lnФ (α1 – xβ) + Iyi=1ln [1- (Ф (α1 – xβ)]                                           
                                                                                                     (4.14) 
 
Where Ik is an indicator function for willingness to adopt; Ф (.) is defined to be the cumulative 
distribution and ln being the natural logs. 
4.10. Model Specification 
 
The Ordered Probit model that investigates the factors affecting a producer’s willingness to 
adopt the vaccine is as follows (see Table 4.7 for a definition of the variables below): 
Willingness to Adopti = β0 + β1 Genderi + β2 Agei + β3 Educationi + β3 Awarenessi + β4 
Responsibilityi + β5 Retaini + β6 Sizei + β7 Livelihoodi + β8 Experiencei + β9 Locationi + β10 
Continuityi + β11 Benefitsi + β12 Locusi + β13 Individual Best-Worst Scoresi + εi            (4.15) 
 Where: 
i: individual; 
εi: is assumed to be a random error with a zero mean and finite variance. 
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Equation (4.15) with εi following a normal distribution is modeled as both a Binary and Ordered 
Probit model and is estimated by a maximum likelihood technique. The explanatory variables are 
included on the basis that they are observable and are deemed a priori to inform a producer’s 
willingness to adopt an E. coli vaccine.  In addition to these variables, aggregated BWS scores 
are included in order to ascertain the effect of each of the incentives presented on producer 
willingness to adopt. 
This chapter has outlined the methods that are used to carry out and analyze the internet based 
survey of cow-calf producers’ willingness to adopt an E. coli vaccine.  Particular emphasis was 
placed on the BWS choice tasks, the main empirical section of this thesis.  The BWS was 
utilized to give a clear indication of which incentives are considered to be important to producers 
in improving their willingness to adopt the E. coli vaccine.  Case 1 of the BWS in this instance 
provides policymakers, supply chain participants and other stakeholders with aggregate level 
information on the incentives that are most acceptable to cow-calf producers and alternatives that 
would likely be rejected by the producers.  Survey questions not discussed in this methodological 
section are used for descriptive data analysis to explore further the research questions highlighted 
in chapter 1 of this thesis. 
Concurrently, this chapter also sought to explain how, using Latent Class cluster analysis, 
Chapter 5 identifies segments/classes of cow-calf producers with heterogeneous preferences 
towards the adoption incentives.  Furthermore, a Binary/Ordered Probit model identifies the 
determinants/factors that are most likely to affect a producer’s willingness to adopt an E. coli 
vaccine.  Results from these analyses are presented in the data analysis and empirical results 
chapter (5) which follows. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
5. RESULTS OF THE CANADIAN COW-CALF PRODUCER SURVEY 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter reports results of the online Canadian cow-calf producer survey administered in 
July 2014.  Ipsos Agriculture and Animal Health were commissioned to administer the survey. 
Cow-calf producers were recruited via e-mail from an on-line panel of Canadian cattle producers 
managed by Ipsos Agriculture and Animal Health. Screening questions were used to select 
producers with varying sizes of operation.  Confirmation of whether the intended participant had 
either overall or joint responsibility for animal health management practices in their operations 
was used as a further screening question.  In addition, quotas were set for the number of 
responses from each province (AB, SK, and MB) in order to match the share of cow-calf 
production in each province.  Respondents were assigned unique identification codes by Ipsos to 
guarantee anonymity and limit the potential for response duplication.  After ascertaining the 
validity of responses, all respondents were retained to make up the final dataset.  A token of 
CDN $20 was provided to participants who completed the study. 
The results are organized as follows: first, the socio-demographic characteristics of the sampled 
cow-calf producers are presented in section 5.2.  Second, descriptive statistics are provided on 
respondents’ awareness of the E. coli pathogen and E. coli vaccine; on the impact of E.coli 
outbreaks on producer operations; the sources of information for E. coli used by producers, 
perceptions on who bears the primary responsibility for E. coli reduction within the supply chain, 
and perceptions regarding who are the major beneficiaries from vaccine adoption are presented 
in section 5.3.  Third, assessment of current management intervention controls/practices utilized 
by producers and the confirmation of whether there is currently an existing vaccination routine 
are discussed in sections 5.4 and 5.5 respectively.  Fourth, the barriers to adoption of an E. coli 
vaccine are identified in section 5.6; the results from the BWS analysis on the relative influence 
of the 13 incentives are then described in section 5.7 and 5.8 to show which incentives have a 
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greater potential to encourage adoption.  Lastly, results from the Latent Class analysis and 
Binary Probit model are discussed in sections 5.9, through 5.10, and 5.11 respectively.  
5.2. Socio-demographic Characteristics of Cow-calf Producers 
 
A final total sample size of 203 was yielded from the survey process.
14
  The majority of the 
sample population was male (79.3%) with female cow-calf producers accounting for 20.7% of 
the sample (Table 5.1).  The average age of respondents was 54, which is identical to the average 
age of Canadian farm operators according to the Statistics Canada Census of Agriculture (2011) 
(see Table 5.1).  The respondents’ age ranged from 77 to 29.  In terms of the total percentage of 
sales/revenues derived from cow-calf operations, on average 42.1% of gross farm revenues came 
from cow-calf operations. 
The survey sample by province is reasonably comparable with the aforementioned Canadian 
industry statistics, with 46.8% of the respondents located in Alberta, 35.5% in Saskatchewan and 
17.7% in Manitoba.  The size of operation (herd size) had a mean of 210, which is greater than 
that of the Canadian population at 63.  The maximum herd size was 11000 and minimum 2.  As 
noted before, varying sizes of operations were targeted using quotas for different operation sizes 
in order to capture a wide array of cow-calf producers (see Appendix 3 for herd size 
distribution). 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
14
 The final sample size included only fully completed surveys responses.  Respondents could opt 
out or quit the survey at any time with incomplete surveys not included in the final sample size.  
Information on the number of incomplete surveys is not available.  
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Table 5.1: Selection of Socio-demographic Characteristics of Cow-calf Producers 
Socio-demographic 
characteristics of cow-calf 
producers  
Min Max Mean/ 
Percentage 
Comparative 
Canadian 
statistics 
Std. 
Deviation 
Gender      
Male                                                             79.3   
Female   20.7   
Age 77 29 54 54
+ 9.954 
      
Percentage of total 2013 gross 
farm sales/revenues derived 
from cow-calf operations 
1 100 42.12  29.147 
Province      
AB   46.8 40.7  
SK   35.5 29.8  
MB   17.7 11.6  
Size of Operation (herd size) 2 11000 210 63
+ 834.77 
+
Source: Statistics Canada, Census of Agriculture, 2011. 
 
The cow-calf producers in the sample population were fairly well educated, with 35.5% of the 
respondents having attended trade school/college and 34.5% of respondents holding 
secondary/high school certification. Furthermore, 28.1% of the respondents had a university 
education with only 2% holding only a primary/elementary education.  In comparison to the 
general population the sample population was highly educated, perhaps suggesting that online 
surveys, in this case the online panel used by Ipsos, tend to be biased towards more educated 
respondents.  
 
With respect to years of experience in the industry, 35.5% of the sample population had above 35 
years of experience as principal decision makers, with 33.5% of respondents falling in the 21-35 
years category, and 27.1% possessing between 5-20 years as principal decision makers.  
Producers were asked how long they plan to be in the cow-calf business on the premise that this 
question has the potential to shed light on adoption decisions since it was assumed that the length 
of time that producers plan on continuing in the cow-calf business can potentially influence the 
introduction of food safety technologies such as an E. coli vaccine.  The survey revealed that 
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31.5% of respondents planned on continuing as cow-calf producers for between 10-25 years, 
with 29.6% specifying 6-10 years, 26.1% stating 1-5 years, and 8.9% indicating more than 25 
years.  
The inclusion of the question on the importance of cow-calf operations to a producer’s livelihood 
sought to assess the notion that producers who depend on their operations as the primary means 
of their livelihood may be more likely to be willing to invest in technologies to protect their 
investment.  The majority of respondents indicated that their cow-calf operations were important 
to their livelihoods, although to different degrees.  Specifically, 35.5% of respondents suggested 
that their cow-calf operations was fairly important to their livelihood, with 35% indicating it was 
very important and 21.7% suggesting it was essential.  
  
5.3. ECONOMICS OF INCENTIVES 
 
5.3.1. Awareness of E. coli O157:H7, related outbreaks and the E. coli Vaccine 
 
The awareness questions included in the Canadian cow-calf producer survey were included to 
find out the knowledge that producers possess regarding the E. coli pathogen and the recent E. 
coli outbreaks that have affected the beef and cattle industry.  Moreover, producers’ knowledge 
and perception of the E. coli vaccine technology, which has been available in the market since 
2008, were also examined.  This section is particularly important for the simple reason that 
knowledge, understanding and awareness of E. coli and its related issues is likely to be important 
to producers’ willingness to adopt the technology. 
Cow-calf producers were asked about their familiarity with the E. coli O157:H7 pathogen (see 
question 6).  59.1% of the respondents indicated that they were somewhat familiar with E. coli 
while 17.2% were very familiar, bringing familiarity to a total of 76.3% (Figure 5.1).  On the 
other hand, 14.8% and 8.9% of cow-calf producers stated that they were somewhat unfamiliar 
and very unfamiliar with the pathogen respectively.  These results are consistent with the survey 
of Canadian cattle producers conducted by Strategic Research Associates on behalf of Bioniche 
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Life Sciences in 2010, where the authors reported 75% of Canadian cattle producers were 
familiar with the E. coli pathogen.  
 
Figure 5. 1: Awareness of E. coli O157:H7 
 
In relation to familiarity with E. coli outbreaks that have taken place in Canada since 2000 (see 
question 7), the majority of the respondents stated that they were somewhat familiar 66.5% and 
9.4% very familiar with such E. coli incidences (Figure 5.2).  Only 18.2% and 5.9% of cow-calf 
producers were somewhat unfamiliar and very unfamiliar with episodes of E. coli outbreaks.  
Producers were prompted further with an open ended question to list any cases of E. coli 
outbreaks they were aware of since 2000.  Frequently mentioned E. coli incidences included the 
Walkerton, Ontario E. coli case and the XL Foods Inc. E. coli outbreak in Brooks, Alberta 
(2012), which resulted in the largest beef recall in Canadian history.  Also mentioned, was the 
(2013) E. coli incident that took place in British Columbia as a result of cheese being 
manufactured using unpasteurized milk. 
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Figure 5. 2: E. coli Outbreaks Awareness 
 
After producers were assessed on the E. coli pathogen and related incidences, a question was 
posed on whether they had ever heard of an E. coli vaccine such as the Canadian made brand 
Econiche.  About 46.3% of the respondents indicated that they had heard of the vaccine but had 
never used it, 4.9% specified that they have used the vaccine and are currently still using it 
(Figure 5.3).  Whereas 41.9% stated that they have never heard of the vaccine, while 6.9% 
indicated that they have heard about and used the vaccine before, but are currently not using it.  
These results suggest that more would need to be done in sensitizing Canadian cow-calf 
producers to the food safety technologies that are available for them to utilize in their operations 
as in this case of an E. coli vaccine.  This can be done in tandem with cow-calf producers’ major 
information sources on animal health as presented in the information sources subsection.  
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Figure 5. 3: E. coli Vaccine Awareness 
 
For those respondents who stated that they had heard of and were currently using the E. coli 
vaccine or had used it before, a follow-up question on the motivation behind usage was posed.  
About 6.4% of these producers, 24 in total, suggested that they used or are using the vaccine 
based on the recommendation of their veterinarian, while 3.4% used it on a trial basis.  In 
addition, the awareness of the cost of the E. coli vaccine was sought from producers that had 
heard of the E. coli vaccine, 118 in total, to get a sense of a producer’s knowledge of the 
technology.  The sizeable number of the producers, 47.3%, specified that they were not aware of 
the cost of the vaccine, while 10.8% indicated they were indeed aware of the cost.  Finally, a 
question concerning producer confidence in the level of immunization that the E. coli vaccine 
provides was asked.  From this pool of 118, 31.5% indicated that they were not confident about 
the level of immunization provided, while 26.6% of the sub-sample responded in the affirmative, 
with 41.9% representing those producers who had not heard of the E. coli vaccine before.  
The awareness questions were helpful in establishing a more informed picture on the current 
status of adoption of the E. coli vaccine.  This was done through the assessment of producer 
knowledge and understanding on the current and technical issues involving E. coli O157:H7, its 
related outbreaks and a potential solution of an E. coli vaccine.  This set the stage for finding out 
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where producers obtain their knowledge of the E. coli pathogen leading to the examination of 
producer information sources as discussed below. 
5.3.2. Information sources on E. coli O157:H7 
 
Respondents were asked about their primary sources of information regarding E. coli (see 
question 10).  In Figure 5.4, it is evident that the most popular primary source amongst producers 
was producer associations (federal or provincial) with 36.9%.  The second most popular primary 
source was a producer’s veterinarian, garnering 29.1% of responses.  About 11.3% of 
respondents however, indicated that they currently did not have any sources of information 
regarding E. coli matters, whereas 10.3% stated they received their information from government 
information agencies/services such as provincial ministries.  On being asked which primary 
source of information they consult first, 44.4% selected their veterinarian followed by 
government information agencies at 17.8%; internet searches 16.7%.  Furthermore, producer 
associations, other cow-calf producers and consultants were consulted first by 12.8%, 7.2% and 
1.1% respectively.   
 
Figure 5. 4: Primary Sources of Information on E. coli 
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Figure 5. 5: Priority Consultation of Primary Information Sources 
 
These results show that veterinarians are typically the first contact regarding technical issues on 
animal health to many Canadian cow-calf producers.  Other cow-calf producers were not 
typically the first option as a primary source of information, and this result is confirmed by the 
relatively low influence of the incentive “my neighbours are adopting the E. coli vaccine” (see 
BWS analysis in section 5.7).   
5.3.3. Responsibility for E. coli reduction within the supply chain 
 
Cow-calf producers were asked who they think has the primary responsibility for reducing the 
risk of E. coli problems within the beef supply chain (see question 20 of survey).  The majority 
of the respondents, 56.2%, indicated that processors/packers have the primary responsibility for 
reducing the risk of E. coli problems.  Meanwhile, 15.3% of respondents indicated that the 
primary responsibility lay with cow-calf producers, 15.3% feedlots, 7.8% consumers and 5.4% 
regulators such as the CFIA.  A follow-up question on secondary responsibility yielded quite 
similar results, albeit a rescaling in the weights, with 25.1% of producers believing that the 
secondary responsibility should lie with processors/packers and 23.6% suggesting feedlots, 
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16.7% suggesting regulators, 9.8% consumers and 11.3% cow-calf producers.  Cow-calf 
producers’ perception of which supply chain participant should bear primary responsibility is 
closely related to the perception of how the benefits of adoption are spread.  The next section 
explores this link. 
 
 
Figure 5. 6: Primary Responsibility of E. coli Reduction 
 
5.3.4. Benefits of E. coli vaccine adoption 
 
As can be seen in Figure 5.6, a significant proportion of respondents, 40.9%, believed consumers 
to be the main beneficiaries from the use of E. coli vaccines.  This is followed by 
processors/packers at 26.1%, then cow-calf producers at 20.7%.  As discussed in the theoretical 
considerations chapter, the notion of positive externalities/public good dynamics comes into play 
in this case.  This result confirms earlier assertions about the perceived flow of benefits going 
elsewhere within the supply chain other than to the adopters, which perhaps explains the current 
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low level of adoption amongst Canadian cow-calf producers.  Feedlots on the other hand were 
expected to be the primary beneficiaries by 7.4% of respondents; retailers by 3.9% and municipal 
water security agencies by only 1% of respondents.  In relation to the municipal water security 
agencies result, this option was included in the question to reflect potential environmental 
benefits given the potential for E. coli to affect ground water systems through farm run-offs.  
This result is surprisingly low and probably understates the extent to which protection of 
drinking water supplies is a potential benefit of this type of intervention in the Prairie provinces. 
 
Figure 5. 7: Perceived Top Beneficiaries from Cattle Vaccine Adoption 
 
Following from the results presented above, it is evident that the majority of surveyed Canadian 
cow-calf producers currently do not utilize an E.coli vaccine as a means of combating potential 
E. coli hazards and believe that the primary beneficiaries of the vaccine would be consumers and 
processors.  Current interventions and management controls/practices were assessed to ascertain 
what measures cow-calf producers have in place within their operations to mitigate against E. 
coli incidences.  
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5.4. Current use of management controls which mitigate E. coli incidences 
 
This particular section of the survey (see question 24: management practices currently in use to 
reduce E. coli incidences) was important given that at present market penetration of the E. coli 
vaccine is low, as outlined in Chapter 1 of this thesis.  In this light it is useful to know what 
current practices Canadian cow-calf producers have in place to control against the presence and 
spread of E. coli in their operations.  This low market penetration of the E. coli vaccine is 
confirmed by producer responses when asked whether they vaccinated their cattle as a form of 
management control for E. coli colonization and shedding, with 18.2% answering in the 
affirmative as shown in Figure 5.8.  For purposes of analysis, the interventions are grouped into 
common categories such as physical barriers, treatments and use of an environmental farm plan. 
5.4.1. Physical Barriers 
 
A number of interventions or management practices in question 24 require physical alteration or 
additions to the farming environment as a means of reducing the risk of the spread of the E. coli 
pathogen.  With regard to the management practice of removing of farm animals from the 
proximity of private water supplies, Figure 5.8 shows that 63.1% of cow-calf producers indicated 
that they follow this practice.  Further, 28.1% of respondents fenced off streams to prevent 
access by their livestock.  The use of fencing to keep livestock/pets from ready to eat crop areas 
was fairly common, with a majority of producers 62.1% stating that they actively keep livestock 
and pets out of these areas.  The use of vegetative buffer strips to stop run-off and control 
contamination of ready to eat crops was utilized by 43.8% of cow-calf producers, while the 
prohibition of recreational activities such as walking and camping was used by 38.4% of 
respondents.  The prevention of contact with neighbouring cows via double fencing was used by 
27.6% of producers.  In relation to the prevention of ground water system contamination from 
farm run-off, 73.9% of producers claim that they utilize this particular management control.  
This result is in contrast with the very low level of concern for E. coli contamination of water 
captured by producer’s perception of benefits flowing to municipal water agencies. 
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5.4.2. Treatment  
 
The use of probiotics as a measure to reduce E. coli shedding rates was put into practice by only 
13.8% of producers (Figure 5.8).  The treatment of water supplies through the process of 
ozonation, chlorination or ultra-violet treatment was utilized as a measure by 24.6%
15
 of 
respondents.  When respondents were asked about not mixing groups of young stock once 
formed as a measure of curbing the transmission of the E. coli pathogen, 40.4% of the 
respondents indicated that they put this control into practice.  The monitoring of private water 
supplies to identify those with higher indicator or counts, or those in high risk areas was put to 
use by 36.9% of respondents. 
5.4.3. Environmental Farm Plan 
 
The results concerning the use of an Environmental Farm Plan (EFP) suggest that a majority of 
respondents are more conscious about the impact their operations can have on the environment.  
About 63.5% of producers indicated that they currently have an environmental plan in place for 
their operations.  Statistics Canada (2013) note that the use of environmental farm plans in 
Western Canada is a relatively new phenomenon, unlike provinces such as Quebec and the 
Atlantic region where the number of farms with a formal EFP exceed the number of farms 
without a formal EFP.  Statistics Canada (2013) further state that in Quebec’s case, 
approximately seven out of ten farms had a formal EFP possibly due to provincial legislation that 
targets nutrient and manure management issues.  In contrast they noted that fewer than three out 
of ten farms in Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta and British Columbia had a formal EFP 
program.  It should be noted that in order for a farmer to be eligible to receive best management 
practices (BMPs) cost share payments, a completed EFP is required.  
Such a result can be dissected in two ways.  In spite of lack of provincial legislation being in 
place to target nutrient and manure management issues as in the Quebec case, the majority of 
respondents claim to have adopted a beneficial management practice that can help mitigate or 
                                                          
15
 This figure is surprisingly high, possibly suggesting that these survey questions are privy to 
agreement or social desirability bias and therefore should be interpreted with caution.    
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eliminate risks of pathogens such as the E. coli O157:H7.  This is an encouraging sign toward 
the future outlook of mitigation strategies, despite the low adoption of technologies such as the 
E. coli vaccine.  On the other hand, for those producers that indicated that they currently did not 
have an environmental farm plan in place, this is consistent with the use of an environmental 
farm plan in western Canada as being solely voluntary.  This result, however, differs from the 
Statistics Canada (2013) finding.  Given the fact that producers were recruited through Ipsos 
Reid’s Animal health database there is the possibility that the respondents were more likely to be 
engaged in these types of pro-active management practices, and/or the responses may suffer 
somewhat from social desirability bias, and thus this result should be interpreted cautiously.  
The more popular interventions currently being utilized by Canadian cow-calf producers based 
on the results above are related to physical barriers being strategically implemented to limit the 
E. coli pathogen.  The use of treatments or preventative methods such as use of probiotics and 
vaccination of cattle using an E. coli vaccine are not on producers’ high priority usage list.  The 
existence of a current vaccination routine may influence incentives to adopt an additional (E. 
coli) vaccine if it affects the scale of change necessary.  This section now follows. 
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Figure 5. 8: Percentage of Respondents Stating Use of E. coli Management Controls 
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Removing of farm animals from the proximity of private water supplies (e.g. At least 50m from well, 
borehole or other private water supply by fencing-off)
Prohibit recreational activities (such as walking and camping) on land where manure or slurry have been 
applied, or animals and faeces present, in previous 4 weeks.
Monitoring of private water supplies to identify those with either high indicator or counts, or those in 
areas of high risk. 
Treatment of water supplies by ozonation, chlorination or ultra -violet treatment.
Stop run-off from adjacent manured fields using vegetative buffer strips to control contamination of 
ready-to-eat crops.
Keep livestock and/or pets out of ready-to-eat crop areas, using fencing.
Fence-off streams from livestock.
Vaccinate cattle to control pathogen colonization and faecal excretion of E. coli.
Use probiotics to reduce E. coli shedding rates (e.g. E. Coli and lactobacillus strains).
Prevent contact with neighbouring cows via double fencing.
Not mixing groups of young stock once formed so as to prevent direct and indirect transmission of 
pathogens.
Prevention of ground water contamination from farm run-off.  
Use of an environmental farm plan.
91 
 
Overall, from the listed management controls presented to respondents above, four of these 
controls qualify for BMPs.  These include: removing of farm animals from the proximity of 
private water supplies, stopping run-off from adjacent manured fields using vegetative buffer 
strips to control contamination of ready-to-eat crops, fencing-off streams from livestock, and 
lastly, prevention of ground water contamination from farm run-off.  Literature suggests that on 
average, 52.5% of farmers are willing to use these BMPs in comparison to 32% that are willing 
to use the other listed management controls.  A case can thus be made for the inclusion of the 
management control of vaccinating cattle to mitigate against pathogen colonization and faecal 
excretion of E. coli as part of BMPs in order to encourage wider adoption of the E.coli vaccine.  
However, literature on BMPs suggests that if these controls do not fit in well with the current 
farming routine/protocol, farmers are not likely to adopt them despite incentive payments 
associated with BMPs.   
5.5. Existence of a vaccination routine/protocol 
 
One of the inhibitors to the adoption of the E. coli vaccine is the expected impact it might have 
on the cost of production.  Thus the extent to which cow-calf producers can include an E. coli 
vaccine in their existing vaccination routine is relevant since this may be less costly than if the E. 
coli vaccine is administered as a standalone solution.  Respondents were asked a series of 
questions in the survey including whether they currently vaccinate their calves against any form 
of diseases (see question 12).  An overwhelming amount of producers, 86.7%, responded in the 
affirmative, and only 13.3% indicated that they currently did not vaccinate their calves. 
A follow-up question was posed asking how often most of the calves are vaccinated (question 
13).  Cow-calf producer responses in this case were consistent with a priori expectations, with 
48.8% stating that they vaccinated twice a year while 38.9% vaccinated once a year.  Only 3% of 
producers indicated they vaccinated their calves/cattle more than twice a year.  Bioniche Life 
Sciences Inc. recommends that calves be vaccinated twice a year using the E. coli vaccine. 
Respondents were then asked who typically vaccinated their cattle (see question 14) and the 
majority of producers, 72.9%, specified that they typically do the vaccinations themselves.  
About 5.4% of respondents indicated that they utilize their veterinarians, while 4.4% stated they 
do it themselves but with the supervision of their veterinarians and 3.9% indicated an employee 
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carries out the vaccination process.  The Econiche vaccine protocol is such that Bioniche Life 
Sciences Inc. strongly recommends veterinarian support given that the vaccine is only made 
available through a veterinary specialist, who either administers the vaccine or supervises the 
process.  This result thus suggests that the need to use a veterinarian could deter adoption due to 
added costs.  On the other hand, this can be seen as a feasible way to verify the use of an E. coli 
vaccine through a third party which may be useful in the emergence of specialized vaccinated 
cattle supply chains.  In relation to how much cow-calf producers spend in total on vaccines per 
year for each calf, 30% of respondents indicated that they spent on average about $5-$6.99, 
while 28% and 26.6% of producers stated that they spent more than $7 and between $1-$4.99, 
respectively, per calf.   
Having established the existence of an ongoing vaccination protocol that has potential in 
affecting the cost of adoption, the survey further sought to identify other barriers to adoption 
faced by Canadian cow-calf producers.  The following section provides details of these barriers. 
5.6. Barriers to adoption of the E. coli Vaccine 
 
This section presents a set of potential issues that could have deterred producers from adopting 
the vaccine.  Respondents were asked to indicate with a ‘yes’ or a ‘no’ whether these issues 
qualified as barriers (see question 28). To recall, these barriers were identified through the 
review of literature and pre-test interviews conducted in the survey design.  Based on the results, 
the underlying theme resonating from the data is that Canadian cow-calf producers are risk 
seeking when it comes to the investment in technologies such as the E. coli vaccine.   
The uncertainty of whether the adoption of the E. coli vaccine would meet the needs of the 
buyer(s) of my cattle was considered to be a major barrier.  The majority of producers, 71.4% 
indicated that such uncertainty was enough to deter them from using the E. coli vaccine. 
Uncertainty about whether adoption of the E. coli vaccine will improve food safety was also 
found to be a significant barrier, with 68.5% of producers specifying that this particular issue 
served as a deterrent to adoption of the vaccine technology.  Another issue involving uncertainty 
was the issue of pay-off/premiums being available as a result of adoption of the E. coli vaccine.  
The majority of producers, 76.8% stated that this issue deters them from adopting (Figure 5.9). 
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Other perceived barriers, such as the cost of production, were expected to be of major concern 
for Canadian cow-calf producers in their quest to remain competitive and profitable in their 
operations.  Thus there was an a priori expectation that costs would be an important barrier to 
adoption.  Respondents were divided with respect to incurring an additional cost as a result of 
adoption, with approximately half of the producers, 49.3% indicating this as a deterrent to 
adoption (Figure 5.9). Other issues presented as potential deterrents to adoption were not 
perceived to be significant barriers.  These include: not enough of my neighbours adopting, 
which is fairly consistently sidelined as a non-influential factor in producer decisions throughout 
the results (see BWS analysis).  Furthermore, food safety issues not being sufficiently important 
to warrant investment on E. coli vaccines were perceived as a barrier by only 24.1% of 
respondents.  
Based on the discussion above, the issues that would deter cow-calf producers from adopting an 
E. coli vaccine appear to be more related to uncertainty as to whether the vaccine would address 
food safety concerns, meet buyer needs, and generate the necessary premiums to allow 
recoupment of investment in vaccine technology.  This suggests that these barriers can be 
addressed using incentives that lessen the uncertainty surrounding the adoption of the E. coli 
vaccine.  The Best-Worst Scaling (BWS) analysis is used to assess the influence of these 
incentives on producer adoption decisions.  
Having presented and discussed the barriers to adoption of an E. coli vaccine, 13 incentives 
which can potentially influence the adoption decision were identified from the literature and pre-
survey interviews.  The analysis of these incentives through BWS is presented in the next 
section.   
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Figure 5. 9: Barriers to Adoption 
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5.7. BWS Analysis 
 
The main objective of this analysis is to examine the relative strengths of various incentives to 
adopt the E. coli vaccine technology.  As discussed in the introductory chapter, the current 
under-utilization of the vaccine, despite its availability since 2008, is likely due to the positive 
spill-over effects accruing to other stakeholders within the supply chain other than the 
technology adopters.  
Following the formula specified in the analytical method section 4.7.2 of the methodological 
chapter, a standard score was computed.  This initial simplified rank ordering process creates 
individual-level scales for each attribute that are easily comparable across the entire sample 
(Coltman et al., 2011).  These attribute scales are computed from the individual B-W scores of 
each respondent, aggregated across the sample for each identified incentive. 
In order to calculate the ranking of the various incentives used in the sample data, a first 
calculation of the results is computed using the standard BWS summary statistics.  Table 5.2 
shows the importance (influence) and ranking of each attribute or incentive presented in the 
BWS choice tasks, ranked in terms of most to least important.  The maximum difference is 
measured as the difference between total best scores and total worst scores marked for each 
incentive presented in the survey (aggregated B-W score) (see the explanation in section 4.7.2).   
Based on the aggregated B-W across respondents and standard scores, the data indicated that the 
incentives “premiums for E. coli vaccinated cattle are available through various programs (e.g. 
branded beef program) within the supply chain” (selected 307 times with a 0.378 standard score) 
and “subsidy to compensate the costs of my adoption of the vaccine is available through a 
government funded vaccination program” (selected 280 times and 0.345 standard score) are 
perceived as the most preferred and second most respectively in incentivizing producers to adopt 
the E. coli vaccine across the entire sample.  In addition, supply chain co-ordination in the form 
of “my buyer requiring use of an E. coli vaccine as part of production protocol as a condition for 
accepting my calves/cattle” was the third most influential incentive (selected 260 times with a 
score of 0.320).  This was followed by the “attraction of new sets of buyers” as the fourth most 
influential incentive (selected 110 times with a score of 0.135) as a result of vaccinating cattle 
with the E. coli vaccine.  Recommendation from my veterinarian to use the E. coli vaccine in my 
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operations was the fifth most influential incentive (selected 88 times with a score of 0.108), 
while “I can include an E. coli vaccination in my existing vaccination routine” was selected as 
the sixth most important incentive (selected 86 times with a score of 0.106) (Table 5.2).   
These results reveal that the top five incentives are dominated by market/supply chain oriented 
incentives (availability of premiums through branded beef programs, attraction of new sets of 
buyers and buyer requiring use of vaccine as part of production protocol).  This suggests the 
possibility of closer supply chain co-ordination, such as branded beef programs, as a potential 
means to strengthen the current low adoption rates. 
On the other hand, the least preferred or influential incentive for the entire sample is 
“government recommending the use of the E. coli vaccine” which garnered a total worst count of 
482 responses, with an aggregated B-W score and standard score of (-427 and -0.526).  The 
second least influential incentive is “my neighbours adopting the E. coli vaccine” with an 
aggregated B-W and standard score of (-297 and -0.366). 
In the theoretical considerations chapter, the framework of the Tragedy of Anti-Commons was 
discussed.  This particular theory explored the notion of the majority of other cow-calf 
producers’ adoption influencing producers to adopt the E. coli vaccine technology.  This notion, 
however did not hold as indicated by the results.  Therefore, if cow-calf producers within close 
proximity are adopting, other producers are not more likely to adopt for this reason.  The third 
least influential incentive in Table 5.2 is “feedlots providing an assurance that they will give my 
cattle a booster of the E. coli vaccine to maintain the immunity of my cattle” (-203 and -0.250).  
The idea behind this incentive was to preserve or protect the investment that a cow-calf producer 
makes if they adopted the E. coli vaccine, given the fact that feedlots may also deal with non-
vaccinated cattle.  The implications of these results are such that these incentives are unlikely to 
change the behaviour of cow-calf producers. 
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Table 5.2: Best-Worst Scaling Summary Statistics 
Incentive Total 
Best 
Total 
Worst 
Aggregated 
B-W Score 
Average B -W 
Score 
(Standard 
Score) 
Ranking 
based on 
Standard 
Score 
Premiums available 
through beef branded 
programs 
392 85 307 0.378 1 
Subsidy to compensate 
costs of adoption is 
available 
357 77 280 0.345 2 
My buyer requiring use of 
vaccine as part of 
production protocol 
327 67 260 0.320 3 
Attraction of new buyers 
for vaccinated cattle 
249 139 110 0.135 4 
Recommendation from my 
veterinarian 
245 157 88 0.108 5 
I can include vaccine in 
existing vaccination routine 
205 119 86 0.106 6 
Through vaccination my 
farm is less exposed to E. 
coli 
193 136 57 0.070 7 
My reputation as a cattle 
producer is at risk 
157 172 -15 -0.018 8 
Duration of immunity is 
greater than 6 months 
160 203 -43 -0.053 9 
Beef products can be 
traced to my farm 
165 213 -48 -0.059 10 
Feedlots providing booster 
assurance 
83 286 -203 -0.250 11 
My neighbours adopting E. 
coli vaccine 
51 348 -297 -0.366 12 
Government 
recommending use of 
vaccine 
55 482 -427 -0.526 13 
 
Table 5.2 presents a simple ranking of incentives.  To understand the extent to which one 
incentive was more influential than another, the B-W scores are standardized to probabilistic 
ratio or interval scales.  This allows the relative importance/influence of the incentives to be 
meaningfully analyzed.  To recall, the Sqrt (B-W) in Table 5.3 for all the presented incentives is 
scaled by a factor such that the most influential incentive that has the highest Sqrt (B-W) takes 
the interval scale of 100 in this case “my buyer requiring use of an E. coli vaccine as part of 
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production protocol as a condition for accepting my calves/cattle”.  All other incentives are 
compared relative to the high ranking interval.  After the B-W scores were transformed into a 
standardized sqrt interval scale, the ranking in relation to the most important/influential incentive 
changed.  The incentive “my buyer requiring use of an E. coli vaccine as part of production 
protocol as a condition for accepting my calves/cattle” based on the standardized interval scale 
became the most influential incentive with other top five incentives shifting rank
16
 within this 
echelon, as shown in Table 5.3.  This was followed by “subsidy to compensate the costs of my 
adoption of the vaccine is available through a government funded vaccination” and then 
“premiums for E. coli vaccinated cattle are available through various programs (e.g. branded 
beef program) within the supply chain”.  On the other end of the spectrum, the least influential 
incentives remained unchanged.  
As noted earlier, the standardized interval scale allows for a more meaningful interpretation and 
cross comparison of incentives relative to the most important/influential incentive.  The incentive 
“my buyer requiring use of an E. coli vaccine as part of production protocol as a condition for 
accepting my calves/cattle” is the most influential incentive while “government recommending 
use of E. coli vaccine” is the least influential incentive taking into account all producer responses 
across the entire sample.  Bearing this result in mind, the results show that incentives such as 
“subsidy to compensate the costs of my adoption of the vaccine is available through a 
government funded vaccination program” and “premiums for E. coli vaccinated cattle are 
available through various programs (e.g. branded beef program) within the supply chain” are 
0.97 times as influential to producers as “my buyer requiring use of an E. coli vaccine as part of 
production protocol as a condition for accepting my calves/cattle” (Table 5.3).  The attraction of 
new sets of buyers as an incentive to adoption is 0.60 times as influential as “my buyer requiring 
use of an E. coli vaccine as part of production protocol as a condition for accepting my 
calves/cattle”.  Such a result, together with the relatively low influence of the incentives 
“government recommending use of E. coli vaccine”, “my neighbours (other cattle producers) are 
adopting the E. coli vaccine” and “feedlots providing an assurance that they will give my cattle a 
                                                          
16
 The intuition behind this change is that the SQRT B-W utilizes the formula total best/total 
worst. The incentive my buyer requiring use of vaccine received the least amount of worst counts 
which aided in this incentive yielding the highest SQRT B-W, becoming the most influential 
incentive and therefore the reference incentive. 
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booster of the E. coli vaccine to maintain immunity of my cattle”, are thought-provoking 
outcomes.  Thus incentives that are not concerned with market/supply chain dynamics which can 
allow for growth opportunities as a result of adoption do not appear to be very influential.    
 
The standardized interval scale also reveals key information on the relative importance of these 
incentives.  A closer inspection of the results shows a large drop between the third and fourth 
incentives, which highlights the relative equal importance of the top three incentives that were 
identified as being suitable for broader targeting given their homogeneity amongst respondents.  
Furthermore, the fourth through to the seventh incentives are also of similar importance although 
respondents did not uniformly agree on their importance as shown by the heterogeneity of the 
incentives.  This pattern of results continues, with incentives eight to ten showing similar 
importance, followed by the last three which are much lower compared to the most important 
incentive.   
 
  
 
 
1
0
0 
Table 5.3: BWS Relative Importance and Heterogeneity Summary Statistics 
Incentive Mean of 
Individual 
B-W 
Var of 
Individual 
B-W 
Stdev of 
Individual 
B-W 
Stdev/
Mean 
Sqrt B-W Standardized 
Sqrt Interval 
Scale (Relative 
Importance) 
Ranking 
based on 
Standardized 
Scale 
Ranking 
based on 
Standard 
Score 
My buyer requiring use of 
vaccine as part of production 
protocol 
1.28 2.79 1.67 1.30 2.21 100.0 1 3 
Subsidy to compensate costs 
of adoption 
1.38 3.50 1.87 1.36 2.15 97.4 2 2 
Premiums available through 
programs 
1.51 3.53 1.88 1.24 2.15 97.2 3 1 
Attraction of new buyers for 
vaccinated cattle 
0.54 3.85 1.96 3.62 1.34 60.6 4 4 
I can include vaccine in 
existing vaccination routine 
0.42 2.97 1.72 4.07 1.31 59.4 5 6 
Recommendation from my 
veterinarian 
0.43 4.22 2.05 4.74 1.25 56.5 6 5 
Through vaccination my 
farm is less exposed to E. coli 
0.28 2.14 1.46 5.21 1.19 53.9 7 7 
My reputation as a cattle 
producer is at risk 
-0.07 3.00 1.73 -23.43 0.96 43.2 8 8 
Duration of immunity is 
greater than 6 months 
-0.21 3.27 1.81 -8.54 0.89 40.2 9 9 
Beef products can be traced 
to my farm 
-0.24 3.64 1.91 -8.07 0.88 39.8 10 10 
Feedlots providing booster 
assurance 
-1.00 2.52 1.59 -1.59 0.54 24.4 11 11 
My neighbours adopting E. 
coli vaccine 
-1.46 3.14 1.77 -1.21 0.38 17.3 12 12 
Government recommending 
use of vaccine 
-2.10 3.02 1.74 -0.83 0.34 15.3 13 13 
Notes: Column 2 aggregated B-W score/No. of observations (203).  Column 3, variance of individual B-W scores.  Column 4, 
Standard deviations of individual B-W scores. Column 5, Standard deviation of individual scores/mean of individual scores. Column 
6, square root of total best/total worst.  Column 7, see BWS analysis for detailed explanation.  
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To summarize, the influence/preference analysis of the 13 identified incentives, shows that cow-
calf producers respond to the presence of incentives to different degrees.  The results point 
towards cow-calf producers being more driven, above all, by market/supply chain oriented 
incentives, as well as financial support/guarantees in the form of government subsidies in order 
to increase their willingness to adopt the E. coli vaccine technology.  Also, taking the 
standardized ratio scale structure into account, supply chain co-ordination represented by “my 
buyer requiring use of an E. coli vaccine as part of production protocol as a condition for 
accepting my calves/cattle”, “premiums for E. coli vaccinated cattle are available through 
various programs (e.g. branded beef program) within the supply chain”, and “attraction of new 
sets of buyers” appear to be particularly important in incentivizing cow-calf producers to adopt 
the E. coli vaccine.  It should be noted however, that such supply chain co-ordination efforts 
would need to be initiated by downstream supply chain participants in order for cow-calf 
producers to be more receptive toward the inclusion of such food safety improvement initiatives.  
This reinforces the notion that producers respond to market pressures and incentives from 
downstream participants.   
5.8. BWS Choice Heterogeneity Analysis 
 
Although the initial results of the BWS give a clear indication as to which incentives are 
considered to be the most and least influential by the respondents as a whole, the exploration of 
preference/influence heterogeneity provides further insights.  As noted by Adamsen et al. (2013), 
the initial case 1 of B-W analysis does not capture any heterogeneity that might be present in the 
data.  The calculations of the variance, more specifically the standard deviation of the individual 
BWS scores, can be used to ascertain whether the choices of cow-calf producers were selected 
consistently or whether they are heterogeneous across the sample.   
As is observable in Table 5.3, all 13 incentives have standard deviations above 1 which is an 
indication of the existence of respondent heterogeneity in their response to the incentives.  To 
establish the extent of heterogeneity in producer preferences, the individual standard deviation to 
individual mean of B-W score ratio is utilized (Stdev/Mean). High absolute ratios of Stdev/Mean 
suggest greater heterogeneity, whereas absolute ratios that are equivalent to zero or close indicate 
total or more agreement in the degree of influence respectively.  From Table 5.3 it can be seen 
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that the incentives with lower Stdev/Mean ratios tend towards homogeneity, meaning that cow-
calf producers were for the most part in agreement as to the relative influence or non-influence of 
these particular incentives.   
These incentives include: (“premiums for E. coli vaccinated cattle are available through various 
programs (e.g. branded beef program) within the supply chain”, “government recommending use 
of vaccine”, “my neighbours (other cattle producers) are adopting the E. coli vaccine”, “subsidy 
to compensate the costs of my adoption of the vaccine is available through a government funded 
vaccination program”, and “my buyer requiring use of an E. coli vaccine as part of production 
protocol as a condition for accepting my calves/cattle”).  On the other hand, other incentives 
such as (“beef products from my calves/cattle can be traced back to my farm”, “recommendation 
from my veterinarian to use the E. coli vaccine in my operations”, “my reputation as a cattle 
producer is at risk because of higher consumer expectations concerning food safety”, “I can 
include an E. coli vaccination in my existing vaccination routine”, “attraction of a new set of 
buyers for my vaccinated cattle”, “duration of immunity for calves/cattle is greater than 6 
months”, and “through vaccination, my farm is less exposed to the effects of E. coli outbreaks 
such as beef recalls and supply disruptions at packing plants”) all have Stdev/Mean ratios well 
above 1 strongly indicating substantial heterogeneity among cow-calf producer responses 
regarding the relative importance or influence of these incentives to the adoption of the vaccine.  
Muller and Rungie (2009) suggest that special attention should be paid to attributes that show a 
high degree of heterogeneity and reasonable influence as they imply significant importance to a 
subset of respondents, even though these incentives may not be important to all respondents.  
Thus incentives which have a low mean B-W score but high degree of heterogeneity such as “my 
reputation as a cattle producer is at risk because of higher consumer expectations concerning 
food safety” with an individual mean of (-0.07) and Stdev/mean ratio of (-23.43) are suitable for 
narrow targeting, particularly if policy makers want to spur adoption of food safety initiatives 
such as the E. coli vaccine from smaller segments of cow-calf producers. Taking into 
consideration that the adoption of the E. coli vaccine is currently voluntary in nature, this 
suggests that some cow-calf producers may not deem it necessary to adopt.  Therefore, one-size-
fits all type of strategies may not be effective.  Thus more efficient targeting or differentiated 
policies for sub-groups of producers may be more appropriate.  
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On the other hand, heterogeneity can present challenges for policymakers and industry strategists 
in broadly targeting incentives from the standpoint that widespread adoption of the E. coli 
vaccine may be preferred.  Therefore, incentives that are more homogeneous amongst cow-calf 
producers could be ideal for broader targeting.  These incentives included: “my buyer requiring 
use of an E. coli vaccine as part of production protocol as a condition for accepting my 
calves/cattle” with a Stdev/mean ratio of (1.30), and “subsidy to compensate the costs of my 
adoption of the vaccine is available through a government funded vaccination program” (1.36), 
“premiums for E. coli vaccinated cattle are available through various programs (e.g. branded 
beef program) within the supply chain” (1.24).  On the other end of the scale, homogeneity was 
also found to be present in the bottom three ranking incentives which included: “feedlots 
providing an assurance that they will give my cattle a booster of the E. coli vaccine to maintain 
immunity of my cattle” (1.59), “my neighbours (other cattle producers) are adopting the E. coli 
vaccine” (1.21), and “government recommending use of E. coli vaccine” (0.83).  This suggests 
that these set of incentives may be suitable for broader targeting for purposes of achieving wider 
adoption of the E. coli vaccine, however, producer buy-in would not be strong.  As noted in 
section 4.8 of the methodological chapter, the Stdev/mean ratio signals the possible existence of 
sub-sections of producers that are homogenous within their sub-group and heterogeneous across 
other sub-groups.  A Latent Class cluster analysis is performed to identify unique 
classes/segments of cow-calf producers within the data set.   
5.9. Latent Class Analysis 
 
Latent Class cluster analysis was discussed in the methodology chapter of this thesis.  Coltman et 
al. (2011), summarizing this approach, note that LC analysis enables one to derive a maximum 
likelihood based statistical model that accounts simultaneously for both the similarity and 
differences between individuals or firms.  Furthermore, the authors state that this method also 
allows one to: (1) classify subtypes of related cases based on unobserved (latent) heterogeneity, 
(2) estimate posterior probabilities that a specific individual/firm falls into a particular class, and; 
(3) include exogenous variables (covariates) to enable simultaneous segment classification and 
description.  
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With the empirical estimation of the latent class model the aim is to assess what type of cow-calf 
producers prefer each of the incentives and how the social, economic, geographical and locus of 
control considerations influence their choices.  Several models were estimated in order to select 
the optimal number of unique classes/segments within the data.  Beyond the estimation of five 
classes, degrees of freedom became negative and thus five classes was considered to be the upper 
threshold of segments for this dataset.   
The process that was used to formally identify the number of classes or segments present in the 
data was based on the information criteria scores.  As a general rule, the lower the value, the 
better the model fit.  According to Coltman et al. (2011) information criteria scores are derived 
by assessing the degree of improvement in explanatory power adjusted by degrees of freedom.  
Although the most commonly used information criteria are the Akaike information criterion 
(AIC) and the Bayesian information criterion (BIC), in similar style to Coltman et al. (2011), this 
study opted to use the consistent Akaike information criterion (CAIC) and the Akaike 
information criterion 3 (AIC3) as these criteria are considered to yield more conservative 
estimates.  This is from the premise that these criteria factor in parsimony by penalizing the Log-
Likelihood goodness-of-fit values to account for the number of parameters in the model 
(Coltman et al., 2011).  Table 5.4 contains the classification statistics including the Log-
Likelihood value, number of parameters and classification errors.  These estimates are commonly 
employed in order to select the optimal number of classes in addition to the information criteria.   
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Table 5.4: Measure of Model Fit and Parsimony by Latent Class Cluster 
Number of Segments 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Log Likelihood -5071 -5022 -4993 -4965 -4938 
Bayesian Information Criteria 10679 10693 10745 10800 10860 
Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) 10345 10288 10272 10257 10247 
Akaike Information Criteria 3 
(AIC3) 
10446 10410 10415 10421 10432 
Consistent AIC (CAIC) 10780 10815 10888 10964 11045 
Number of parameters 101 125 149 173 197 
Degrees of Freedom 102 78 54 30 6 
Classification Error 0.000 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.105 
 
The interpretation of the statistics contained in Table 5.4 follows.  All the statistics are assessed 
collectively to ensure that the final choice of number of unique segments is an accurate fit to the 
data.  The Log-Likelihood statistic, similar to the information criteria, should be low to indicate a 
good model fit.  A closer look at the AIC3 and CAIC shows an increase of these statistics 
beyond the third segment, a pattern used in determining the ideal class fit.  It is worth mentioning 
that a two cluster solution based on these information criteria statistics seemed ideal, yet, a 
review of the probability loadings on each incentive changed this conclusion as the loadings 
were positive and negative duplicates of each other.  The number of parameters is also of 
considerable importance, as models with fewer numbers of parameters are considered a better fit 
as noted by Coltman et al. (2011).  In this instance, compared to the four and five cluster 
solutions, the three cluster solution has a lower number of parameters (149).  Finally, the 
classification error for segment three was (0.09), the same as the four cluster solution and better 
than five clusters.  Again, the lower the classification error, the better the model fit.   
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Based on the magnitude of the AIC3 and CAIC statistics, as well on the criteria of parsimony, 
classification error and probability loadings distribution, the results of the Latent Class cluster 
analysis reveal the existence of three unique classes/segments of cow-calf producers.  As can be 
observed in Table 5.5, the relative influence of producer incentives differs across segments with 
each cluster influenced differently by the incentives.  Furthermore, several covariates were found 
to be significant in determining class membership.  In the following discussion, the terms class, 
cluster and segments are synonymous and as such these terms are used interchangeably.  
As discussed in section 4.8 the covariates included in the Latent Class estimation were gender, 
age, education, years as principal decision maker, years planning on continuing as a cow-calf 
producer, percentage of sales/revenues derived from cow-calf operations, importance of cow-calf 
operations to livelihood, province, and locus of control.  The selection of these characteristics 
follows the literature where empirical studies have utilized similar socio-demographic and 
behavioural characteristics to determine the class membership of individuals or firms in latent 
class analysis.   
In order to facilitate discussion, the three clusters were given names based on the incentives that 
appear to be influential in these segments.  Cluster 1 was more influenced by market/supply 
chain oriented incentives, cluster 2, production protocol incentives, and cluster 3 was influenced 
by incentives that relate to risk aversion.  Table 5.5 shows the probability of cow-calf producers 
falling within each of the three clusters (class size), 58%, 24% and 18% respectively, as well the 
probabilities of the 13 incentives being selected as influential in each of the three 
clusters/segments. 
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Table 5.5: Characteristics of Latent Class Clusters 
 
 
 
Class Size 
Cluster1 
Market/Supply 
Chain 
58% 
 Cluster2 
Production 
Protocol 
24% 
 Cluster3 
Risk Averse 
 
18% 
  
 Most 
Influential 
Incentives 
Prob. Most 
Influential 
Incentives 
Prob. Most 
Influential 
Incentives 
Prob.  
Most Attraction of 
new sets of 
buyers 
0.42 Duration of 
immunity > 
6 months 
0.89 Beef products 
can be traced 
to my farm 
0.52  
2nd My buyer 
requiring use of 
vaccine 
0.39 Feedlots 
providing 
assurance 
0.21 My reputation 
as cattle 
producer is at 
risk 
0.26  
3rd Premiums for 
E. coli 
vaccinated 
cattle available 
0.34 My 
neighbours 
adopting the 
vaccine 
0.20 Government 
recommending 
use of vaccine 
0.14  
4th   I can include 
vaccine as 
part of 
existing 
vaccination 
routine 
0.19 My 
neighbours 
adopting the 
vaccine 
0.13  
 
Cluster 1, the market/supply chain cluster, with a 58% class probability, represents the largest 
group of respondents.  Attraction of a new set of buyers for vaccinated cattle and “my buyer 
requiring use of vaccine as part of production protocol as a condition for accepting my 
calves/cattle” are the two most influential incentives, followed by “premiums for E. coli 
vaccinated cattle are available through various programs (e.g. branded programs) within the 
supply chain”.  Thus, a significant portion of cow-calf producers prefer incentives that can 
translate to growth opportunities. 
Cow-calf producers in this segment can be said to be mainly characterized by downstream 
supply chain/market oriented incentives, as indicated by the higher probability loadings on the 
most influential incentives in this segment.   The notion of supply chain co-ordination is fairly 
strong among respondents in this cluster, with producers more likely to be influenced by 
market/supply chain type incentives in their decision to adopt the E. coli vaccine.     
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The adoption incentives that are most influential in cluster 2 (24% class probability) are more 
production protocol oriented.  This segment of producers place the most emphasis on “duration 
of immunity for my calves/cattle is greater than six months” and “feedlots providing an 
assurance that they will give my cattle a booster of the E. coli vaccine to maintain immunity of 
my cattle”.  This is followed by “my neighbours (other cattle producers) are adopting the E. coli 
vaccine” and “I can include an E. coli vaccination in my existing vaccination routine”.   
This particular class of cow-calf producers can be considered to be assurance seekers.  They are 
driven or influenced by incentives that guarantee that their initial investment in the E. coli 
vaccine technology is safeguarded, as seen in the higher probability loadings on the incentives 
mentioned above.  The significant influence of these particular incentives in this segment 
particularly “my neighbours (other cattle producers) are adopting the E. coli vaccine” might be 
interpreted as a way to use another producer’s learning curve to become more efficient and 
effective once the decision of adoption is finally made.   
Following from the theoretical considerations chapter, including the Tragedy of Anti-Commons, 
if neighbours are adopting the E. coli vaccine, there is more assurance that if a cattle producer 
utilizes the same pool of feedlots and retains ownership of their cattle, exposure to E. coli risk is 
reduced.  What is interesting is that these producers were less likely to be motivated by 
incentives that represent supply chain co-ordination dynamics. This therefore signals that 
guarantees regarding vaccine efficacy and the production characteristics of the technology in this 
class of producers take precedence over supply chain co-ordination incentives.  For this cluster 
of cow-calf producers, technological change policies which focus on improving ease of use and 
ease of adoption into existing production protocols, allowing adoption of the E. coli vaccine to 
be made less expensive or to be included within existing BMP programs may be effective. 
Cluster 3, with a class probability of 18%, rates “beef products from my calves/cattle can be 
traced back to my farm” as the most important/influential incentive, followed by “my reputation 
as a cattle producer is at risk because of higher consumer expectations concerning food safety”, 
“government recommending use of E. coli vaccine for cattle” and “my neighbour (other cattle 
producers) are adopting the E. coli vaccine”.  This particular class can be said to be characterized 
as risk-averse from the perspective that cow-calf producers in this segment are more influenced 
by incentives relating to E. coli risk in relation to exposure to their farming operations.  These 
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producers are concerned about their reputations as farmers being at risk as a result of potential E. 
coli outbreaks, which can lead to beef recalls and possible supply chain disruptions as well as 
liability risks.  
Overall, due to positive externalities/public good attributes, and information asymmetry as a 
result of the pooling effect discussed in Chapter 3, the under-production of the E. coli vaccine 
has led to an incomplete market as a result of market failure.  This concept of an incomplete 
market can be addressed through various incentives that have been found to motivate cow-calf 
producers in their respective unique segments.  The influence of these incentives can therefore be 
viewed as mirror images of the issues that cow-calf producers in these segments might be 
concerned about prior to their adoption decisions.  The creation of such incentives may serve in 
stifling the current market failure, however, these incentives are currently not available hence the 
failure of the market to produce vaccinated cattle.  For example, in the case of cluster 1, putting 
mechanisms in place in the form of governance structures that are able to identify new markets 
and define production protocols that meet buyer needs, which then may create avenues for 
premiums to be established that can perhaps address the market failure situation if brought on 
stream. 
5.10. Covariates 
 
A total of 10 covariates were utilized in the Latent Class cluster analysis.  Out of these 10 
covariates, 4 were found to be statistically significant and thus provide further insight into the 
three unique producer segment/classes identified in the data.  These covariates include: age, 
duration as a principal decision maker, sales/revenues generated from cow-calf operations, and 
external locus of control.  This significance is evidenced by the p-values and high Wald statistics 
shown in Table 5.6. The variables that were not significant in explaining class membership 
included gender, education, continuity as cow-calf producer, and the province of operation.  The 
significant covariates will now be discussed in the context of the three producer classes. Table 
5.8 shows the probability loadings of the significant covariates by cluster. 
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Table 5.6: Significant Covariates 
Covariates Wald p-value  
Gender 0.18 0.91 n.s. 
Age 6.14 0.046 ** 
Education 1.06 0.59 n.s. 
Duration as principal decision maker 5.36 0.068 * 
Continuity 3.41 0.18 n.s. 
Sales/Revenues 6.89 0.032 ** 
Livelihood 0.64 0.73 n.s. 
Province 3.06 0.22 n.s. 
Internal Locus 0.20 0.91 n.s. 
External Locus 8.69 0.013 *** 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
5.10.1. Age 
 
This variable, although collected as actual age in the survey, was re-coded into a categorical 
variable in order to preserve degrees of freedom in the latent class analysis estimation.  These 
categories took the form of a count variable, with 1 representing cow-calf producers in the age 
range 25-34 years, 2 for ages 35-44 years, 3 for ages 45-54 years, 4 for ages 55-64 years, and 5 
for producers older than 64 years.  Age was found to be a significant covariate at the 5% level of 
significance, as shown in Table 5.6.  As can be seen in Table 5.7, producers who fell in the 25-34 
age category were more likely to belong to cluster 1 or 3 with slightly differing probabilities.  
This perhaps can be taken as young cow-calf producers seeking greater opportunities for growth, 
but given less experience, are also likely to be more risk-averse as they learn the cow-calf 
business.  As the age range advances, the probability of producers belonging to segment/cluster 1 
increased, with a noticeable change in those producers greater than 64 years.  This age category 
was split, with 51% and 42% likely to belong in segments 1 and 2 respectively.  Overall, those 
producers that range between the ages of 35 to 64 are likely to belong to cluster 1, which is 
dominated by downstream supply and market oriented incentives. 
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Table 5.7: Probabilities of Significant Covariates by Class Cluster 
Covariates Cluster1 Cluster2 Cluster3 
 Prob. Prob. Prob. 
Age    
25-34 years 0.43 0.24 0.33 
35-44 years 0.64 0.06 0.30 
45-54 years 0.67 0.20 0.13 
55-64 years 0.56 0.24 0.20 
>64 years 0.51 0.43 0.06 
Principal Decision Maker    
Less than 4 years 0.33 0.12 0.55 
5-20 years 0.75 0.13 0.12 
21-35 years 0.65 0.19 0.16 
35 years and over 0.41 0.37 0.22 
Sales/Revenues    
0-24% 0.53 0.12 0.34 
25-49% 0.58 0.26 0.16 
50-79% 0.62 0.27 0.11 
80-100% 0.62 0.37 0.01 
External Locus     
Completely disagree 0.63 0.10 0.27 
Somewhat disagree 0.58 0.19 0.23 
Neutral 0.62 0.23 0.15 
Somewhat agree 0.44 0.42 0.14 
Completely agree 0.0009 0.98 0.02 
 
5.10.2. Duration as Principal Decision Maker 
 
This particular variable was collected as a categorical variable in the producer survey. With 
category 1, representing producers with less than 4 years as principal decision makers, 2 for 5-20 
years of experience, 3 for 21-35 years and lastly, 4 for producers with 35 years and over as 
principal decision makers.  The duration as a principal decision maker in the cow-calf operations 
was found to be significant at the 10% level of significance as seen in Table 5.6.  Cow-calf 
producers that have less than 4 years of experience were more likely to belong to segment/cluster 
3, at 55%, which suggests this segment may be more attuned to reputation-based incentives and 
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thus are more risk averse given the duration as principal decision makers.  In the 6-10 and 10-25 
year categories, the probability of cow-calf producers belonging to segment/cluster 1 and 2 is 
74% and 64% respectively.  For those producers with more than 35 years as principal decision 
makers, there is almost an equal split in their probabilities to belong to both segment 1 or 2 at 
41% and 37% respectively.  Similar to age, a possible interpretation would be that producers in 
this category have enough experience to also see value in selecting incentives that provide 
assurance in the adoption process as they endeavor to achieve efficiency and maximize 
profitability. 
5.10.3. Sales/Revenues 
 
In relation to percentage of sales/revenues derived from cow-calf operations, this particular 
covariate was significant at the 5% level as shown in Table 5.6.  Observing from Table 5.7, it can 
be seen that as the level of sales/revenues from cow-calf operations increases, the probabilities of 
producers belonging to cluster 1 also increases.  This similar pattern is also observed in cluster 2, 
with those producers having sales/revenues from cow-calf operations of 80-100% having a 37% 
probability of belonging to segment 2.  This result suggests that as the cow-calf operations 
become the mainstay of producers, the importance placed on growth opportunities and supply 
chain co-ordination increases. This takes place in tandem with their investment protection 
awareness, resulting in producers seeking incentives that are more assurance motivated.  
Segment 3 on the other hand shows the reverse effect, with the probability decreasing as 
dependency on operations increases. 
5.10.4. Locus of Control 
 
The two locus of control variables included as covariates in the Latent Class cluster analysis 
were created from the seven locus of control questions included in the Canadian cow-calf 
producer survey as seen in Table 5.8.  These variables were measured in the form of a Likert 
scale, with 1 indicating a respondent being completely in disagreement with the locus statements, 
and 5 completely in agreement (see survey question 29: a, b and d) for internal loci and external 
loci (c, e and f).  A priori, the locus questions were categorized into internal and external loci and 
thus those questions representing internal loci and external loci were transformed into single 
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variables through an average calculation.  The internal locus control questions were summed and 
averaged by the number of questions (locus (a) + locus (b) + locus (d)/3 to yield a single 
variable.  A similar transformation was done for the external locus of control (locus(c) + locus 
(e) + locus (f))/3 to produce a single variable.  A factor analysis was considered, however, taking 
into account degrees of freedom considerations in the cluster analysis, categorical variables were 
deemed to be more effective rather than continuous variables, as they take less degrees of 
freedom.  Furthermore, the interpretation of the factored variable was not clear, as it was not 
clear how to interpret the internal and external aspect of the variable.  The external locus of 
control was found to be significant at the 1% level as shown in Table 5.6. 
Table 5.8: Locus of Control Questions 
Internal Locus of Control 
I feel in control of potential E. coli contamination due to my existing management 
practices/interventions 
Whether or not I’m successful in mitigating/controlling E. coli depends mostly on my own 
ability 
To a great extent E. coli incidences on my cow-calf operation are determined by the 
management practices I have in place 
External Locus of Control 
My success as a cow-calf operator depends mostly on luck 
 
It is not advisable for me to plan too far ahead by enhancing my current management practices 
because E. coli incidences are such that they cannot be fully prevented. 
 
To a great extent E. coli incidences on my cow-calf operation are determined by factors 
beyond my control 
 
 
As shown in Table 5.7, for those cow-calf producers that completely disagreed that E. coli 
incidences on their farms are outside of their control, 63% belonged to segment/cluster 1.  This 
trend continued through the middle categories where most of the producers aligned to 
segment/cluster 1 until the somewhat agree category.  At this point there was approximately an 
even split with 43% and 42% of cow-calf producers belonging to cluster 1 and cluster 2 
respectively.  A more interesting result shows that for those cow-calf producers that were 
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completely agreed that E. coli outbreaks on their farms was beyond their control, 98% were 
likely to belong to segment/cluster 2.  This result is consistent with the assurance nature of this 
segment of cow-calf producers who strongly believe that E. coli risk on their farms is beyond 
their control.  In the absence of assurance like incentives, these producers are less likely to adopt 
the E. coli vaccine as they believe the E. coli pathogen is not within their capacity to control.  
The following section assesses the determinants of a producer’s willingness to adopt an E. coli 
vaccine using Probit analysis. 
5.11. Probit Analysis 
 
A Binary Probit model was estimated to examine the determinants that may affect a cow-calf 
producer’s willingness to adopt the E. coli vaccine.  As discussed in chapter 4, a variation of an 
anchored Best-Worst Scaling was employed in the Canadian cow-calf producer survey where, 
after the completion of the 13 choice sets, producers were probed with a follow-up question 
based on the incentives that had been presented: “would you consider adopting an E. coli vaccine 
if presented with incentives such as some of those appearing above?”.  The answers were ordered 
into three categories of “yes”, “don’t know/unsure” and “no” responses and represent the 
dependent variable in the binary and Ordered Probit analyses.  The number of respondents that 
indicated yes was 145, this followed by 50 for those unsure and 8 for no responses.  In order to 
estimate the Binary Probit model, the dependent variable was transformed into a dummy 
variable, where the “yes” responses were transformed to 1 and 0 otherwise.  All estimations were 
conducted using STATA 2013.  
A total of 32 variables were estimated in the Binary Probit model (see Table 5.9), with 13 of 
these variables representing the 13 identified incentives that were presented to surveyed 
producers in a series of 13 repeated choice sets (see Table 4.4).  These incentives were included 
in the model to confirm the extent to which they explain the adoption decision. Socio-
demographic characteristics were also included to control for the effect of gender, age, level of 
education, location (Alberta and Manitoba with Saskatchewan omitted as a reference variable), 
dependence on cow-calf operations for livelihood, number of years a principal decision maker, 
continuity as a cow-calf producer and the percentage of sales/revenues derived from cow-calf 
operations. Other variables expected to affect willingness to adopt the vaccine included: 
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producer awareness of the E. coli vaccine technology, perception of responsibility regarding E. 
coli reduction
17
, retaining of ownership of cattle, size of operation, and locus of control.  These 
variables were added to the estimation equation (15) in chapter 4 on the premise that they can 
potentially explain a producer’s willingness to adopt.  Table 4.7 in chapter 4 provides details on 
the definitions of each of the included variables together with how these variables are measured.  
Table 5.9 presents the results of the Binary Probit model estimations. 
The Binary Probit model results shown in Table 5.9 suggest that 20 out of 32 estimated variables 
are important/influential predictors of a cow-calf producer’s willingness to adopt the E. coli 
vaccine.  These variables include a producer’s level of education, awareness of technology, 
perception of responsibility; attitude surrounding the external locus of control, and all the 13 
incentives captured by the individual B-W scores.  As shown in Table 5.9, the p-values indicate 
that these variables, excluding the 13 incentives for now, are significant at the 1%, and 5% 
respectively.  The individual B-W scores on the other hand, are mostly significant at the 1% level 
of significance with the exception of “subsidy to compensate the cost of my adoption of the 
vaccine is available through a government funded vaccination program,”, “government 
recommending use of E. coli vaccine”, “attraction of a new set of buyers, and “I can include 
vaccine in an already existing vaccination routine” which are significant at the 5% level.  The 
pseudo R-squared shows the goodness of fit of the data to the model.  The results indicate that 
the Binary Probit model has a better fit to the data, with a pseudo R-squared of 23.4% compared 
to that of 19.4% for the Ordered Probit model which is reported in Appendix 2. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
17
 Perception of primary responsibility for reducing E. coli is comprised of dummy variables 
created for each of the categories given the difficulty of interpreting an aggregated coefficient.  It 
should be noted that due to co-linearity concerns, the first category dummy variable (cow-calf 
producers) was omitted and thus serves as the reference variable.  Furthermore, the fifth category 
dummy variable (retailers) did not receive any responses hence its omission from the model.   
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Table 5.9: Binary Probit Model with all estimated variables included  
(Dependent variable – willingness to adopt) 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Err. P value 
Gender 0.354 0.314 0.260 
Age 0.017 0.018 0.344 
Level of education 0.672*** 0.241 0.005 
Awareness of technology 0.473** 0.238 0.047 
Primary Responsibility of E. coli reduction - Feedlots -1.479*** 0.501 0.003 
Primary Responsibility of E. coli reduction – Processors/Packers -0.824** 0.427 0.054 
Primary Responsibility of E. coli reduction - Consumers -1.674*** 0.571 0.003 
Primary Responsibility of E. coli reduction - Regulators -1.662** 0.627 0.008 
Retain ownership of cattle -0.014 0.238 0.995 
Size of operation 0.000 0.000 0.561 
Importance of operations to Livelihood 0.371 0.293 0.206 
Experience as principal decision maker -0.014 0.018 0.425 
Alberta -0.181 0.276 0.513 
Manitoba -0.241 0.332 0.467 
Perception of benefits 0.002 0.311 0.993 
Continuity as a cow-calf producer 0.008 0.019 0.656 
Sales/Revenue derived from operations 0.000 0.005 0.994 
Internal Locus of control 0.033 0.152 0.827 
External Locus of control -0.373** 0.170 0.028 
Beef products can be traced to my farm 1.043*** 0.323 0.001 
Premiums available through branded programs 0.927*** 0.314 0.003 
Recommendation from my veterinarian 0.883*** 0.313 0.005 
Subsidy to compensate cost of adoption available 0.862*** 0.310 0.005 
Government recommending use of vaccine 0.791** 0.308 0.010 
My reputation as producer is at risk 0.877*** 0.304 0.004 
My buyer requiring use of vaccine 0.935*** 0.316 0.003 
Feedlots providing assurance for a booster 0.951*** 0.313 0.002 
Duration of immunity greater than 6 months 0.918*** 0.316 0.004 
Through Vaccination I can reduce supply disruptions 0.960*** 0.319 0.003 
My neighbours adopting vaccine 0.866*** 0.305 0.005 
Attraction of a new set of buyers 0.756** 0.300 0.012 
I can include vaccine in an existing vaccination routine 0.885** 0.326 0.006 
_cons 0.586 1.309 0.654 
N 203   
Pseudo R-sq. 0.234   
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
An Ordered Probit model was also estimated, where the dependent variable took the order of the 
three categories of “yes”, “don’t know/unsure” and “no” responses.  The categorical nature of 
this dependent variable allowed for the marginal effects of each sub-group of producers to be 
examined in relation to the drivers of their adoption decisions.  Results for the Ordered Probit 
model are provided in Appendix 2.  As seen in Table A2.1 and A2.2 in the appendix, this model 
performs comparably to the Binary Probit model, however, this particular model also allowed for 
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additional information to be examined due to the categorical nature of its dependent variable.  In 
comparison to the Binary Probit model, the Ordered Probit model was able to show the effect of 
the explanatory variables on willingness to adopt for the sub-groups of producers who indicated 
that they didn’t know or were unsure; those that stated they would not be willing to adopt the 
vaccine despite the presence of incentives (see Table A2.3, Table A2.4 and Table A2.5) in 
Appendix 2.  Following the estimation of the Binary Probit model inclusive of all variables, the 
insignificant variables were dropped from the model. This reduced model is preferred in order to 
dampen the effects of the insignificant variables and thereby produce more robust marginal 
effects estimations.  These results are presented in Table 5.10.  
Table 5.10: Binary Probit Model with Significant Variables 
(Dependent variable – willingness to adopt) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Err. P value 
Level of education 0.639*** 0.228 0.005 
Awareness of technology 0.522** 0.228 0.022 
Primary responsibility for E. coli reduction – Feedlots -1.391*** 0.489 0.004 
Primary Responsibility of E. coli reduction – Processor/Packer -0.807* 0.418 0.054 
Primary Responsibility of E. coli reduction - Consumers -1.497** 0.550 0.007 
Primary Responsibility of E. coli reduction - Regulators -1.599** 0.611 0.009 
External Locus of control -0.379** 0.152 0.013 
Beef products can be traced to my farm 0.882*** 0.297 0.003 
Premiums available through branded programs 0.787*** 0.288 0.006 
Recommendation from my veterinarian 0.759*** 0.290 0.009 
Subsidy to compensate cost of adoption available 0.717** 0.284 0.012 
Government recommending use of vaccine 0.673** 0.286 0.018 
My reputation as producer is at risk 0.766*** 0.284 0.007 
My buyer requiring use of vaccine 0.785*** 0.292 0.007 
Feedlots providing assurance for a booster 0.857*** 0.293 0.003 
Duration of immunity greater than 6 months 0.800*** 0.293 0.006 
Through Vaccination I can reduce supply disruptions 0.841*** 0.295 0.004 
My neighbours adopting vaccine 0.737*** 0.282 0.009 
Attraction of a new set of buyers 0.650** 0.279 0.020 
I can include vaccine in an existing vaccination routine 0.763** 0.297 0.010 
_Cons 1.831 0.644 0.004 
N 203   
Pseudo R-sq. 0.212   
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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5.12. Marginal Effects 
 
The marginal effect
18
 of an independent variable measures the impact of a change in an 
independent variable (e.g., Xi) on the expected change in the dependent variable (e.g., Y).  In 
other words, marginal effects show the change in probability when the predictor or independent 
variable increases by one unit.  
The marginal effects of the Binary Probit model were estimated using the results in Table 5.10, 
which included variables that were found to be significant.  These marginal effects are presented 
in Table 5.11.  The estimated marginal effect for level of education shows that an increase in a 
cow-calf producer’s level of education at or above the college level compared to less than 
college education increases the probability of their willingness to adopt an E. coli vaccine by 
20.3%.  This result suggests that producers with higher levels of formal education may have a 
better appreciation of food safety technologies such as that of an E. coli vaccine which would 
thus affects their willingness to adopt.   
The impact of a producer’s awareness of technology, defined as whether a cow-calf producer has 
ever heard of an E. coli vaccine bears a positive sign and is significant at the 5% level.  The 
estimated marginal effect show that on average, if producers had heard of or became aware the 
E. coli vaccine, this would increase the probability of their willingness to adopt by 16.1%. 
In the descriptive statistics section, it was shown that almost half of the producers 42% had not 
previously heard of the E. coli vaccine technology, thus the decision to use this awareness in the 
probit analysis.  The significance of this result suggests that awareness programs where 
producers can be informed and updated on the food safety technologies available for their use in 
addressing E. coli may be important.  A producer must be aware of a technology first before 
even considering its adoption.  The survey data identified producer associations and veterinarians 
as important sources of information which may be relevant for designing awareness programs. 
 
                                                          
18
 Calculation of the marginal effects was done as follows: Y = ɸ (β0+β1χ1+β2χ2+…+βnχn), thus 
δY/δχi   = βi Ø (β0+β1χ1+β2χ2+…+βnχn). 
119 
 
Table 5.11: Binary Probit Model Marginal Effects 
Variable Dy/Dx Std. Err. P value 
Level of education  0.203 0.074 0.006 
Awareness of technology  0.161 0.071 0.024 
Primary Responsibility of E. coli reduction – Feedlots -0.499 0.166 0.003 
Primary Responsibility of E. coli reduction – Processor/Packer -0.232 0.058 0.035 
Primary Responsibility of E. coli reduction - Consumers -0.543 0.151 0.002 
Primary Responsibility of E. coli reduction - Regulators -0.576 0.181 0.001 
External Locus of control -0.115 0.046 0.012 
Beef products can be traced to my farm 0.266 0.088 0.003 
Premiums available through branded programs 0.238 0.086 0.006 
Recommendation from my veterinarian 0.229 0.086 0.008 
Subsidy to compensate cost of adoption available 0.216 0.085 0.011 
Government recommending use of vaccine 0.203 0.085 0.017 
My reputation as producer is at risk 0.231 0.084 0.006 
My buyer requiring use of vaccine 0.237 0.087 0.007 
Feedlots providing assurance for a booster 0.259 0.087 0.003 
Duration of immunity greater than 6 months 0.242 0.087 0.006 
Through Vaccination I can reduce supply disruptions 0.254 0.088 0.004 
My neighbours adopting vaccine 0.223 0.084 0.008 
Attraction of a new set of buyers 0.196 0.083 0.018 
I can include vaccine in an existing vaccination routine 0.231 0.089 0.009 
 
 
The estimated marginal effect for a producer’s perception of primary responsibility, i.e. the 
supply chain participant with whom the producer believes the primary responsibility of reducing 
E. coli lies, is a categorical dummy variable as noted earlier.  Primary responsibility was 
constructed from the survey question 20, which explored the concept of which supply chain link 
should be held accountable for having the primary responsibility for reducing E. coli risk.  All 
levels of this categorical dummy variable were found to be significant: primary responsibility – 
feedlots, consumers, and regulators were found to be highly significant at 1% and bearing 
negative signs.  The other significant variable at the 5% level of significance was primary 
responsibility - processors/packers which represents processor/packers holding the major 
responsibility for E. coli risk reduction within the supply chain.  These variables are interpreted 
with respect to cow-calf producers. 
The marginal effects in this case indicate that on average, the perception that primary 
responsibility of E. coli reduction belongs to feedlots relative to cow-calf producers would lead 
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to a decrease in the probability of producers’ willingness to adopt by 49.9%.  On the other hand, 
the marginal effect on primary responsibility – processors/packers suggests that the belief that 
primary responsibility of E. coli reduction lies with processors/packers relative to cow-calf 
producers would lead to a decrease in the probability of producers’ willingness to adopt the 
technology by 23.2%.  In addition, the marginal effect of the perception that primary 
responsibility lies with consumers relative to cow-calf producers suggests that on average, this 
would lead to a decrease in producers’ willingness to adopt the vaccine by 54.3%.  In relation to 
regulators and the belief that primary responsibility belongs to this group. The marginal effects 
results imply that on average relative to cow-calf producers, this belief would lead to a decrease 
in producers’ willingness to adopt by 57.6%. 
These results imply that the perception of responsibility for E. coli reduction affects the decision 
of cow-calf producers adopting the E. coli vaccine.  They are consistent with the results of cow-
calf producers believing that the responsibility of E. coli reduction lies mostly with other supply 
chain participants in the mid-stream and downstream stages of production as reported earlier.  
The marginal effects relating to feedlots, consumers and regulators were particularly high which 
firstly highlights the importance placed on feedlots by cow-calf producers given their 
contribution towards contamination of ground water systems that usually affect produce and 
drinking water.  Furthermore, the idea that consumers reduce the risks of exposure to E. coli 
contamination by properly cooking beef products might also explain the higher percentage 
decrease in the marginal effect when cow-calf producers believe consumers bear the primary 
responsibility for this reduction.  As it pertains to regulators, the belief of responsibility 
belonging here perhaps can be explained by the influence that regulatory bodies such as the 
CFIA have, as they can pass and mandate various policies that can shape and re-shape industry 
norms.  These results possibly underscore the importance of responsibility for the reduction of E. 
coli incidences at each stage of the production process so as to ensure safe food production 
which would minimize supply and demand disruptions.   
The external locus of control, as indicated in the Latent Class cluster analysis, is an aggregate of 
combination locus questions.  The results for this variable, as shown in Table 5.11, imply that on 
average an increase in a producer’s perception that E. coli incidences occurring in their 
operations are outside of their control would lead to a decrease in the probability of their 
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willingness to adopt by 11.5%.  Such a result is consistent with the idea that if cow-calf 
producers believe E.coli risk is beyond their control, then the adoption of an E. coli vaccine will 
be lower.  This result also highlights the importance of management or intervention techniques 
that are currently in use by producers, as these might reflect their perception regarding the ability 
to mitigate E. coli risk within their cow-calf operations. 
In relation to the 13 incentives, B-W scores for each respondent related to each incentive were 
used in the probit estimations.  In the Binary Probit marginal effects estimation (see Table 5.11) 
the positive signs attached to each of the incentives suggests a positive relationship with 
producer’s willingness to adopt which met a priori expectations.  
In summary, chapter 5 has outlined the results from the analysis of the Canadian cow-calf 
producer survey.  The descriptive statistics confirmed the notion of the perception among 
producers that the benefits of E. coli adoption flow elsewhere within the supply chain, 
particularly to consumers and processors/packers, re-affirming the importance of incentives to 
encourage adoption.  In relation to awareness, these statistics also showed that a significant 
percentage of respondents had never heard of the E. coli vaccine.  The BWS analysis revealed 
that the most influential incentives for the adoption of the E. coli vaccine were related to 
market/supply chain incentives, indicating a possible market-based solution as a strategy for 
reversing the current low adoption trend.   
A Latent Class analysis indicated the existence of three unique clusters of cow-calf producers 
motivated by different sets of incentives, offering opportunities for industry stakeholders to take 
a more targeted approach to adoption.  On the other hand, the incentives that were found to be 
homogeneous can be used to appeal to a wider selection of cow-calf producers thus encouraging 
wider adoption.  The Probit analysis suggested that a producer’s level of education, awareness of 
food safety technologies, perception of primary responsibility for E. coli risk reduction, 
perception on external locus of control and the 13 identified incentives were all significant in 
driving a producer’s willingness to adopt the E. coli vaccine.  These results will be discussed 
further in chapter 6, where policy and industry implications and conclusions will be drawn.  
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CHAPTER 6 
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
6.1. Introduction 
 
As established in the introductory chapter of this thesis, cattle are considered to be asymptomatic 
carriers of the E. coli pathogen, meaning they carry the bacterium but their health or productivity 
is not affected.  The use of an E. coli vaccine therefore addresses a potential public health 
problem as humans are affected by E. coli O157:H7 through consumption of contaminated beef 
products.  This can lead to minor symptoms such as acute hemorrhagic diarrhea and abdominal 
cramps, to more severe symptoms that can result in kidney failure and even premature death.  
This translates to health costs, productivity loss and premature death costs that society would 
have to incur.   
Econiche, the first E. coli vaccine made in Canada, has been available in the market since 2008.  
However, the uptake amongst Canadian cow-calf producers has been low despite the potential 
social benefits from this vaccine.  This study theorized that due to the benefits of adoption 
flowing elsewhere to participating supply chain stakeholders, primarily, processors/packers and 
consumers, producer willingness to adopt the E. coli vaccine was reduced.  The study therefore 
assessed possible incentives that may change this pattern of adoption in terms of their relative 
influence on producers’ adoption decisions. Current barriers to adoption were also evaluated.  To 
recall, the primary objectives of this study were to: 
I. Examine the underlying economics of incentives to adopt socially beneficial technologies 
II. Explore the barriers that currently exist towards the adoption of the E. coli vaccine 
III. Examine whether incentives for adoption could be strengthened through closer supply 
chain coordination 
IV. Discuss the implications for policies to enhance adoption of socially beneficial 
technologies 
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Several theoretical frameworks shed light on the low adoption rates of the E. coli vaccine.  These 
included: Market Failure, the Tragedy of the Anti-Commons, and Transaction Cost Economics.  
Market failure in this instance resulted from the E.coli vaccine possessing public good 
attributes/positive externalities as well as information asymmetry as a result of quality 
uncertainty which all led to the under-production of vaccinated cattle, affecting the demand for 
the E. coli vaccine.  The tragedy of the Anti-commons examined the notion of a threshold of 
adoption being met in order for the full benefits of adoption to be realized.  The TCE framework 
on the other hand was able to identify costs (identity preservation, third party verification and 
search and information costs) that producers might incur while operating in the current supply 
chain structure.  This framework while identifying these costs, was also able to offer potential 
solutions to the low adoptions rates through the use of supply chain governance structures that 
reward the vaccination of cattle such as branded beef programs. 
Data for this study was gathered through an online survey focused on cow-calf producers in the 
Prairie provinces.  The information gathered was analyzed using Best-Worst Scaling, Latent 
Class cluster analysis, and a Binary Probit model.  This chapter contains the thesis summary and 
conclusions.  The summary describes the major findings of this study within the context of the 
objectives identified for this thesis.  This is then followed by a discussion of the policy and 
industry implications and main conclusions.  Lastly, this chapter concludes with a brief 
discussion of the limitations of the study and suggestions for further research. 
6.2. Major findings and policy and industry implications 
 
In line with expectations, most producers expected the benefits from vaccinating their cattle and 
calves against E. coli to flow elsewhere in the supply chain.   This assertion was confirmed based 
on the descriptive statistics regarding the perceived distribution of benefits from the adoption of 
the E. coli vaccine.  Sixty-seven percent of respondents felt that the benefits of vaccinating 
cattle/calves against E. coli would flow primarily to either consumers or processors/packers 
rather than to cow-calf producers.  This outcome is consistent with the discussion in the 
theoretical chapter where the potential reasons for low adoption and market penetration of the E. 
coli vaccine were outlined.   
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Another major insight from the descriptive statistics was the incorporation of an Environmental 
Farm Plan (EFP) by approximately 64% of cow-calf producers.  The E. coli pathogen, as much 
as it can be a health threat to consumers through direct consumption of E. coli infected beef, has 
also affected people through the environment as a result of ground water contamination from 
farm run-off.  The creation of negative externalities that have far wider reaching effects such as 
the Walkerton, Ontario E. coli outbreak in 2000 is an example. The use of EFPs by the majority 
of respondents perhaps is an indication of a growing awareness and responsibility regarding the 
environmental footprints of cow-calf operations.   
The existence of an ongoing vaccination routine in the cow-calf operation was established 
through a series of questions in the survey asking respondents about their current vaccination 
practices.  The major idea here was to examine how an existing vaccination routine affects 
willingness to adopt the E. coli vaccine.  Most producers were found to have an established 
routine in place.  This finding is an important one, particularly in light of an established 
vaccination routine allowing for a more efficient scale of change. 
In relation to awareness of the E. coli pathogen and its related outbreaks, the majority of cow-
calf producers were very much familiar with the E. coli bacterium and the consequences of its 
existence, with cited examples of previous E. coli incidences.  An aspect of producer awareness 
that perhaps warranted deeper investigation was awareness of the E. coli vaccine, where a 
significant number (42%) of cow-calf producers indicated they had never heard of an E. coli 
vaccine let alone make use of it within their operations.  This particular avenue of producer 
awareness was utilized as an explanatory variable in the Probit analysis to ascertain its effect on 
a producer’s willingness to adopt an E. coli vaccine.  The findings showed a very significant 
variable that serves as a potentially strong driver of a producer’s decision to adopt.  The 
implication of this result is that if a producer is not aware of the availability of certain 
technologies, their decision or willingness to adopt is made without the availability of full 
information.  In other words, a producer can only adopt a technology of which they are aware.  
Producer education and awareness campaigns may be important as tools for disseminating 
information pertaining to food safety technologies such as the E. coli vaccine. 
The above findings go hand in hand with the primary sources of information for cow-calf 
producers which were mostly producer associations and veterinarians, with the latter being the 
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primary information source.  These sources of information may have a role to play as a conduit 
for information about food safety technologies, thereby potentially increasing adoption through 
increasing of awareness.  
In line with the second objective, barriers to adoption that have impeded the current use of the E. 
coli vaccine as a mitigating strategy to E. coli were examined.  The results suggest that producers 
found issues involving the uncertainty of adoption as the major deterrents to adoption.  These 
uncertainties pertained to the effect of the E. coli vaccine in alleviating food safety concerns, 
meeting buyer needs, and generating the necessary premiums/pay-offs to recoup investment.  
These barriers to adoption are such that cow-calf producers would need some form of 
reassurance as to the post-adoption outcomes of their decisions, thus reinforcing the need to have 
the appropriate incentives in place.   
The Best Worst Scaling analysis revealed the degree of influence of the 13 identified incentives 
on producers’ decisions to adopt the E. coli vaccine.  These findings provide useful insights for 
industry stakeholders and government agencies alike with respect to the solutions that have the 
strongest potential to increase the use of food safety technologies such as the E. coli vaccine.  To 
recall, amongst the most influential incentives were market/supply chain oriented incentives 
(“my buyer requiring use of an E. coli vaccine as part of production protocol as a condition for 
accepting my calves/cattle”, “premiums for E. coli vaccinated cattle are available through 
various programs (e.g. branded beef program) within the supply chain” “attraction of new sets of 
buyers”). As the Transaction Cost Economics framework suggested in Chapter 3, supply chain 
governance structures that emerge to reduce the transaction costs related to adoption can take the 
form of beef branded alliances or beef branded programs.   
These governance structures may assist in realizing the market/supply chain incentives that were 
found to have the strongest appeal to cow-calf producers.   These include premiums for cow-calf 
producers, production protocols that meet potential buyer needs as it relates to vaccination, and 
attracting of new sets of buyers as potential market-based solutions.  In addition, having 
subsidies in place to compensate the costs of adoption through government vaccination programs 
was found to be very influential, particularly if premiums are not available currently in the 
marketplace for vaccinated cattle. 
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From the BWS analysis, the data also revealed that there was heterogeneity in the choice of the 
most and least influential incentives. This result suggests the existence of unique classes or 
segments of cow-calf producers who respond differently to different incentives.  To explore 
these segments, a Latent Class cluster analysis was performed using the Latent Gold 5.0 software 
which suggests the existence of three distinct segments of cow-calf producers with respect to the 
influence of the 13 incentives.  These producer segments were categorized into three themes 
defined by the importance or influence of incentives dominating each of the classes: 
market/supply chain oriented producers; production protocol oriented producers; and risk averse 
producers. 
The probability of cow-calf producers belonging to the market/supply chain incentives oriented 
group (cluster 1) was 58%.  This particular cluster is defined mainly by producers looking for 
growth opportunities within their operations through taking advantage of supply chain 
incentives.  The production protocol incentives oriented group (cluster 2), representing 24% of 
producers, consists of producers that seek assurance and are more concerned about the efficacy 
of the vaccine, and how efficiently the vaccine would fit into their current production system.  
Finally, the risk averse or producer reputation incentives oriented group (cluster 3), representing 
18% of the sample, consists of cow-calf producers that are more risk averse with respect to 
liability and reputation effects, given the high loadings on incentives involving traceability and 
reputation.   
The implications of these results are such that a one-size fits all strategy or policy to encourage 
adoption of this type of technology may be difficult to implement. Narrow targeting is a viable 
option where certain incentives are specifically geared towards a certain group of producers 
given their strong preference for these incentives.  It is clear that currently the vaccine is adopted 
on a voluntary basis and thus not all producers are likely to adopt.  Hence, those willing to adopt 
may show preference for certain incentives within their respective sub-groups.  On the other 
hand, given that the ideal outcome may be to have widespread adoption of the E. coli vaccine in 
order for the benefits to be fully realized, broad targeting might be a viable option with respect to 
those incentives around which producers were more homogeneous.   
Homogeneity was found in the attitudes of cow-calf producers around the top three ranked 
incentives based on the standardized interval scale.  These incentives included: “my buyer 
127 
 
requiring use of an E. coli vaccine as part of production protocol as a condition for accepting my 
calves/cattle”, “subsidy to compensate the costs of my adoption of the vaccine is available 
through a government funded vaccination program”, and “premiums for E. coli vaccinated cattle 
are available through various programs (e.g. branded beef program) within the supply chain”.  
This suggests that these set of incentives may be ideal for broader targeting to achieve wider 
adoption rates of the E. coli vaccine.  On the other hand, homogeneity was also found to be 
present in the bottom three ranked incentives which included: “feedlots providing an assurance 
that they will give my cattle a booster of the E. coli vaccine to maintain immunity of my cattle”, 
“my neighbours (other cattle producers) are adopting the E. coli vaccine”, and “government 
recommending use of E. coli vaccine”.  It seems that the use of these types of incentives will not 
have strong producer buy-in and thus would likely need to be accompanied by an emphasis on 
monitoring and enforcement to ensure compliance.   
The inclusion of covariates in the Latent Class cluster analysis adds further depth to the cluster 
analysis. Variables such as producer age, number of years as principal decision maker, 
sales/revenues attributed to operations and perception of external locus of control were all found 
to be significant predictors of the likelihood of a producer belonging to a particular segment.   
The Binary Probit analysis examining the factors affecting willingness to adopt the E. coli 
vaccine revealed a number of significant determinants.  These included producer’s level of 
education, whereby higher levels of education tended to increase the willingness to adopt.  These 
results suggest that producers with higher levels of education may have a better appreciation of 
food safety technologies.  Another variable that was significant in influencing a cow-calf 
producer’s decision to adopt an E. coli vaccine was the perception of who held the primary 
responsibility for E. coli risk reduction.  All of the category dummy variables (feedlots, 
processor/packers, consumers, and regulators) of primary responsibility relative to cow-calf 
producers were found to be significant and drivers of a producer’s willingness to adopt.  These 
results underline the need for a continuity of effort and vigilance across the entire supply chain 
so as to reduce instances of E. coli incidences and therefore strengthen the production of safe 
food. 
The external locus of control assessed the extent to which respondents believed controlling E. 
coli risks on their cow-calf operations lay beyond their control. The negative sign attached to this 
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variable was consistent with the idea that if producers perceive the control of E. coli incidences 
as being beyond their reach, then their willingness to adopt the vaccine decreases.  The 
perception of the E. coli risk as either internal or externally determined therefore is very 
important in influencing the decision to adopt food safety technologies such as an E. coli 
vaccine.  The current management controls in use by producers are also relevant as these might 
reflect their perception regarding the ability to control the E. coli pathogen.   
The Binary Probit analysis with regard to the individual B-W scores for the 13 incentives were 
all found to be significant.  For those producers that were willing to adopt, the positive signs met 
a priori expectations seeing that incentives are created for the express purpose of stimulating a 
positive response or outcome.  On the other hand, the analysis using the Ordered Probit model 
showed that for those producers that were unsure about their adoption decision or those that were 
unwilling to adopt, the incentives all had negative signs. This result might suggest that more 
would need to be done beyond incentives to encourage adoption of the E. coli vaccine from this 
sub-set of cow-calf producers.  The marginal effects for the 13 incentives were all of a similar 
magnitude in the Binary Probit model. 
Broader implications of this research pertain to the idea of how food safety technologies and 
other technologies that may improve the overall efficiency of the beef industry are implemented 
in terms of the evenhandedness of adoption.  The notion of how this cost of adoption can be 
equitably spread throughout the supply chain is explored in the areas of further research.  In 
addition, the BWS results have shed light on the importance and role of downstream market 
pressure in technology adoption within the beef industry.  In particular, the significance of the 
incentive “my buyer requiring use of vaccine as part of the production protocol as a condition for 
accepting my calves/cattle” highlights the necessity of downstream market pressure as a valuable 
component in the adoption of industry defining technologies such as the E. coli vaccine.   
As discussed in Chapter 1, policy makers and industry strategists have not prioritized their 
efforts towards preventative pre-harvest interventions such as the E. coli vaccine due to the 
previous lack of existence of these technologies, or limited commercial availability.  Therefore, 
facilitating avenues for the wider adoption of food safety technologies such as the E.coli vaccine 
has implications for the traditional emphasis placed on end products in the value chain, with an 
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impending emergence of an equivalent focus placed on the prevention of food contamination at 
the source.  
Other implications of this research include adoption of a more wholistic approach to food safety, 
one that encompasses the entire food chain, all the while adhering to the Food and Agriculture 
Organization’s (FAO) definition of a food chain approach, where responsibility for the 
production of safe food is shared along the entire food/supply chain.  This from the perspective 
that responsibility for adoption in most cases, falls on one set of participants within the supply 
chain thus not only suggesting absorption of the full cost of adoption, but also creating 
vulnerabilities of exposure to the pathogen at other points in the supply chain.  This vulnerability 
in turn might lead to the realization of dynamic externalities as outlined in the Anti-Commons 
section of Chapter 3, where recurring incidences of E. coli take place as a result of the current 
under-use of production assets.  This causes supply and demand disruptions such as the XL 
Foods Inc. case.   
6.3. Limitations of the Research 
 
As in many other studies, practical limitations of this project confined its range.  The online 
producer survey was confined to cow-calf producers located in western Canada who belong to 
the animal health database of a market research company.  An online-based survey was 
determined to be the more effective means of data collection as it was challenging locating 
contact details for cow-calf producers.  Other alternatives to the online survey were considered, 
specifically, surveying producers at producer association conferences.  This method however, 
would have also generated its own set of sample biases.  Although the online survey sample was 
broadly representative of Canadian cow-calf producer distribution by province, the selection was 
not random and as such care needs to be given when extrapolating the results to the broader 
population of cow-calf producers.   
Additional limitations relating to the use of an internet based survey is the possibility that certain 
populations of cow-calf producers are less likely to have internet access and therefore respond to 
online questionnaires.  However, this limited sampling bias is becoming less of a concern as 
internet use becomes more ubiquitous among the Canadian population.  Furthermore, the 
possibility of social desirability or agreement bias concerning some of the survey questions 
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related to good management practices, such as the current use of environmental farm plans, may 
not reflect the state of these practices within the industry at large.  
Another limitation pertains to the Best Worst Scaling method.  Although the method allows for 
maximum discrimination and trade-off opportunities as a product of the repeated choice set 
selection, it contains a threshold that if exceeded can place an enormous cognitive burden on the 
respondent.  The literature suggests that beyond 15 choice sets, respondent fatigue is likely 
which could lead to response bias. As such, the experimental design for this study was restricted 
to 13 attributes/incentives which yielded 13 choice sets.  Furthermore, the number of incentives 
selected must match a corresponding statistical/experimental design such as a balanced 
incomplete block design, as not all numbers are compatible with this design.  Thus the choice of 
the number of incentives and structure of the survey was somewhat driven by the needs of the 
experimental design. The survey was pre-tested and no major problems were found, 
nevertheless, it is possible that respondent fatigue may have been an issue. 
6.4. Areas for Further Research 
 
Producers were asked who they think should bear the primary responsibility of reducing the risk 
of E. coli within the supply chain.  Most producers indicated that this responsibility belonged to 
processors/packers.  Indeed, the literature on E coli contamination shows that there are many 
points in the supply chain at which the risks of E. coli contamination can be mitigated, only one 
of which is on the farm. Feedlots, retailers, consumers, and in particular, processors/packers are 
other important points in the supply chain with a role to play in reducing food safety hazards.  
An important area of future research therefore is to explore the specific role of 
processors/packers in reducing E. coli risks and the factors affecting the willingness of packers to 
adopt food safety technologies and food safety mitigation strategies.  This might include the 
willingness of packers to engage in source and pay premiums for E. coli vaccinated cattle, 
provided that processors/packers are willing to put the market/supply chain incentives in place as 
these were found to be the most important.     
As noted in the previous chapters, upstream participants allocate their resources in response to 
the market pressures and incentives from downstream supply chain participants.  With this in 
mind, if processors/packers were to require evidence of E. coli vaccines as part of upstream 
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production protocol, adoption rates among cow-calf producers would likely increase.  How 
would this widespread adoption affect the role of processors/packers in the control of the E. coli 
pathogen?  If upstream participants use the vaccine as a measure to combat E. coli outbreaks, 
how would this affect the current preventative efforts that are in use at the processor/packer stage 
of production such as HACCP?  The concept of moral hazard might come into play in this case; 
as E. coli controls upstream become more effective, would downstream participants such as 
processors/packers ease the food safety risk reduction measures they have in place?  Many 
interesting questions therefore arise with respect to how adoption of the E coli vaccine by cow-
calf producers would affect the behavior of other supply chain participants and are fruitful areas 
for further research. 
Based on the results from this thesis, the possibility of closer supply chain co-ordination 
increasing the current low adoption is real.  Such a mechanism can be put in place through use of 
governance structures such as branded beef alliances, which may be a vehicle for the more 
influential market/supply chain incentives noted earlier.  Another area of future research 
therefore is to examine other ways in which wider adoption can be achieved.  Food safety 
technologies such as the E. coli vaccine as noted in the literature often suffer from the 
expectation that one element within the supply chain will bear the full cost of adoption, in this 
case cow-calf producers.   
Bearing in mind that the original research into the E. coli vaccine was funded by the Canadian 
Cattlemen’s Association, a producer association, it would be interesting to explore the role of 
producer associations, both nationally and provincially, in influencing the development and 
adoption of food safety technologies through use of national check-off funding.  The goal of 
national check-offs is to find better and more efficient ways of producing high quality cattle and 
beef through research, to increase sales in the domestic and export markets.  Research into a 
whole supply chain approach to mitigating E. coli risk (i.e. including but not limited to E. coli 
vaccinations by cow-calf producers) can therefore be useful in encouraging an evenhanded 
approach.   This may reduce the potential of supply chain and demand disruptions as a result of 
E. coli outbreaks, while simultaneously expanding opportunities of finding new sets of buyers 
willing to pay premiums for the use of food safety technologies. 
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6.5. Conclusions 
 
This thesis has outlined a set of most and least influential incentives that can be considered in 
addressing the current low adoption rates of the E. coli vaccine as mitigation for the risk of E. 
coli incidences.  Results indicate that cow-calf producers respond to market/supply chain 
incentives; however, these incentives are currently not in place to address the low adoption of the 
E. coli vaccine.  Furthermore, possible barriers were examined together with several drivers that 
can affect a cow-calf producer’s propensity to adopt the vaccine technology.  The results indicate 
that for the majority of cow-calf producers, once the right incentives are in place, their 
willingness to adopt a socially beneficial technology such as an E. coli vaccine increases.  The 
existence of unique segments of cow-calf producers can aid in the creation of industry strategies 
that can assist in the adoption of socially beneficial technologies such as the E. coli vaccine 
through a more targeted approach.   
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8. APPENDICES  
Appendix 1: Canadian Cow-Calf Producer Survey 
 
You are invited to participate in a study entitled: Incentives to adopt an E. coli cattle vaccine 
 
Principal Investigator: Jill E. Hobbs, Ph.D. Professor, Department of Bioresource Policy, 
Business and Economics, University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, SK  
 Phone: 306-966-2445; jill.hobbs@usask.ca  
 
Student Investigator: Brian Ochieng’, MSc Candidate, Department of Bioresource Policy, 
Business and Economics, University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, SK  
 Phone: 306-966-4043; bjo835@mail.usask.ca  
         
Purpose and procedure: We would like your responses to some questions about your 
awareness of E. coli, risk management practices in use in the beef industry, and your assessment 
of the factors affecting adoption of an E. coli vaccine for cattle.  The data collected through this 
survey will be used in a Master’s thesis in the Department of Bioresource Policy, Business and 
Economics at the University of Saskatchewan. 
 
This research project is coordinated by the Department of Bioresource Policy, Business and 
Economics at the University of Saskatchewan. The results of this research will be used for a 
master’s thesis in Agricultural Economics.     
  
Your participation in this study is appreciated and voluntary. It is expected that the survey should 
take about 20 minutes to complete.  
 
Potential Benefits: Your participation in this study will help improve our understanding of the 
incentives and barriers to the adoption of an E. coli vaccine. The research has the potential to 
inform food safety management and supply chain strategies in the Canadian beef sector  
 
Potential Risks: No known or foreseeable human risk will be involved in completing the survey. 
 
Storage of Data: The data from the survey will be securely stored in the Department of 
Bioresource Policy, Business & Economics at the University of Saskatchewan. The data will be 
destroyed, after at least 5 years, when it is no longer required. 
 
Confidentiality: Data will be combined and aggregated to protect individual respondents. The 
research conclusions will be published in a variety of formats, both print and electronic. These 
materials will be used in the development of a Master’s Thesis and may be further used for 
purposes of conference presentations, or publication in academic journals, books or popular 
press. In these publications, the data will be reported in a manner that protects confidentiality and 
the anonymity of participants.  
 
Right to Withdraw: Participation in this survey is voluntary, and you can decide not to 
participate at any time by closing your browser Survey responses will remain anonymous. Since 
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the survey is anonymous, once you have submitted the survey your responses can no longer be 
removed. 
 
Questions: If you have any questions concerning the research project, please feel free to contact 
the researchers at the phone numbers or email addresses provided above. 
 
This research project has been approved on ethical grounds by the University of Saskatchewan 
Research Ethics Board on June 27
th
 2014.  Any questions regarding your rights as a participant 
may be addressed to that committee through the Research Ethics Office ethics.office@usask.ca 
(306) 966-2975. Out of town participants may call toll free (888) 966-2975. 
 
Consent to Participate: I have read and understood the description provided above. Completion 
of this survey will constitute consent to participate and permission for the 
researcher to use the data gathered in the manner described. If you would like a 
copy of this consent form for your record, please contact the Principal Investigator: Dr. 
Jill Hobbs, Phone: 306-966-2445 or Email: jill.hobbs@usask.ca.  
 
 I Accept 
 I Decline 
 
Thank you.  We would like you to participate in our study. 
Qualifiers 
A. How many beef cows do you currently have in your operation? 
 
[IF > 0 CONTINUE]  
 
 
 
B. To confirm, are you the person that has overall or joint responsibility for the animal health 
management practices you use for your cow-calf operation? 
 
Yes 
No 
 
[IF YES, CONTINUE] 
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[SURVEY] 
 
 
 
1. What is your primary role on the farm? (Please select one response) 
o Owner 
o Co-owner 
o Manager 
o Employee 
2. Do you retain ownership of your cattle/calves during the feeding/finishing process? 
o Yes 
o No 
3. How do you market the majority of your cattle/calves? (Please select one response) 
o Contracts with feedlots  
o Auction barns 
o Forward pricing 
o Breed influenced programs  
o Age-and-source verification programs 
o Direct marketing to consumers/restaurants 
o Natural or certified organic marketing 
4. Have you ever participated as a supplier in a branded beef program(s)? (E.g. Certified 
Angus Beef; SYSCO Butcher’s Block Reserve; Sterling Silver Premium Beef or similar 
programs). 
o Yes 
o No 
[IF YES, CONTINUE – OTHERWISE SKIP TO Q.6] 
 
5. What is/are the names of the branded beef programs you have participated in? 
 
6. How familiar would you say you are with E. coli? 
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o Very Unfamiliar 
o Somewhat Unfamiliar 
o Somewhat Familiar 
o Very Familiar  
 
7. How familiar would you say you are with E. coli outbreaks that have taken place in 
Canada since the year 2000? 
o Very Unfamiliar 
o Somewhat Unfamiliar 
o Somewhat Familiar 
o Very Familiar 
[IF SOMEWHAT FAMILIAR OR VERY FAMILIAR IN Q.7, CONTINUE – OTHERWISE 
SKIP TO Q.9] 
8. Please list one/some of the E.coli outbreaks you’re familiar with that have taken place in 
Canada since the year 2000. 
 
9. Which, if any, of the following ways have recent E. coli outbreaks in Canada reduced the 
value of - or created problems for your cow-calf operation? (Please select all that apply) 
o Increased extra days to feed due to blocked market access 
o Buyers not accepting my cattle 
o Increased costs due to extra bio-security measures put in place 
o Resulted in training of employees on new management practices 
o My cow-calf operation has been improved by recent E. coli outbreaks (E.g. 
encouraged me to be more proactive with my environmental or animal health 
practices) 
o My cow-calf operation has not been affected at all  
 
10. Who/where is your primary source of information regarding E. coli? (Please check all 
that apply) 
o Producer associations (e.g. provincial or national cattle industry associations) 
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o My veterinarian 
o Consultants 
o Government information services (e.g. provincial ministries of Agriculture) 
o Internet searches 
o Other cow-calf producers 
o Pharmaceutical companies  
o I have no source of information regarding E.coli [EXCLUSIVE RESPONSE] 
[IF “I HAVE NO SOURCE OF INFORMATION REGARDING E.COLI” 
SELECTED IN Q.10 – SKIP TO Q.12] 
11. Which of the following sources do you consult first regarding E.coli? 
o Producer associations (e.g. provincial or national cattle industry associations) 
o My veterinarian 
o Consultants 
o Government information services (e.g. provincial ministries of Agriculture) 
o Internet searches 
o Other cow-calf producers 
o Pharmaceutical companies  
 
12. Do you currently vaccinate your calves against any form of disease?  
o Yes 
o No 
[IF YES, CONTINUE – OTHERWISE SKIP TO Q.16] 
13. About how often are most of your calves vaccinated?  
o Once a year 
o Twice a year 
o More than twice 
 
14. Who typically vaccinates your calves? (Please select all that apply) 
o Local veterinarian 
150 
 
o I do it myself 
o I do it myself with supervision from the veterinarian 
o An employee does it 
 
15. About how much do you spend in total on vaccines per year per calf? 
o Less than $1 
o $1 - $4.99 
o $5 - $6.99 
o More than $7 
 
16. Have you ever heard of an E. coli vaccine, such as the brand Econiche?  
o Yes, I have used an E.coli vaccine and am currently still using it 
o Yes, I have used an E.coli vaccine 
o Yes, I have heard of an E.coli vaccine but have not used one 
o No, I have never heard of an E.coli vaccine 
[IF NO IN Q.16 SKIP TO Q.20] 
16.a Approximately what percentage of your beef cattle are vaccinated with an E.coli vaccine? 
[IF YES, I HAVE HEARD OF AN E.COLI VACCINE BUT HAVE NOT USED 
ONE IN Q.16 – SKIP TO Q.18] 
17. Which of the following reasons indicate why you use/have used an E. coli vaccine 
(please check all that apply) 
o My veterinarian suggested use of the vaccine 
o I used it on a trial basis 
o I wanted a way to differentiate my cattle in the marketplace 
o I found a buyer willing to pay a premium 
o Other reason (Please type in)  
18. Are you aware of the cost of the E. coli vaccine?  
o Yes 
o No 
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19. Are you confident in the level of immunization the E. coli vaccine provides? 
o Yes 
o No 
20. In your opinion, who has the primary responsibility for reducing the risk of E. coli 
problems within the beef supply chain? (Please check one response) 
o Cow-calf producers 
o Feedlots 
o Processors/ Packers 
o Retailers 
o Consumers 
o Regulators (e.g. Canadian Food Inspection Agency) 
21. In your opinion, who has the secondary responsibility? (Please check one response) 
o Cow-calf producers 
o Feedlots 
o Processors/Packers 
o Retailers 
o Consumers 
o Regulators (e.g. Canadian Food Inspection Agency) 
22. In your opinion who would benefit the most from a cattle vaccine to reduce colonization 
and shedding of E. coli by cattle? (Please check one response) 
o Cow-calf producers 
o Feedlots 
o Processors/Packers 
o Retailers 
o Consumers 
o Municipal water security agencies 
23. What proportion of the cost of an E. coli vaccination program should be borne by the 
following groups? Please allocate 100 percentage points across the following groups.  
The more you feel a particular group should bear the cost of an E.coli vaccination 
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program, the more percentage points should be given to it. You may give all or none 
of the 100 percentage points to a group, but your total must equal 100. 
o Cow-calf producers 
o Feedlots 
o Processor/Packers 
o Retailers 
o Consumers 
o Municipal water security agencies 
 
24. Which of the following interventions/management practices to mitigate E. coli incidences 
in your cow-calf operation do you currently use, if any?  
INTERVENTIONS/MANAGEMENT CONTROLS  
Removing of farm animals from the proximity of private water 
supplies (e.g. At least 50m from well, borehole or other private 
water supply by fencing-off) 
 
o Yes 
o No 
o Not applicable 
Prohibit recreational activities (such as walking and camping) on 
land where manure or slurry have been applied, or animals and 
faeces present, in previous 4 weeks. 
 
o Yes 
o No 
o Not applicable 
 
Monitoring of private water supplies to identify those with either 
high indicator or counts, or those in areas of high risk.  
o Yes 
o No 
o Not applicable 
 
 
Treatment of water supplies by ozonation, chlorination or ultra-
violet treatment. 
 
o Yes 
o No 
o Not 
applicable 
Stop run-off from adjacent manured fields using vegetative 
buffer strips to control contamination of ready-to-eat crops. 
 
o Yes 
o No 
o Not applicable 
 
Keep livestock and/or pets out of ready-to-eat crop areas, using 
fencing. 
 
o Yes 
o No 
o Not applicable 
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Fence-off streams from livestock. 
 
o Yes 
o No 
o Not applicable 
 
Vaccinate cattle to control pathogen colonization and faecal 
excretion of E. coli. 
 
o Yes 
o No 
o Not applicable 
 
Use probiotics to reduce E. coli shedding rates (e.g. E. Coli and 
lactobacillus strains). 
 
o Yes 
o No 
o Not applicable 
 
Prevent contact with neighbouring cows via double fencing. 
 
o Yes 
o No 
o Not applicable 
 
Not mixing groups of young stock once formed so as to prevent 
direct and indirect transmission of pathogens. 
 
o Yes 
o No 
o Not applicable 
 
Prevention of ground water contamination from farm run-off.   o Yes 
o No 
o Not applicable 
Use of an environmental farm plan. o Yes 
o No 
o Not applicable 
Other (Please type in) 
 
 
 
[IF “YES, I HAVE USED AN E.COLI VACCINE AND AM CURRENTLY STILL USING IT” 
SELECTED IN Q.16 – SKIP TO Q.26] 
25. We are interested in whether you would be more likely to use an E. coli vaccine if other 
cow calf producers were using the vaccine.  Please indicate on a scale of 0 to 100% what 
proportion of cow-calf producers would need to use an E.coli vaccine before you would 
consider using an E.coli vaccine. Or, if it would not make a difference to you what 
percentage of cow-calf producers would need to use an E.coli vaccine before you would 
consider using an E.coli vaccine, please select “It would not make a difference”. 
_____% 
Or, 
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o It would not make a difference 
Best-Worst Choice Tasks 
26. Please Read Carefully 
Imagine that you are considering using an E. coli vaccine.  Calves/cattle are asymptomatic 
carriers of the E. coli pathogen, meaning that the pathogen does not affect the health of the 
animal but could increase the risk of E. coli problems in the food supply chain or the 
environment.  We are interested in learning to what extent the following incentives would 
influence your decision to use an E. coli vaccine. 
In what follows you will see a series of 13 choice sets. For each of the following choice sets, 
tick (click) the ONE incentive that will MOST influence your decision whether to adopt the 
vaccine and the ONE that will LEAST influence this decision.  
Most Desirable 
(tick one) 
Of these incentives, which would be Most likely to 
influence and Least likely to influence your adoption of 
an E.coli vaccine... 
Least Desirable 
(tick one) 
o  Beef products from my calves/cattle can be traced 
back to my farm 
o  
o  Premiums for E. coli vaccinated cattle are available 
through various programs (e.g. branded beef 
program) within the supply chain. 
o  
o  Recommendation from my veterinarian to use the E. 
coli vaccine in my operations 
o  
o  Subsidy to compensate the costs of my adoption of 
the vaccine is available through a government funded 
vaccination program. 
o  
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For the 2nd choice set, please tick (click) the ONE incentive that will MOST influence your 
decision whether to adopt the vaccine and the ONE that will LEAST influence this decision. 
Most Desirable 
(tick one) 
Of these incentives, which would be Most likely to 
influence and Least likely to influence your adoption of 
an E.coli vaccine 
Least Desirable 
(tick one) 
o  Premiums for E. coli vaccinated cattle are available 
through various programs (e.g. branded beef 
program) within the supply chain. 
o  
o  Government recommending use of E. coli vaccine for 
cattle 
o  
o  My reputation as a cattle producer is at risk because 
of higher consumer expectations concerning food 
safety  
o  
o  My buyer requiring use of  an E. coli vaccine as part 
of production protocol as a condition for accepting 
my calves/cattle 
o  
 
For the 3rd choice set, please tick (click) the ONE incentive that will MOST influence your 
decision whether to adopt the vaccine and the ONE that will LEAST influence this decision. 
Most Desirable 
(tick one) 
Of these incentives, which would be Most likely to 
influence and Least likely to influence your adoption of 
an E.coli vaccine 
Least Desirable 
(tick one) 
o  Government recommending use of E. coli vaccine for 
cattle 
o  
o  Recommendation from my veterinarian to use the E. 
coli vaccine in my operation. 
o  
o  Feedlots providing an assurance that they will give 
my cattle a booster of the E. coli vaccine to maintain 
the immunity of my cattle. 
o  
o  Duration of immunity for my calves/cattle is greater 
than 6 months. 
o  
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For the 4th choice set, please tick (click) the ONE incentive that will MOST influence your 
decision whether to adopt the vaccine and the ONE that will LEAST influence this decision. 
Most Desirable 
(tick one) 
Of these incentives, which would be Most likely to 
influence and Least likely to influence your adoption of 
an E.coli vaccine 
Least Desirable 
(tick one) 
o  Recommendation from my veterinarian to use the E. 
coli vaccine in my operations 
o  
o  My reputation as a cattle producer is at risk because 
of higher consumer expectations concerning food 
safety. 
o  
o  I can include an E. coli vaccination in my existing 
vaccination routine. 
o  
o  Through vaccination, my farm is less exposed to the 
effects of E. coli outbreaks such as beef recalls and 
supply disruptions at packing plants. 
o  
 
For the 5th choice set, please tick (click) the ONE incentive that will MOST influence your 
decision whether to adopt the vaccine and the ONE that will LEAST influence this decision. 
Most Desirable 
(tick one) 
Of these incentives, which would be Most likely to 
influence and Least likely to influence your adoption of 
an E.coli vaccine 
Least Desirable 
(tick one) 
o  My reputation as a cattle producer is at risk because 
of higher consumer expectations concerning food 
safety. 
o  
o  Feedlots providing an assurance that they will give 
my cattle a booster of the E. coli vaccine to maintain 
the immunity of my cattle. 
o  
o  Attraction of a new set of buyers for my vaccinated 
cattle 
o  
o  Beef products from my calves/cattle can be traced 
back to my farm 
o  
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For the 6th choice set, please tick (click) the ONE incentive that will MOST influence your 
decision whether to adopt the vaccine and the ONE that will LEAST influence this decision. 
Most Desirable 
(tick one) 
Of these incentives, which would be Most likely to 
influence and Least likely to influence your adoption of 
an E.coli vaccine 
Least Desirable 
(tick one) 
o  Feedlots providing an assurance that they will give 
my cattle a booster of the E. coli vaccine to maintain 
the immunity of my cattle. 
o  
o  I can include an E. coli vaccination in my existing 
vaccination routine. 
o  
o  My neighbours (other cattle producers) are adopting 
the E. coli vaccine 
o  
o  Premiums for E. coli vaccinated cattle are available 
through various programs (e.g. branded beef 
program) within the supply chain. 
o  
 
For the 7th choice set, please tick (click) the ONE incentive that will MOST influence your 
decision whether to adopt the vaccine and the ONE that will LEAST influence this decision. 
 
Most Desirable 
(tick one) 
Of these incentives, which would be Most likely to 
influence and Least likely to influence your adoption of 
an E.coli vaccine 
Least Desirable 
(tick one) 
o  I can include an E. coli vaccination in my existing 
vaccination routine. 
o  
o  Attraction of a new set of buyers for my vaccinated 
cattle 
o  
o  Subsidy to compensate the costs of my adoption of 
the vaccine is available through a government funded 
vaccination program. 
o  
o  Government recommending use of E. coli vaccine for 
cattle 
o  
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For the 8th choice set, please tick (click) the ONE incentive that will MOST influence your 
decision whether to adopt the vaccine and the ONE that will LEAST influence this decision. 
 
Most Desirable 
(tick one) 
Of these incentives, which would be Most likely to 
influence and Least likely to influence your adoption of 
an E.coli vaccine 
Least Desirable 
(tick one) 
o  Attraction of a new set of buyers for my vaccinated 
cattle. 
o  
o  My neighbours (other cattle producers) are adopting 
the E. coli vaccine. 
o  
o  My buyer requiring use of vaccine as part of 
production protocol as a condition for accepting my 
calves/cattle. 
o  
o  Recommendation from my veterinarian to use the E. 
coli vaccine in my operations. 
o  
 
 
 
 
For the 9th choice set, please tick (click) the ONE incentive that will MOST influence your 
decision whether to adopt the vaccine and the ONE that will LEAST influence this decision. 
 
Most Desirable 
(tick one) 
Of these incentives, which would be Most likely to 
influence and Least likely to influence your adoption of 
an E.coli vaccine 
Least Desirable 
(tick one) 
o  My neighbours (other cattle producers) are adopting 
the E. coli vaccine 
o  
o  Subsidy to compensate the costs of my adoption of 
the vaccine is available through a government funded 
vaccination program. 
o  
o  Duration of immunity for my calves/cattle is greater 
than 6 months. 
o  
o  My reputation as a cattle producer is at risk because 
of higher consumer expectations concerning food 
safety. 
o  
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For the 10th choice set, please tick (click) the ONE incentive that will MOST influence your 
decision whether to adopt the vaccine and the ONE that will LEAST influence this decision. 
 
Most Desirable 
(tick one) 
Of these incentives, which would be Most likely to 
influence and Least likely to influence your adoption of 
an E.coli vaccine 
Least Desirable 
(tick one) 
o  Subsidy to compensate the costs of my adoption of 
the vaccine is available through a government funded 
vaccination program. 
o  
o  My buyer requiring use of E. coli vaccine as part of 
production protocol as a condition for accepting my 
calves/cattle. 
o  
o  Through vaccination, my farm is less exposed to the 
effects of E. coli outbreaks such as beef recalls and 
supply disruptions at packing plants. 
o  
o  Feedlots providing an assurance that they will give 
my cattle a booster of the E. coli vaccine to maintain 
the immunity of my cattle. 
o  
 
 
 
For the 11th choice set, please tick (click) the ONE incentive that will MOST influence your 
decision whether to adopt the vaccine and the ONE that will LEAST influence this decision. 
 
Most Desirable 
(tick one) 
Of these incentives, which would be Most likely to 
influence and Least likely to influence your adoption of 
an E.coli vaccine 
Least Desirable 
(tick one) 
o  My buyer requiring use of E. coli vaccine as part of 
production protocol as a condition for accepting my 
calves/cattle. 
o  
o  Duration of immunity for my calves/cattle is greater 
than 6 months. 
o  
o  Beef products from my calves/cattle can be traced 
back to my farm 
o  
o  I can include an E. coli vaccination in my existing 
vaccination routine. 
o  
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For the 12th choice set, please tick (click) the ONE incentive that will MOST influence your 
decision whether to adopt the vaccine and the ONE that will LEAST influence this decision. 
Most Desirable 
(tick one) 
Of these incentives, which would be Most likely to 
influence and Least likely to influence your adoption of 
an E.coli vaccine 
Least Desirable 
(tick one) 
o  Duration of immunity for my calves/cattle is greater 
than 6 months. 
o  
o  Through vaccination, my farm is less exposed to the 
effects of E. coli outbreaks such as beef recalls and 
supply disruptions at packing plants 
o  
o  Premiums for E. coli vaccinated cattle are available 
through various programs (e.g. branded beef) within 
the supply chain. 
o  
o  Attraction of a new set of buyers for my vaccinated 
cattle. 
o  
 
 
For the 13th and last choice set, please tick (click) the ONE incentive that will MOST 
influence your decision whether to adopt the vaccine and the ONE that will LEAST influence 
this decision. 
Most Desirable 
(tick one) 
Of these incentives, which would be Most likely to 
influence and Least likely to influence your adoption of 
an E.coli vaccine 
Least Desirable 
(tick one) 
o  Through vaccination, my farm is less exposed to the 
effects of E. coli outbreaks such as beef recalls and 
supply disruptions at packing plants 
o  
o  Beef products from my calves/cattle can be traced 
back to my farm 
o  
o  Government recommending use of E. coli vaccine for 
cattle 
o  
o  My neighbours (other cattle producers) are adopting 
the E. coli vaccine. 
o  
 
27. Would you consider adopting an E. coli vaccine if presented with the right incentives 
such as some of those appearing above? 
o Yes 
o No  
o Don’t know/Unsure 
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28. Please indicate whether the following issues deter you from adopting an E. coli vaccine. 
  
 
Lots of changes to my vaccination protocols would be 
needed before E. coli vaccines can be made part of my 
production process. 
Challenges associated with adoption of an E.coli vaccine 
are not easily overcome such as not enough of my 
neighbours (other cattle producers) adopting the vaccine 
to mitigate E. coli 
Greater priority is given to other issues other than 
enhancing my food safety controls in my cattle operation. 
 
 
o Yes 
o No 
 
 
o Yes 
o No 
 
 
o Yes 
o No 
 
 
I am uncertain whether the adoption of the E. coli vaccine 
would meet the need of the buyer(s) of my cattle 
Food safety issues are not sufficiently important to 
warrant the investment in the E. coli vaccine 
I am uncertain about whether adoption of the E. coli 
vaccine will improve food safety 
E. coli vaccine goes against all of the ways in which my 
farm has traditionally done things 
 
 
 
o Yes 
o No 
 
o Yes 
o No 
 
o Yes 
o No 
 
o Yes 
o No 
 
 
 
The additional cost is not warranted 
 
There is too much uncertainty about the pay-off/premiums 
as a result of adoption of an E.coli vaccine 
 
 
o Yes 
o No 
 
o Yes 
o No 
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29. Please indicate your agreement with the following statements using the scale where (1 = 
completely disagree, 2 = somewhat disagree, 3 = Neutral, 4 = somewhat agree, 5 = 
completely agree) by clicking on appropriate response. 
 
Completely 
Disagree 
1 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
2 
Neutral 
3 
Somewhat 
Agree 
4 
Completely 
Agree 
5 
 
a. I feel in control of potential E. coli contamination due to my existing management 
practices/interventions. 
 
b. Whether or not I’m successful in mitigating/controlling E. coli depends mostly on 
my own ability. 
 
c. To a great extent E. coli incidences on my cow-calf operation are determined by 
factors beyond my control  
 
d. To a great extent E. coli incidences on my cow-calf operation are determined by 
the management practices I have in place. 
 
e. My success as a cow-calf operator depends mostly on luck. 
 
f. It is not advisable for me to plan too far ahead by enhancing my current 
management practices because E. coli incidences are such that they cannot be 
fully prevented. 
 
The following questions are designed to tell us a little about you and your cow-calf operation.  
This information will be aggregated and used to report comparisons among groups of 
respondents. Your identity will not be linked to your responses in any way.  
30. Gender:  
o Male 
o Female 
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31. In what year you were born? 
Decline to respond 
32. In which province or territory is your cow-calf operation located? 
o BC 
o AB 
o SK 
o MB 
33. Please provide the first three letters of your postal code… 
34. What best describes your highest level of education? (Please select one that applies) 
o Primary/Elementary 
o Secondary/High School 
o Trade School/College 
o University 
35. How many years have you been a principal decision maker in your cow-calf operation? 
o Less than 4 years 
o 5-20 years 
o 21-35 years 
o 35 years and over 
36. How long do you plan on continuing being a cow-calf producer? 
o Less than 1 year 
o 1 – 5 years 
o 6 – 10 years 
o 10 – 25 years 
o More than 25 years 
37. What percentage of your total 2013 gross farm sales/revenues is derived from your cow-
calf operations? 
 
38. How important is your cow-calf operation to your livelihood? 
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o Not at all important 
o Fairly important 
o Very important 
o Essential 
 
39. That completes our survey.  Do you have any further comments? 
 
Thank you very much for your time and participation in our survey.  Your input is greatly 
appreciated.  
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Appendix 2: Ordered Probit Models 
 
Following Verbeek (2004), the equations (A2.16) below show the probabilities of the 3 available 
choices being selected. 
Prob (y = 0 ׀ x) = P (у* ≤ α1 ׀ x) 
= P (xβ + ε ≤ α1 ׀ x) 
= P (ε ≤ α1 – xβ ׀ x) 
= Ф (α1 – xβ) 
                                                    Prob (y = 1 ׀ x) = P (α1 < у* ≤ α2 ׀ x) 
= P (α1 < xβ + ε ≤ α2 - xβ) 
= P (α1 – xβ < ε ≤ α2 – xβ) 
   = Ф (α1 – xβ) – Ф (α2 – xβ) 
 
Prob (y = 3 ׀ x) = P (α2 > у* ׀ x) 
= P (α2 > xβ + ε ׀ x) 
                               = 1- Ф (α2 – xβ)                        (A2.16) 
 
As noted earlier, the alphas represent cut-off points or thresholds levels.  The assumption is that 
an individual is willing to adopt an E. coli vaccine if the utility difference exceeds a certain 
threshold level. Consequently we observe yi = 2 (willingness to adopt: yes) if and only if yi* > 0 
and yi = 0 (No) otherwise.  
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Thus substituting the appropriate form for Ф (.) gives an expression that can be maximized with 
respect to β using the method of maximum likelihood. 
The likelihood function becomes: 
(14) Ln L = Σ Iyi=0 lnФ (α1 – xβ) + Iyi=1 ln [Ф (α1 – xβ) – Ф (α2 – xβ)] +Iyi=2 ln [1- (Ф (α2 – 
xβ)] 
                                                                                                                                               (A2.17) 
 
Where Ik is an indicator function for willingness to adopt; Ф (.) is defined to be the cumulative 
distribution and ln being the natural logs. 
A2.1: Ordered Probit Model with all estimated variables included 
Variable Coefficient Std. Err. P value 
Gender 0.388 0.280 0.166 
Age 0.011 0.017 0.523 
Level of education 0.388* 0.219 0.076 
Awareness of technology 0.660*** 0.221 0.003 
Primary Responsibility of E. coli reduction – Feedlots -0.748* 0.419 0.074 
Primary Responsibility of E. coli reduction – Processor/Packer -0.272 0.351 0.439 
Primary Responsibility of E. coli reduction – Consumers -1.084** 0.485 0.026 
Primary Responsibility of E. coli reduction – Regulators -1.175** 0.546 0.031 
Retain ownership of cattle -0.052 0.222 0.815 
Size of operation 0.000 0.000 0.809 
Importance of operations to Livelihood 0.443 0.275 0.107 
Experience as principal decision maker -0.014 0.016 0.377 
Alberta -0.239 0.254 0.347 
Manitoba -0.143 0.310 0.644 
Benefits 0.177 0.289 0.541 
Continuity as a cow-calf producer 0.004 0.018 0.841 
Sales/Revenue derived from operations 0.001 0.004 0.837 
Internal Locus of control -0.019 0.143 0.893 
External Locus of control -0.369** 0.156 0.018 
Beef products can be traced to my farm 0.840*** 0.259 0.001 
Premiums available through branded programs 0.745*** 0.249 0.003 
Recommendation from my veterinarian 0.707*** 0.247 0.004 
Subsidy to compensate cost of adoption available 0.681*** 0.241 0.005 
Government recommending use of vaccine 0.651** 0.245 0.008 
My reputation as producer is at risk 0.724*** 0.238 0.002 
My buyer requiring use of vaccine 0.748*** 0.251 0.003 
Feedlots providing assurance for a booster 0.761*** 0.251 0.002 
Duration of immunity greater than 6 months 0.717*** 0.249 0.004 
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Through Vaccination I can reduce supply disruptions 0.798*** 0.255 0.002 
My neighbours adopting vaccine 0.689*** 0.243 0.005 
Attraction of a new set of buyers 0.556*** 0.235 0.005 
I can include vaccine in an existing vaccination routine 0.671** 0.253 0.008 
N 203   
Pseudo R-sq. 0.194   
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
The performance of the Ordered Probit model in relation to the Binary Probit model was 
relatively comparable as noted earlier.  However, changes in the level of significance highlighted 
the major differences with level of education and perception of responsibility, particularly 
pertaining to processors/packers.  A noticeable change was the weak significance of the 
importance of operations to a producer’s livelihood.  
 
A2.2: Ordered Probit Model with Significant Variables 
Variable Coefficient Std. Err. P value 
Level of education 0.380* 0.207 0.067 
Awareness of technology 0.664*** 0.212 0.002 
Primary Responsibility of E. coli reduction - Feedlots -0.638 0.404 0.114 
Primary Responsibility of E. coli reduction – Processor/Packer -0.292 0.339 0.388 
Primary Responsibility of E. coli reduction – Consumers -0.948** 0.462 0.040 
Primary Responsibility of E. coli reduction - Regulators -1.083** 0.527 0.040 
External Locus of control -0.385*** 0.140 0.006 
Beef products can be traced to my farm 0.694**** 0.240 0.004 
Premiums available through branded programs 0.611**** 0.231 0.008 
Recommendation from my veterinarian 0.589** 0.230 0.010 
Subsidy to compensate cost of adoption available 0.544** 0.222 0.014 
Government recommending use of vaccine 0.542** 0.229 0.018 
My reputation as producer is at risk 0.621*** 0.224 0.006 
My buyer requiring use of vaccine 0.600** 0.232 0.010 
Feedlots providing assurance for a booster 0.663*** 0.236 0.005 
Duration of immunity greater than 6 months 0.620*** 0.233 0.008 
Through Vaccination I can reduce supply disruptions 0.700*** 0.238 0.003 
My neighbours adopting vaccine 0.564** 0.225 0.012 
Attraction of a new set of buyers 0.462** 0.220 0.036 
I can include vaccine in an existing vaccination routine 0.566** 0.238 0.017 
N 203   
Pseudo R-sq. 0.169   
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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A2.3: Ordered Probit Model Marginal Effects for Producers' Willingness to Adopt 
Marginal effects after OProbit 
      y = Pr (wtao == 3) (predict, outcome (3)) 
         = .75469531 
Variable Dy/Dx Std. Err. P value 
Level of education  0.123 0.068 0.071 
Awareness of technology  0.214 0.068 0.002 
Primary Responsibility of E. coli reduction - Feedlots -0.225 0.152 0.137 
Primary Responsibility of E. coli reduction – Processor/Packer -0.091 0.103 0.378 
Primary Responsibility of E. coli reduction – Consumers -0.351 0.177 0.047 
Primary Responsibility of E. coli reduction - Regulators -0.404 0.195 0.039 
External Locus of control -0.121 0.044 0.006 
Beef products can be traced to my farm 0.218 0.074 0.003 
Premiums available through branded programs 0.192 0.072 0.007 
Recommendation from my veterinarian 0.185 0.071 0.009 
Subsidy to compensate cost of adoption available 0.171 0.069 0.013 
Government recommending use of vaccine 0.170 0.071 0.017 
My reputation as producer is at risk 0.195 0.069 0.005 
My buyer requiring use of vaccine 0.188 0.072 0.009 
Feedlots providing assurance for a booster 0.208 0.073 0.004 
Duration of immunity greater than 6 months 0.195 0.072 0.007 
Through Vaccination I can reduce supply disruptions 0.220 0.074 0.003 
My neighbours adopting vaccine 0.177 0.070 0.011 
Attraction of a new set of buyers 0.145 0.068 0.034 
I can include vaccine in an existing vaccination routine 0.178 0.074 0.016 
 
Table A2.4 and A2.5 show that the marginal effects of all the incentives bear negative signs, 
indicating an inverse relationship exists between these incentives and the ‘no’ and ‘unsure/don’t 
know’ producer responses.  An increase in the incentives for adoption would still lead to a 
decrease in these categories.  The Ordered Probit model therefore allows for additional 
information representative of the sub-groups of adopters to be examined as can be seen in the 
separate marginal effects results. 
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A2.4: Ordered Probit Model Marginal Effects for adopters that don't know or are unsure about 
adoption decision 
Marginal effects after OProbit 
      y = Pr (wtao==Don’t Know/Unsure) (predict, outcome (2)) 
         = .22813041 
Variable Dy/Dx Std. Err. P value 
Level of education
 
 -0.105 0.058 0.070 
Awareness of technology
 
 -0.181 0.059 0.002 
Primary Responsibility of E. coli reduction - Feedlots 0.181 0.112 0.106 
Primary Responsibility of E. coli reduction – Processor/Packer 0.078 0.089 0.378 
Primary Responsibility of E. coli reduction – Consumers 0.258 0.103 0.013 
Primary Responsibility of E. coli reduction - Regulators 0.281 0.095 0.003 
External Locus of control  0.105 0.039 0.008 
Beef products can be traced to my farm -0.189 0.067 0.005 
Premiums available through branded programs -0.166 0.064 0.010 
Recommendation from my veterinarian -0.160 0.064 0.012 
Subsidy to compensate cost of adoption available -0.148 0.062 0.017 
Government recommending use of vaccine -0.147 0.064 0.020 
My reputation as producer is at risk -0.169 0.063 0.007 
My buyer requiring use of vaccine -0.163 0.064 0.011 
Feedlots providing assurance for a booster -0.180 0.066 0.006 
Duration of immunity greater than 6 months -0.169 0.065 0.009 
Through Vaccination I can reduce supply disruptions -0.190 0.067 0.004 
My neighbours adopting vaccine -0.153 0.062 0.014 
Attraction of a new set of buyers -0.126 0.060 0.038 
I can include vaccine in an existing vaccination routine -0.154 0.066 0.020 
 
A2.5: Ordered Probit Model for unwilling Adopters 
Marginal effects after OProbit 
      y = Pr (wtao== No) (predict, outcome (1)) 
         = .01717428 
Variable Dy/Dx Std. Err. P value 
Level of education  -0.018 0.013 0.153 
Awareness of technology  -0.033 0.016 0.040 
Primary Responsibility of E. coli reduction - Feedlots 0.044 0.043 0.308 
Primary Responsibility of E. coli reduction – Processor/Packer 0.012 0.015 0.406 
Primary Responsibility of E. coli reduction – Consumers 0.093 0.082 0.256 
Primary Responsibility of E. coli reduction - Regulators 0.123 0.112 0.273 
External Locus of control  0.016 0.008 0.044 
Beef products can be traced to my farm -0.029 0.014 0.037 
Premiums available through branded programs -0.026 0.013 0.047 
Recommendation from my veterinarian -0.025 0.013 0.051 
Subsidy to compensate cost of adoption available -0.023 0.012 0.057 
Government recommending use of vaccine -0.023 0.012 0.062 
My reputation as producer is at risk -0.026 0.013 0.040 
My buyer requiring use of vaccine -0.025 0.013 0.050 
Feedlots providing assurance for a booster -0.028 0.014 0.040 
Duration of immunity greater than 6 months -0.026 0.013 0.046 
Through Vaccination I can reduce supply disruptions -0.030 0.014 0.036 
My neighbours adopting vaccine -0.024 0.012 0.054 
Attraction of a new set of buyers -0.020 0.011 0.084 
I can include vaccine in an existing vaccination routine -0.024 0.013 0.061 
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Appendix 3: Distribution of size of operation among survey respondents (herd size) 
 
 
 
Figure A3. 1: Distribution of size of operation (herd size) 
 
